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COPYRIGHT AS A MODEL FOR FREE 
SPEECH LAW: WHAT COPYRIGHT HAS IN 
COMMON WITH ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY 
LAWS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, AND 
TIDECO~CATIONSREGULATION 
REBECCA TuSHNET* 
Abstract: Copyright raises real and troubling free speech issues, and 
standard responses to those concerns are inadequate. TIlls Article aims 
to put copyright ill the context of other free speech doctIine. 
Acknowledging the link between copyright and free speech can help 
determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both allows 
and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of speedl 
toward change. 
INTRODUCTION 
vVhat is "protected expression"? Suppose you write an article 
criticizing a public official. If the government cannot prosecllte you 
for the article or award damages in a libel case brought by the official, 
your speech is protected. On the other hand, if the government can 
give you an i~unction or award damages against someone who copies 
the article, your speech is protected. So your speech can be protected 
against the government, or by the government. These two common 
meanings of protected expression are each found in different areas of 
the law. Speech protected against the government is First Amendment 
speech, and speech protected by the government is intellectual prop-
erty. The First Amendment declares that speech is free, while copy-
right means that people may be made to pay for speech. So, which is 
it? 
* Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton. lowe Mark Tushnct a great dcbt for his commcnts 
and his self-restraint, and Jack Balkin for his assistance at cvcry stagc. L.'\\TCncC Lessig. 
Richard Primus, Kim Roosevclt, Zachary Schrag. and Tim Wu pro\idcd man}' hclpful 
comments. As I have doubts about the concept of independent allthorship. responsibilitr 
for any remaining errors is no more mine than responsibility for any insights. C'.omlllcnts 
are welcome at rebecca@tushnet.com. 
1 
HeinOnline -- 42 B.C. L. Rev. 2 2000-2001
2 Bostoll College Law Review [Vol. 42:1 
The conventional answer is both. l The First Amendment gets 
government off speakers' backs, while the Copyright Act enables 
speakers to make money from speaking and thus encourages them to 
enter the private marketplace of ideas. But this apparently simple re-
lationship hides some profound tensions. When one speaker wishes to 
use another's words, or even words that, taken as a whole, are "sub-
stantially similar" to someone else's words, the government may tell 
her that she cannot. If she has printed books with those words in 
them, her books may be seized and destroyed by U.S. marshals, 01' she 
may be enjoined from trying to sell them. When such situations arise, 
why does free speech apparently give way?2 
This Article aims to put copyright in a context of other free 
speech doctrine. Part I considers how copyright raises real and trou-
bling free speech issues and why the standard responses to those con-
cerns are inadequate.s The conventional responses do not defend 
copyright law because it promotes speech, but rather analyle copyright 
as if it furthers a generalized legitimate government goal, one like 
physical safety. From that perspective, the government is required to 
pursue its legitimate interest without using means that impermissibly 
trench upon free speech. The main aspects of copyright that prevent 
it from impermissibly restricting free speech, in this view, are the 
ideal expression dichotomy and the principle of fair use. This Part 
argues that neither principle adequately addresses the free speech 
concerns generally thought relevant in other areas of free speech law. 
Part I also sets forth potentially less restrictive alt(!rnatives to copyright 
as we know it and rejects the argument that the First Amendment is 
simply a property regime like copyright. Thus, Part I provides a cri-
I See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Cmiae Association of American Publishers, Inc., Harpel' & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("[I]f the First 
Amendment is the moral force of publishing, copyright is its commercial fouudation •••• 
[C]opyright and the First Amendment are essentially complementary."); Hal'vcy S. 
Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelandel; Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United Stales: Pholocopying. 
Copylight, and theJudicial Process, 1975 SuP, CT. REv. 355,404 ("While the First Amcudmcnt 
facilitates the flow of information by preventing government intervention, the copyl'ight 
system encourages the development of information and its disseminlltion by providing 
incentives for publication. The conflict, if lIny, is in method not purpose,"); Michael D. 
Blitten, Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 Will. & MARY L. REv. 85,92 (1978) ("[C]opydght 
seeks by actively encouraging what the first amendment seeks by strictly discourOlging."). 
2 Brief of Gannett Co. et at., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. NlItion Enters., 471 V.S. 
539 (1985) (No. 83-1632) ("Read literally, the First Amendment would invalidate Ihe 
Copyright Act"); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright ami the First A11Iem111l1'll/, 70 COLOM. L. 
REv. 983, 989 (1970); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amend11lent Perspective 011 Ihe /t/ea/E;-:pressioll Di· 
chotolllY a1ld Copylight in a n'clrks "Total Concept a1ldFee/, "38 EMORY LJ. 393, 393-9'. (1989). 
3 See i1lfra notes 8-126 and accompanying text. 
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tique of copyright from the perspective of stmidard First Amendment 
theory, but its aim is not to demonstrate that copyright is or might be 
unconstitutional. Rather, my goal is to make possible a redlinking of 
stmtdard First Amendment theory in light of copyright's constitution-
ality. 
Part II sets fordl dIe free speech justification for copyright." 
Copydght is "the engine of free expression,"5 prO\iding people \\idl 
property incentives to speak and disseminate speech. The argument 
that copyright encourages speech may allow copyright to sweep fur-
ther dIan purely speech-suppressing regulations. But copyright is not 
unique. Part II shows dlat dIe free speech issues raised by copyright 
are related to controversial claims about fi .. ee speech laws in odlcr 
contexts, such as hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance, 
which makes the lack of controversy over copyright law even more of 
a puzzle. These other arguments, concerning how plimte parties' 
speech may suppress others' speech, have not been integrated into 
prevailing free speech doctrine in dIe same way as dIe analytically 
similar argument about copyright. Properly understood, cop}'light 
can become the engine of free expression in a second sense: Not only 
does it enable free speech, but copYlight can drive free speech dleory 
in unexpected but important directions. 
IT we believe standard First Amendment dleory, dlen we should 
believe that copyright is unconstitutional because it is designed to 
suppress some speech to generate other speech, a result dIe Supreme 
Court condemned in the campaign finance context. But dmt would 
be silly; copyright is constitutional, in large part because it does en-
courage speech by dIe people it protects. The problem is widl dIe 
stmtdard theory: Government is already invoh'ed in shaping available 
speech, and dlat's a good dling. Ow' objections to particular govern-
ment regulations-and there are valid ones-must be to dleir bias or 
ineffectiveness, not to the mere fact of government action. 
4 See infra notes 127-214 and accompan}ing text. This Article \\1l1l1ot take up the de-
bate o\,er how well copyright writ large scr\'es to generate more speech. That dcb:lle has 
been e.'>:tensh·eiy addressed elsewhere. &e, e.g., Stephen Breyer, 77,e crllmsy Case lor CAPJ-
riglzt: A Stud), oj CoPJ'right ill BoollS, Photocopies, alld CAmputer Programs, 84 lIAR\'. L. RE,·. 281 
(1970); Robert M. Hurt & Robert N .. Schuchman, The &onomic Rationale 0/ CAPJriglll, 56 
kl. EcoN. RE\,. PAPERS & PROC. 421 (1966); William M. Lmulcs & Richard A. Posner, .tll1 
EC01W11Iic AlIaf)'sis ojCAPJ'n'"gllt Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). Instead, I will assullle that. 
in general, people \\111 do more of what they can get paid for. That this ilia}, not be tme at 
the margin or in certain special cases \\111 affect the boundat1cs of an ideal coppight re-
gime, not the overall justification for the e.'>:istence of copp1ght. 
5 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
HeinOnline -- 42 B.C. L. Rev. 4 2000-2001
4 Boston College Law Rwiew [Vol. '12:1 
The Supreme Court recognized the government's fundamental 
involvement with creating the conditions for speech in the recent 
Turner Broadcasting cases, which upheld a law requiring cable opel'n-
tors to carry local broadcast signals on some of their channels.6 The 
Turner cases offer a new way to evaluate government speech restric-
tions that are designed to promote certain kinds of speech. By requir-
ing substantial evidence in support of a legislative conclusion that 
regulation will better promote speech than inaction, the Court is at-
tempting to balance issues of institutional competence with fem's that 
speech will be suppressed. The Turner analysis is different from most 
First Amendment tests because it explicitly concerns itself with the 
possibility that some speech will disappear if the state regulates, while 
other speech will disappear in the absence of regulation. 
Consistent with Turnel; free speech doctrine should acknowledge 
that the principles supporting copyright are applicable to other areas 
of the law. Otherwise, copyright will remain a fn!e speech anomaly, an 
area of the law with a fully articulated speech-based justification that 
nonetheless contradicts the rest of accepted doctrine. We should not 
rest content with a copyright founded on special pleading. 
Part III briefly applies the theory elaborated in the earlier parts 
to a few aspects of copyright.7 Essentially, we should recognize that 
copyright's limits are as important as the rights it grants to property 
owners in keeping "tlle engine of free expression" running properly. 
Acknowledging tlle link between copyright and free speech can help 
us determine the proper contours of a copyright regime that both 
allows and limits property rights in expression, skewing the content of 
speech toward change. 
1. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT AGAINST COPYRIGHT 
. Copyright gives the government authodty to seize books and en-
join their sale, award damages against booksellers, or even send them 
to jail. Following preliminary ex parte proceedings requiring only a 
modest showing, federal marshals may seize works accused of in-
fdngement and the machines used to reproduce those works.s The 
6 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hercinaftel' TIII'llt'/' Jl1; 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter 7ilrllt'/' IJ. 
7 See infra notes 215-249 and accompanying text, 
8See 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1994) ("At any time while an action under this title is pending. 
the court may order the impounding, on snch terms as it may deem reasonable, of nil top .. 
ies or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright 
HeinOnline -- 42 B.C. L. Rev. 5 2000-2001
December 2000] Cop)'rigizl as a Model Jor Fm Speedt Law 5 
proceedings may be sealed so that the defendants will not get word of 
what is being alleged before the marshals burst in.9 If a jury finds that 
the accused works are infringing by a preponderance of the evidence, 
they may be destroyed.!o These steps in the process of suppressing 
copyright infringement are considered so routine and uninteresting 
that opinions justifying them are rarely even published.ll If the 
justification were anything other than copyright, these sweeping pow-
ers would be seen as a gaping hole at the heart of free speech lights. 
In standard First Amendment scholarship, claims that speech be-
longs to no one and that willing listeners have a right to hem" ml)'thillg 
they would like to hear are common.12 The Supreme Court has held 
that potential audiences are generally not required to incur cxtt<t 
costs to get speech that someone '">'ants to supply them.!' This holding 
mmer's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negativcs, or 
other articles by means of whicll such copies or phonorecords ma}, be reproduced.1. 
9See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. Y. jasso, 927 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. III. 1996); 
Century Home EntIn't. Inc. v. Laser Beat, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.N.V. 199·.). 
lOSee 17 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (1994). 
llSee, e.g.;U2 Home EntIn't. Inc. Y. Sang Kim, No. 98-CV-4159, 1998 U.s. Dist. LE.XIS 
17683 (E.D. Pa. No\,. 4,1998); Basquiat \'. Baghoomian, No. 9O-CIV-3853 (LjF), 1992 U.s. 
Dist. LEXIS 7622 (S.D.N.V. May 22, 1992) (conceming books made by collecting a success-
ful artist's images); D.C. Comics, Inc. Y. john Doc" Nos. 1-25, No. 89-1669, 1989 U.s. Dist. 
LEXIS 7398 (D.D.C.june 26, 1989) (granting blanket permission to search for and seize 
allegedly infringing materials from street vendors in the DisUict of Columbia); WorMs of 
Wonder, Inc. y. Vector Intercontinent.l.l, Inc., No. C86-2671, 1986 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 15879 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 1986); if. Richard Harrington, DlmL.il/g a New CmlL'<i: Comirs for lite 
Rock-alld-Roll Genl!Talion, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at Gl (discussing comic books about 
the rock groups Bon jo\'i and MotIey Crue tIlat were destroyed as part of a settlement in an 
infiingement suit). 
12 See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, Equalil)' al/d Fm! Speech: The Cos~ ,\gail/sl Subslal/lh~ Equal. 
il)~ 82 IOWA L. REv. 645, 673 (1997) (quoting CLAUDE LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POUTICAL 
THEORY 33 (Da\id Macey trans., 1988». 
13 The Court stated that: 
'\Te are aware of no general principle tImt freedom of speech may be abridged 
when the speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means, 
such as seeking him out and asking him what it is. Nor have we recognized 
any such limitation on the independent right of tIlC listener to rcceh'e the in· 
formation sought to be communicated. 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy y. Vrrginia Citizens Consumcr Council, 425 U.s. 748, 757 
n.15 (1976); see also Globe Newspaper Co. Y. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 50·. (1982) 
(right to information on public e\'ents such as trials); Linmark Assoc. \'. Tm\1lship of Will· 
ingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (right to receh'e commercial speech); \bung y. American 
:Mini Theatre, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) ("rhe central First Amendmcnt concern remains the 
need to maintain free access to tIle public to tIlC c.xpressiOll.1; Kleindienst \~ Mandel. 408 
U.S. 753, 760 (1972) (discussing tIle right to "receh'c information and ideas1; Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[T]hc people as a wholc retain ••• thcir 
collecth'e right to have tIle medium function consistentIy \\itIl the ends ami purposes of 
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should make copying a First Amendment activity, as a copier may of-
fer an alternative source of information that the audience wants and 
can obtain more easily than by negotiating with the copyright ownet~1<1 
Yet courts easily reject First Amendmen t claims in copyright 
cases.I5 Free speech belongs to no one, but copyrighted speech be-
longs to someone. Robert Denicola and Melville Nimmer have under-
taken extensive defenses of copyright against First Amendment chal-
lenges; their work laid the foundations for any subsequent inquil'y.t6 
They both recognize minor First Amendment limits on copyright in 
highly important news material, but in general they find that copy-
right itself provides the necessary limits to address any concerns about 
public access or free speech rights. Two internal limits have been 
critical to their thinking, and to all who followed: the ideal expression 
dichotomy and fair useP 
the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters, which is paramount."); Griswold v. COllnecticut, 381 U.S. 479, ·182 (1965) 
(free speech includes the light to speak, the right to distribute, and the right to rcccive 
speech). 
14 SeeL. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, a/l(l Fair Use, 40 V,\ND. L. REV. 1,3 (1987); 
Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitlltional Dimensions of Fair Use in Copyright Lalt', 50 No'l'IU': 
DAME L. REV. 790, 796-98 (1975); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright ami the First ,hllt'llIll/wllt: J1 
GatheringStorm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43,66 (1971). 
15 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Ch~ 1978) 
("[D]efendant's [First Amendment] claim can be dismisscd without a lcngthy discus-
SiOlI."); Sclmapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp.426, 428 (D.D.C. 197D), aff'd, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp.415, 422 (S.D.N.V. 
1971). Most commentators react similarly. See, e.g., NIl Copylight Ptolectioll Act of J995:Joinl 
Heming on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the Sllbcolllm. 0/1 COllrls allli Intellectl/al PJ'operly of IIII! 
HOllse Jlldiciary COIllIll. and the Senate jlldiciary COIllIll., 104th Congo (1995) (tcstimony of 
Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of Patents) ("The First Amendment has always provided a 
completely different standard with regard to liability for actions that constitute spccdl as 
compared to actions that constitute copylight infringement. They're rcally just applcs lind 
oranges .... [I] t docs a disservice to both areas of law .•. to analogize frolll onc to the 
other."). Although Professor Nimmer's important treatise on freedom of speech addrcsscs 
copyright, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2-55 to 2-8,1 (stu-
dent cd. 1984) [hereinafter NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH], the best-sclling constitutionlll 
law casebook in the country devotes over 400 of its 1600-odd pages to frecdom of cxprcs-
sion, with only one sentence and three citations about copyriHht. See GEon'REv R. STONE 
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL L\w 1289 (2d ed. 1991). 
16 See Robert Denicola, Copylight ami Free Speech: Collstitlltiollal Limitatiolls 011 the P/'oll'(" 
tioll oj Expressioll, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283, 289-99 (1979); MclviIl(' B. Nimmcr. DOL'S Copydght 
Ablidge the First A1I/el/dmellt Guarantees of Free Speech and Press 7, 17 UCLA L. lU:v. 1180, 1190 
(1970) [hereinafter Nimmer, Copyright]. 
17 While both Denicola and Nimmer were aware of copyriHht's specch-gencmtillg fca-
tures, they only used those features to prop up the defense of ide<l/ expression IIIld f<lh' usc 
as central speech-protecth'e limits. Others examining the problem have similady fOCUSl·d 
011 idea/expression and fair use. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Sel'v. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791. 
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This Part addresses the claim that copyright's internal 
configuration is sufficient to avoid a First Amendment challenge. 
"While Part II takes up the First Amendment-based argument for copy-
right, here I argue that non-speech arguments are insufficient 011 
their own to defend copyright against free speech cIiticisms. In Sec-
tion I..A., I show that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
defense do not eliminate free speech problems; if anything, they 
make copyright seem even less supportable, a confusing body of law 
likely to deter speakers from speech that might potentially be thought 
to infringe. Section LB. suggests some less restrictive alternatives to 
copyright as we know it. The existence of such alternatives makes 
copyright seem like an excessive, and thus unconstitutional, response 
to the problem it was designed to solve. Finally, Section I.C. explains 
that recent property-based visions of the First Amendment cannot 
solve the problem by folding free speech law into a Valiant of an intel-
lectual property regime. 
A Standard Responses to First Ame1ldment Claims Against Cop:)'1iglzt 
1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
The idea/expression dichotomy, now embodied in § l02(b) of 
the Copyright Act, holds that only expression cml be copyIighted, and 
not the idea, process, or other more general principle that underlies 
the particular expression.18 Because anyone who wishes cml use the 
ideas found in any copyrighted work, there is, it is said, no free speech 
795-96 (9th Crr .. 1992); Floyd Abrams, FirstJlmclldlllent alld Copyright: 17,eSn.orlltrrt,t" DOllald 
c.. Brace Mcmoriol Lecture, 35].. COPYRIGHT Soc. I, 3-l (1987); Celia Goltl\\'ag. Copyrighl 
Infringement and tJ,cFirst Ame1ldmcllt, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SniP. (ASCAP) 1,4 (1983); \\'emlr 
J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of CofJ)'rigllt: The ChallCllgrs of Col/sistNlCj, Col/SNlI, ami 
Encouragemellt TIzcory~ 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1383 n.189 (1989) [hercinaflel· Gordon, ... 111 
Inquiry! into tJzc Merits]; Da\id E. Shipley, Collflitts Bl!tnwlI CofJ)"ight al/(I the First ... lll/ClIdmCllI 
After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. RE\', 983, 998, 10·t2, 
OtIlerways in which tIle copyright law accommodates free speech concern arc occasionally 
mentioned, but tIley generally take a back scat to these two plimary limits. ~, e.g., Brief of 
Gannett Co., Inc., snpra note 2 (tIle exclusion of cop}nght fOI· facts, the exclusion for 
works of tIle U.S. government, and tIle originality requirement); Stephen Fraser, 17,e 
Conflid Between the First Ame1ldmellt alld Copyright Law alld lIs Impad Oil Ihe II/ttrl/d, 16 CAR· 
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (1998) (facts); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1020-22 (original. 
ity); Goldwag, snpra, at 4-5 (limited duration of cop}nght and originality); Nimmer, Copy-
right, supra note 16, at 1193-96 (limited term). 
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In 110 case does cop}nght protection for an original 
work of autIlOrship e.xtend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of tIle form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in sucll work. "). 
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problem, as the copyright has not taken from the public domain any~ 
thing of First Amendment value.19 
a. The First Amendment Value of Expression 
We tend to think of copiers, unlike other speakers, as pirates 01' 
lazy people whose speech does not further frc::e speech values. OUI' 
image of a copier is not of an actor who recites a playwright's lines 01' 
a local 'politico reciting the party platform, though these people copy 
too. But, we assume that those people have the right to copy 01' need 
no permission to do so, and so we don't examine their merit. We only 
look at the value of unauthorized copies. While visceral reaction to 
pirates is natural, it does not sufficiently distinguish a copier-particu-
larly one who is not copying wholesale and for profit-from other dis-
reputable, but protected, speakers. In general, the First Amendment 
protects even speech which is not original to the speaker;20 and the 
Supreme Court has stated that it protects individuals' right "not only 
to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the 
most effective means to advocate their cause."21 "[A]s we know from 
the example of publishing houses, movie theaters, bookstores and 
Reader's Digest, communication occurs in selecting which speech to 
copy and distribute no less than in creating the speech in the first 
place. "22 
Speakers are allowed to choose their preferred modes of expres~ 
sion because altering expression could well change tlle meaning and 
the impact of tlle message. Famously, the Supreme Court protected 
19 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., ·i'll U.S. 539, 560 (1985); sec 
also Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751: Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDomlhl's 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Ch~ 1977) ('1'he 'marketplace of ideas' is not Iimitcd by 
copyright because copyright is limited to protection of expression."); Wainwright Scc. Illc. 
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977): Fantasy. Inc. v. Fogert)'. 6tH F. 
Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987): Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environlllental Actioll 
Found., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630,634 (D.D.C. 1977); NIMMER, FREEDOM 01.' SI'EECH. slIpm 
note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 ("It is exposure to ideas, and not to their particuhll' expressioll. 
that is vital if self-governing people are to make informed decisions."); Denicola. slIpm 
1Iote 16, at 290-91: Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 16, at 1189-ml; Pamela Sallluelson. &lli!,. 
iug Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses i1l Righi of Publicity ami Copyright C(/ses, 57 
TUI .. L. REv. 836, 881-83 (1983). 
20 See Nimmer, CojJylight, supra note 16, at 1181. 
21 Meyerv. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988). 
22 Turner l, 512 U.S. 622, 675 (1994) (O·Connor. j., concurring and dissenting in 
part): see also Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. United Sch. Dist. No. 118,9 F.3d 1295. 1302 (7th 
Cir. 1993) ("A city may not limit booksellers to vending the works they write thelllselvcs; II 
state may not exclude newspapers printed outside its borders, .•• That mlopting the ex-
pression of others is a form of speech we freely concede. "). 
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Paul Cohen's right to wear a jacket proclaiming "Fuck the Draft" in 
public.23 The Court held that the expression can often constitute the 
idea: "[VV]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can for-
bid particular words 'without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process. "24 
These words may seem inapplicable to copyright, where generally 
the words are not suppressed but limited to a particular class of peo-
ple who pay to use them.25 But, if the owner will only authorize their 
use in contexts that are favorable to the author, then the state is ena-
bling the owner to ensure that his expression will only have one 
meaning and will not be available to use in oppositional ways.2G This is 
23 See Cohen Y. Califomia, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971); Str also Guglil'lmi ,~ Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 19i9); Stanlcy Ingber, 771t! Mmkrlpla(~ oJ Itlrns: It 
Legitimizing i\f)'tJI, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1. 34-36 (arguing that. because pcrsuasion is not fullr 
rational, content and form are not separable in practicc). Limits on use of another's ex-
pression may even be fundamentally offcnsh'c to a speakcr's sense of self. Whcn J.D. Salin-
ger's biographer was sued for infringemcnt for quoting Salinger's lettcrs, he was asked why 
he did not paraphrase the contents "ith ncutral words that did not use Salinger's expres-
sion. He replied that he would be ashamcd to put his namc to sllch a\\'I"'':Ird and gutted 
prose. See Salinger Y. Random House. Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1987). 
24 See Colzell, 403 U.S. at 26. 
25 The ideal e.xpression dichotomy might bc a kind of "manner" restriction, like rcgu-
lations that prohibit broadcasting any noisc abovc a ccrtain IC\'cl. ~, r.g., Mctromcdia, 
Inc. Y. San Diego. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In thc right of publicity contc."t, the Tenth Circuit 
recently dealt witll a similar claim: 
[1]n tile context of intcllcctual property, [tllC] "no adequatc alternath'c a\'c-
nues" test does not sufficiently accommodatc tllC public's intcrest in free ex-
pression. Intellectual property. unlikc real estatc, includes the words, imnges 
and sounds tllat we use to communicatc •..• Restrictions on tllC words or im-
ages tllat may be used by a speakcr, tllcrcforc, arc quitc diffcrent tlmn restric-
tions on tile time, place, or manner of spccch. 
Cardtoons, L.C. Y. Major League Bascball Playcrs Ass'n .• 95 F.3d 959, 971 (lOth Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted). The idea/expression distinction fnils tllC standnnl timc, pl:tce and 
manner test, which requires tllat a regulation bc justified \\ithout rcfercnce to the content 
of tile regulated speecll" and tltat "ample altcrnativc channcls for commllllirntioll of the 
information" remain. Clark v. Cmty. for Creativc Non-Violcnce, 468 U.s. 288, 293 (1984). 
Protecting expression from copicrs dcpcnds 011 tllC content of the speech, since non-
copied or fairly used e.xpressioll and facts arc all fair gnlllCj morco\'cr, wherC\'cr a copier 
can speak, she ,~illnot be allowed to usc tllC particulnr words at issuc. Bill if. Robert Post, 
Recuperating First Amelldmcllt Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. RE\,. 1249, 1260-70 (1995) [herein:uter 
Post, Recuperatillg First AlIlelldmellt Doclrillc] (criticizing timc, plncc and n1:ln11Cr doctrine for 
its incoherence and its propensity for autllorizing C\'cr-incrcasing government restlictions 
on speech). 
26 Copyright claims are ob,iously motivatcd by disagrccment \\ith a defendant's Illl'5-
sage in some cases. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Cu: Y. SCOlt, 82 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1996) (one of 
a large number of cases brought by Scientology agninst critics); Unitcd Christian Scientist'S 
v. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs" 829 F.2d 1152, 1156 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing at-
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troubling because an inability to use the most evocative expression 
possible diminishes the power of a speaker's message.27 The Supreme 
Court has recognized that, if the government allows private patties 
exclusive control over cable systems and then allows them to screen 
out objectionable speech, the First Amendment may be violated.28 
The same argument can be made with respect to exclusive state· 
backed control over expression. Moreover, a payment requirement 
may put certain speech beyond the reach of a large group of speakers 
and listeners, which is in itself u·oubling. 
There are two related points here: First, the ideal expression diM 
chotomy recognizes no value in preserving a "breathing space" for 
free speech. In other areas, the Supreme Court has announced that 
we must tolerate a certain amount of valueless, destructive speech, 
because we want to avoid self-censorship by speakers who fear that 
juries or judges might find them liable.29 If courts do not err 011 the 
side of finding unprotectable ideas instead of protectable expression, 
dley run the risk of suppressing important speech. 
Second, the relationship of ideas to expression explains why ex· 
pression deserves strong First Amendment protection. Even if we are 
confident in theory that a thesaurus and some thought will produce 
an alternate way to say almost anydling with almost as much grace, 
courts never actually make this inquiry and it would be hard to hung. 
ine them doing so. To decide whether it is possible to express a pat'· 
ticular idea in a d~ferent way, we have to determine what is idea-ish 
about the idea and what is its expressive raiment. That is, we would 
have to decide what Leaves of Grass says and how to say it in another 
way while still communicating its exact idea. There will be nearly as 
many different answers to this question as there are readers, and that 
is what makes Leaves of Grass so very protectable. Similarly, "It's mom· 
tempts by one group of Christian Scientists to use copyright to block the distl'ibutioJ1 of 
another group's unorthodox version of Mary Baker Eddy's writings); Ma.'(tonc-Gmhl1ln v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (pro<hoice author :med anti--choice allthol' fOl' 
copyright infringement based on a quotation). In Grll1111berg u Upjolm Co., 137 ER.D. 372 
(D. Utah 1991), a manufacturer tried to use copyright to protect 90,000 pieces oflitigatioll 
documents from dissemination by the media in order to prevent pllblic access to the po-
tentially embarrassing contents of those documents. 
27See Int'l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 
(1986) (Kozinski,]., dissenting). 
28 See Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 768 (1996). 
29 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (citation omitted) (finding 
that the First Amendment required an actual malice standard rOl' intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by a parody in a magazine in order "to give adequate 'breathing spare' 
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."). 
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ing in America" is important for its expressive power in making a po-
litical point. The law protects expression (in fi'ee speech and copy-
right) because, in fact, expression is what makes speech worthwhile. 
Thus, it is incorrect to say that there is no First Amendment value in 
"expression," as opposed to ideas. 
Yet copyright is reconciled to fi'ee speech with the claim tllat ex-
pression does not mean all that much to our shared artistic, intellec-
tual, and political lives. The ideal expression dichotomy is troubling 
because it denigrates tlle value of expression while still attempting to 
justify tlte legal protection of expression as property. '''le protect ex-
pression from copying not because expression is uuimporlcUlt to tlle 
free flow of ideas, as tlle ideal expression dichotomy suggests, but be-
cause it is so important tllat it must be encouraged by state-backed le-
gal protections.so 
30 NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 3.01, at 3-6 to -9. The difficulty of 
denying expression's value has been recognized by defenders of the idea/expression dis-
tinction who have felt compelled to make exccptions for special cases. Mehille Nimmer 
identifies limited cases in which "the 'idea' of a work contributes almost nothing to the 
democratic dialogue, and it is only its c-xpression which is meaningful." Nimmer, O1pyriglll, 
supra note 16, at 1197. He suggests that this is ob\iously true of much graphic art, though 
copyright should still protect artworks because society genera11)' has little need of free 
COP)ing of such works. See id. In the case of vcry important pictorial representation of 
newsworthy events, though, an exccption should bc made: coppight should not allow an 
author to control photographs of an C\'ent likc thc My L'li massacre. &r it!. at 1197-98. 
Unfortunately, what is important enough to qualil}' for this c.xception \\i11 be highly uncer-
tain, like the rest of the infringcment test. 
There is also a subtle contradiction bctwcen thc ovcra11 theory of free speech put 
fortll by scholars such as Nimmer and tllC proposal to make exceptions for expression in 
really significant cases. For Nimmer, news pictures arc morc important to a democrntic 
dialogue than .... erbal reports, no matter how eloqucnt, becausc people perceive picturc..'S 
differently than words. If tllis is a correct undcrstanding of how humans process informa-
tion, howC\'er, tllen Nimmer's underlying commiuncnt to rational self-government as the 
fundamental purpose of tile First Amcndment becomes more troublesomc. Ifwe arc crea-
tures who cannot reduce some of our decpest reactions to words, if our politics has to 
transcend words ;Uld look to symbols at crisis points, thcn wc are 110t really talking ahout 
rational, coolly deliberativc self-govcrnmcnt. A picturc is not an argument. If that picture 
is nonetheless \ital to democratic self-governancc, then maybc direct, poinl-h}'-point politi-
cal argument is not tile central valuc of specch. And if that is the case, then Nimmer's 
central distinction between politically important and decorativc speech begins to break 
down: 
Some of tile most influential forces in our culturc do not make an argument 
or appeal to the intellect: music, \isual art, and a grcat deal of atl\'ertising (in-
cluding political ad\'ertising) conuibute to thc "markctpl:tce of ideas" 
through sound, imagery, and nonrational appeals to passion and desire. It 
would be difficult to say that a Madonna concert makes a suietl), rational "ar-
gument," yet Madonna's "communications" ha\'c had at least as greal an ef-
fect on our culture and political lifc as most books of anal)1ic philosophy or 
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b. Low-Value Speakers 
The argument that piracy is not valuable speech depends on the 
idea that a particular speakeris low-value, regardless of the actual con-
tent of the copied speech. The same speech by different (authorized) 
speakers would deserve the full range of constitutional protection. 
Speaker-based discrimination is not unknown to First Amendment 
law. The Supreme Court has, for example, approved a preference for 
broadcasters over cable operators in certain circumstances.:l1 But 
speaker preferences usually require the government to demonstrate 
that it is not discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint and 
that it has a good reason for its actions.32 At the least, speaker-based 
discrimination should put a heavier burden of justification on copy-
right. 
Even assuming that the use of someone else's words provides a 
speaker only minor convenience, avoiding copying still burdens her 
speech somewhat. Generally, the state cannot impose liability on a 
speaker simply to protect another private party's interests. In Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the Supl'ell1e Court 
struck down a requirement that an electric company allow a con .. 
sumer group to insert material in its billing envelopes.33 While the 
electric company had no "right to be free from vigorous debate •• , it 
[did] have the right to be free from government restrictions that 
abridge its own rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its 
opponents."34 Justice Marshall, concurring, wrote that: "[w]hile the 
interference with appellant's speech is, concededly, very slight, the 
State's justification-the subsidization of another speakeI' chosen by 
the State-is insufficient to sustain even that minor burden. "35 One 
might distinguish Pacific Gas & Electric Co. because the Court faced a 
political science .... [O]ne cannot restrict First Amendment protection to 
the rational or ~cognitive" without ignoring what works as pel'suasion in pill>-
lic discourse and vastly expanding the government's power to censor. 
David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rilles: The Reglliation of Se:~/lal &pressioll. 1<13 U. 1),\, L. 
REv. Ill, 125-26 (1994). Nimmer is of course entirely aware of the difficulty of dctc1'llllll-
ing what speech is important to self-governance, and he holds that overtly non·political 
speech serves valuable First Amendment goals. See NIMMER, FREEDOM m' SI'EECII, SliPi'll 
note 15, § 3.01, at 3-6 to 3-9. 
31 See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
32 I discuss good reasons for copyright below; the point here is that courts dOIl't 
botller to make such an inquiry in copyright cases. 
33 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986). 
3-1 [d. at 14 (plurality opinion). 
35 [d. at 24 (citations and fooUlote omitted) (Marshall,]., concurring). 
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situation in which a speaker was forced to subsidize an enemy of that 
speaker's viewpoint. A copiel~ arguably, is not an enemy of a speaker's 
viewpoint. Thus, copyright does not restrict speech in order to en-
hance the relative voice of anothel~ but restlicts speech to let a view-
point-identical but rights-holding speaker prevail. 
This is not what really happens in many significant copyright 
cases, however. J.D. Salinger's biographel~ for example, hardly shared 
Salinger's viewpoint, and yet was found to have infringed because he 
quoted Salinger's letters. Similarly, extensive quot."ltions from L. Ron 
Hubbard's published and unpublished writings justified a finding of 
infringement in the Second Circuit, though those quotes were \lsed 
precisely to show what a fi-aud Mr. Hubbard was. Here we seem to 
have speakers whose words (including their illustrative quot."ltions 
from their targets) are being suppressed to enhance the relative 
voices of their opponents. 
Copiers also add expression, as the Nation did when it excerpted 
parts of Gerald Ford's biogmphy as part of a story on what the biog-
raphy revealed about White House politiCS.36 The underground car-
toonists of Air Pirntes created twisted caricatures of innocent Disney 
chamcters that required time, thought, and creativity,S7 as did a com-
mentary on the OJ. Simpson murder tlial done in the style of Dr. 
Seuss.38 All were found to infringe. Particularly when it comes to non-
literal copying, courts may be incapable of deciding what constitutes 
"opposition" to a copyright owner's viewpoint. ,,,7hat was Andy Wm'hol 
saying with those Campbell's soup cans, mlyway? How many sides does 
an issue of artistic judgment have? 
We could say that the expression t."lken by a copier is not valuable 
as speech, even if the rest of what she says is. (Of course, it is valuable 
as property, which is a bit embarrassing to the theory of value.) Thus, 
the law states that no pirnte can defend against a claim of inflinge-
ment by showing how much she created herself.s9 Yet other areas of 
free speech law resist such a conclusion. The test for obscenil)~ for 
example, requires that a work as a 11lhole must lack literary, artistic, po-
36 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. Y. Natioll Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
3i See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758. 
38 See Dr. Seuss Enters. Y. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394. (9th Cir. 1997). 
39 See, e.g., Rogers Y. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,308 (2d Cir. 1992) (W[N]o copier may defend 
the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copy he has not piratt.·d.-); Sheldon 
Y. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (1.. Hand.].) ('TnJ(~. much 
of the picture owes nothing to the play; .•• bUl thal is entirely immatclial; it is enough thal 
substantial parts were lifted; no plagiarist can excuse the \\TOng by sho\\ing how much of 
his work he did not pirate."). 
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litical or scientific value in order that it may constitutionally be sup-
pressed. Accused purveyors of obscenity can defend themselves by 
showing how much they created that was not obscene. In defamation 
and libel law, inaccurate statements of fact-(!ven those made with 
knowledge or reckless disregard for their falsity-are constitutionally 
protected if the overall work is "substantially correct" or lacks mal-
ice.40 In other words, defendants accused of defhmation can prevail by 
showing how much of their work was true or in good faith. 
The usual justification for looking at an accused work as a whole 
is that courts fear a chilling effect. If a fragment of a work could be 
punished for violating some prohibition, publishers would have a 
much more difficult time determining what was allowable; they would 
have to scrutinize each paragraph for possible offense if taken in iso-
lation. Publishers would also be unable to rely on the overall message 
of the work, even though works are normally consumed in their en-
tirety rather dIan as disconnected passages.41 The reported cases ill 
which using small amounts of another's copyrighted expression in a 
larger work led to liability are disturbing, because they allow suppres-
sion of an entire work for a small taint.42 
We could conceive of the low-value speech argument in dlis way: 
Free speech law recognizes a certain set of facts about the world as 
40 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (HI91) (holding 
that the law of libel overlooks minor inaccuracies and requires analysis of the challenged 
article as a whole); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (196,1) (holding that 
the fact that a published account ,vas "substantially correct" provided a complete deft'lISe 
to a defamation claim even if parts were wrong): Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F,lId 
310,319 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that most of the allegations offered to support a par-
ticular conclusion were true so that one false allegation was not actionable evell if mall· 
ciously made). 
41 See Saint Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1317 (3d Ch~ 1994) 
(,'"Words take on meaning in the company of other words. Th<,y are gregadous. They take 
on tone and color from syntax and context. In defamation actions, words should be con-
sU'ued as they would be understood by the average reade1~ "). 
42 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that 
a preliminary injunction might be appropriate against a tc\("'ision show that displayed 
portions ofa copyrighted poster in the background for 26 seconds total); Woods v. Univct" 
sal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp.62 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the film 1'wl'/vt: A/ol/lwys 
infringing because it used a copyrighted image of a chair); Aicleen F'liardo, /Jo(y GlIse of 
Copyright Infril/gemellt, Batman!, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 263 (1997) (discussing a silnilill' rase 
over use of artwork in the film Batmall): Francis X. Clines, Grea,toT of Religiolls Art PI't'tllliis ill 
Vevit' Film, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at A6 (discussing lawsuit ngainst the film Dt'tli/'s AliI/a. 
cate for containing an image of a sculpture reminiscent of a sculpture Oll the Natiollal Ca-
thedral). But see Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp.409 (S.D.N.V. 1997) 
(finding fair use in a momentary use of copyrighted photogmphs as backgrollnd in the 
film Seven). 
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relevant when deciding whether or not certain speech is regulable; 
those facts are not contained in speech but determine the level of 
protection such speech gets. For example, whether a person is a pub-
lic or a private figure will determine whether negligent misst.'ltements 
of fact about that person will subject a speaker to liability.43 Whether 
an exhortation to kill is made in a play or by one mobster to another 
·wi.1l determine whether the speaker is guilty of criminal conspiracy. It 
could be that whether a speaker has paid the requisite fee to a copy-
right owner is that kind of fact. 44 Facts are relevant when they prove or 
disprove the existence in a particular case of the harms against which 
a speech regulation is directed.45 The fact that a person has paid a fee 
to a copyright owner proves that there is no risk that her speech ·will 
negatively affect the incentives of future speakers to create copy-
rightable expression, or the fact that her appropriation was 
sufficiently transformative proves tllat punishing her would not serve 
tlle goal of encouraging new speech. But tllis justification is not based 
on any inherent feature of expression as opposed to ideas; it is a facet 
of the speech-based justification for copyright, which I take up in Part 
II. 
c. Self-Fulfillment and Stability 
First Amendment theorists have suggested tllat copyright in-
fringement does not serve any value tlIat free speech is generally 
thought to further. Lack of originality supposedly means that copying 
does not serve a self-fulfillment function, in which the speaker ex-
43 See Gertz v. Robert ""TeIch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
44 Once we scrutinize cop)Tight with an eye to its relationship to frec speech, Robert 
Post's claim that there is no one "free speech principle" that justifies the entire sct of rights 
generally called "freedom of speech" seems much more pel'suash·e. ~ ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNrn·, MANAGEMENT 16 (1995); Post, 
Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 25, at 1271-73. Com'entional c:lmlidatcs 
for such an o\'erarching principle such as "distrust of government regulation," s« Geoffrey 
R Stone, Autollomy alldDistrost, 64 U. COLO. L. RE,'. 1171. 1178 (1993), and "indhidual 
self-realization," see Martin H. Redish, The tr,lll~ of Fm! Spmh, 130 U. PA. L. RE\,. 591, 593 
(1982), do not seem to fit all that well into an area of law that holtls that all speech should 
be free, as long as it is not owned by someone else. 
45 CJ. 44 Liquormart, Inc. y. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (plurality opiuion) 
(", ... /hen a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading. 
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices .•. the purpose of its regulation is consistent with 
the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore 
justifies less than strict review."). 
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presses that which is most herself.46 Likewise, no one is going to dot 
over a copyright dispute, and so there is no "safety valve" function ill-
volved.47 
The self-fulfillment and stability arguments are not very persua-
sive. The self-fulfillment point fails to look closely at the practices that 
many people actually do find fulfilling: expressing their commitment 
to certain cultural, political, or social groups in conventional and even 
stylized ways.48 Indeed, the more that a member of a group adheres to 
that group's script, the "better" a member she often is. Just as a per-
sonal choice protected by the First Amendment can consist of giving 
allegiance to an extant faith-choosing to be a Catholic or a Demo-
crat rather than developing one's own religion or political party-
autonomy interests are also served when a person chooses to copy 
what someone else has said, endorsing it as her own:!!) Speech is 110t 
guaranteed only to the well-educated, with thesauruses at theil' 
fingertips, or the creative.5o 
46 See United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (''We do not 
find any denial of freedom of expression to the 'tape pirate'. What hc seeks is not the 
freedom to express himself artistically or otherwise, but the right to make exact and iden-
tical copies of sound recordings produced by others."): NIMMER, FREEDOM o~' SI'EECII, 
supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-67; Goldwag, supra note 17, at 7 ("Onc who appropriates the 
expression of another is not engaging in self-fulfillment: rathe!; he is ;\pprop1'iating lin-
other's labor without exerting any effort."); Sobel, stlpra note ]4, at 72; Leonard W, Wllng, 
Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: ,1 Proposed TEst, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1158, 
1181. 
47 See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 to 2-67; Sobl'l, 
supra note 14, at 73. 
48 See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POUTICS OF TIlE PERFORl\IATl\'E 27, 39 
(1997) (discussing the ways in which using conventionalized exprcssions can actuall), In-
crease the power of speech by evoking well-known associations). Professor NiIlUIICI~ who 
makes the argument that copying serves no self-fulfillment interest, writes in that "[TJhcl'c 
may be no audience at all, and yet the self-fulfillment function will somctimcs be scn'ed b)' 
engaging in some forms of speech. An example of this is the satisfaction that may be expt" 
rienced by singing a song aloud although there is 110 one to hear." NIIIIMEIt, FItEEDOM 010' 
SPEECH, supra note 15, § 1.03 at 1-50. Though he might be imagining that tltc lone singel' 
has composed her own song, he probably isn't, and she probably hasn't. Site enjoys hCI' 
performance nonetheless, just as many people gain fulfillmcnt by retelling stories tltC}' 
have heard before, see JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, TIlE "'\NISJIING HITCIJIIIKER: AMEIUCAN 
URBAN LEGENDS AND THEIR MEANINGS (1981), or even by making II» stories abollt »opu-
lar (copyrighted) television and movie characters, see I-IENRY JENKINS, '!\':XTUAL l'OACIIEltS: 
TELEVISION FANS AND PARTICIPATORY CULTURE (1992); Rebccca Tushnet, Legal Fir/iolls: 
Copydght, Fan Fictioll, al/d aNew Common Law, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. LoRcv. 651 (1997), 
49 See, e.g., Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick Sch. Dcp't, !J77 F. Su»». 1560 (D. tile. 
1984) (graphic quote from Time describing capital punishmcnt could 110t be bat'l'cd Ji'omlt 
yearbook simply because it was powerful). 
50 As noted by the Colorado Supreme Court: 
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The extension of protection to every speakel; however derivative, 
can be justified by reference to general democratic theory, which ,'Cll-
ues the contribution of each citizen to the political process.51 The 
more people vote the better, even though they may well be choosing 
between only two options. The truth is that most equal, autonomous, 
choosing individuals do not have much revelatory to say; they con-
tribute by participating, not by breaking new ideological ground. A 
person who recites John Stuart Mill chapter and verse is doing at least 
as much to further political discourse as someone who composes an 
original ode to liberalism. The Mill disciple will not contlibute much 
to democratic dialogue if she is not in a position to offer cogent re-
sponses to questions from the people to whom she speaks. Even her 
ability to marshal quotations, however, is a contribution, since persua-
siveness is not the test for protected speech.52 Moreovel; a speaker's 
belief that Mill's words are appropliate to a particular political situa-
tion is itself a valuable interpretation of :Mill, just as a politician who 
quotes the Bible in debate is taking a particular religious and political 
stance.53 
The ideas e..'I{pressed by defendant's conduct may seem to some to bejm'cnile 
and inarticulate, and perhaps his actions are subject to inteq>rctations other 
than we have given, but this does not strip his "specch" of constitutional pro-
tection. The First Amendment is not the e..'I{dusi\'c property of the cducatcd 
and politically sophisticated scgmcnt of our population; it is not limited to 
ideas capable of precise explication. 
Colorado Y. Vaughan, 514 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Colo. 1973); S" also Hurlcy \'. Irish·American 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) ("[A] narrow. succinctly articll-
lable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."); Tinker \'. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Viet-
nam War was protected speech despite lack of specific messagc); Ingber. slIpra note 23, at 
33-34 (discussing how bans on disrupti\'e speech are biased against thc poor, the ill· 
educated, and social outcasts). 
51 See Ingber, slIpra note 23, at 11. 
52See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. GOv't PAC, 528 U.S. 377. 120 S. Ct. 897. 919 n.3 (2000) 
(Thomas,J., dissenting) ("We regularly hold that speech is protected when the undcrJ}ing 
basis for a position is not given."). 
53 I am not claiming tllat democracy is tlle only real justification for free speech. My 
point is tllat eyen a Meiklejohnian democracy-promoting theory. which oftcn scenlS to 
limit tlle scope of the First Amendment, does notjustil)' cxcluding copying from the realm 
of protected speech acti\ities. Meiklejohn did not think that it was important for C\'cl'}'one 
to speak, only tllat e\'erything wortll hearing be 5.'lid. In that sense. his self-go\'cmmcnt 
tlleol'}' is consistent \\itll copyright. But speech worth hearing and copyright O\\1lcrs' 
speech ,\i11 only oyerlap if copyright succeeds in tllC work I describe in ParllI: gcnerating 
new speedl. Self-goyemment is tllcrcfore unable to justify copyright \\ithollt reference to 
copyright's speech-promoting function. In addition. the controls 011 dissemination that 
copyright allows may prevent people from receiving wortllwhile specch. 
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As for the safety valve argument, it is probably true that there has 
never yet been a riot over the suppression of copyright infringement. 
But it is equally true that there has yet to be a riot over the suppres-
sion of books from school libraries or any number of speech restric-
tions that nonetheless were deemed impermissible; because of its 
speculative nature, the safety valve argument is generally a 
makeweight. And if we widen the criteria for 'what counts as a safety 
valve to include speech acts that prevent alienatjon from goVel'lllllent 
and disrespect for the law,54 copyright appears to be clogging a fair 
number of safety valves. Outrage at the apparent scope of copyright 
law and a declared intent to violate that law ar(: reasonably prevalent 
on the Internet,55 where people are more likely to publicize their dis-
satisfaction than when they are denied the ability to copy at IGnko's.M 
That such outlaws most likely will never be sued probably does not 
make them respect tlle broad scope of tlle law, and the randoll1ness of 
enforcement may worsen the problem. This is certainly not a reaSOll 
to reject copyright, but it does suggest tllat safety valve concerns are 
not absent in tlle area.57 
54 Such widening could be defended on the grounds thaI the traditional articulatioll 
of the safety valve justification assumes a particular kind of 5pcakcl~ namely a relatively 
powerful (white male) speaker who feels that he has the option ofviolcnce if he call1lot say 
what he wants to say. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassmel/t ami Ihe IlIjo/'llUl! 
Ghelloizalion of n'omen, 106 HARV. L. REv. 517, 560-61 (1993); K.1thlcen M. Sullivan, 11w 
Supreme Collrl, 1991 Term-Foreword: The jllslice of Rilles ami Siandarels, 106 HAR\'. L. Ih:v. 22. 
42 (1992). Other kinds of speakers might react in different, but also damaging, '\~lyS, s\lch 
as sabotage. 
55 See, e.g., The Free Mllsic Philosophy (V 1.1), at http://wwlV,ram.org/ramblings/philo-
sophy/fmp.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998); Ncgativland, Fair Use, at http://www,lIegativ. 
land.com/fairuse.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998); Negativland. Stllff, at http://www.ncg. 
ativland.com/nmol/negmisc.html (last visited Mar. 31, 1998) (advcrtising T-shitt with the 
logo "Copyright Infringement Is Your Best Entertainmcnt Valuc"); The Viral CO/lllllllllim· 
lions Anti-Copyright Policy, at http://www.cyborganic.com/pcople/vir-comm/projccts/allti. 
copy/ (last visited Mar. 31, 1998). 
56 See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure aTllI Prisoller's Dilemma ill Illleilec/IIlIl 
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 855 n.13 (1992) ("[L1egal prohibitions against copying 
pose noneconomic dangers that private modes of fencing-off do not, such as crcating ill 
the user population a perception of governmental compulsion, which could givc risc to a 
species of resentment"); if. Gordon, An Inqlliry inlo the Merils, slIpra notc 17. at 1345-46 
(1989) (describing average consumers' feeling thatjusticc allows thcm to copy tapcs thcy 
own or tape music off the ail'). 
57AllOther related argument concerns the "checking value" of frce spccch, Vinccnt 
Blasi suggests that "the abuse of official power is an especially scrious CVil-1l101'C scdom 
than the abuse of private powel~ even by institutions such as largc corp01"iltions which call 
affect the lives of millions of people." Vincent Blasi, The Checkillg l'allll! illl-i,.sl AI//('//(/I//('II/ 
Theol)~ 1977 &1. B. FOUND. REs.]. 521, 538. Maybe we should not be so COllCCl'1lCt\ about 
private parties' control over the content of expression for that feason. This argu1l1ent docs 
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d. Vagueness and Subjectivity 
Another basic problem with using the ideal expression dichot-
omy to resolve free speech concerns is that the distinction between an 
idea and the concrete form it takes is entirely too vague.58 Indeed, the 
most famous and well-received explanation of the dichotomy appeals 
to its vagueness. Judge Learned Hand wrote: 
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the work is about, and at 
times might consist only of its title; but tllere is a point in tllis 
series of abstractions where tlley are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwlight could prevent tlle use of his 
"ideas,» to which, apart from tlIeir expression, his propert}' is 
never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fl., tllat 
boundary, and nobody ever can.59 
It is unsurprising, then, tlIat judges often disagree amongst tllem-
selves about when it is necessary to use a particular fragment of ex-
pression or whetlIer the idea could have been expressed in some 
other, nOllcopying way.60 Particularly since infringement can be found 
not answer the question of what le\'el of 5Cnlliny to gh-c to cop}Tight: Public \;olcnce may 
be worse at its worst than private \;olence, but primtc abuse is worth considering. S« Gold-
stein, supra note 2, at 997 (discussing thc privatc monopoly power of largc corporations 
\\;th control o,'er many copyrights); Eugcne Yolokh 8: Brctt McDonnell, Frrttfoll/ oJSpt«1i 
and IndepemlentJudgment Review in Copyright CasI!S, 107 YALE L.]. 2431 (1998) (suggesting 
that private enforcement may be more dangerous to spcech becausc it may be morc perm-
sive and effective). 
58 See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression DieJlotomy ill Cop)'ligllt Lall~ 56 TENN. L. RE\·. 
321, 398 (1989) ("The idea-c. .. pression dichotomy simply does not lend itself to ••• precise 
and easy application_ ... Even in thc definition of what is idea and what is c.xprcssion, the 
doctrine probably incorporates just as many perplexing issul'S as does the first amendmcnt 
itself."); Yen, supra note 2, at 396-97; Dianc Leenheer Zimmerman, bljonrralioTl as Spt«1i, 
Infonnation as Goods: Some Tlwugllis on Mar/u!lplaces alld 11z~ Bill oJ rogllls, 33 WM. 8: MAR\' L. 
REv. 665, 709 (1992). 
59 Nichols Y. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); s« auo Pcter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. Y. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 19(0) ("fhe test for in-
fringement of copyright is of necessity vaguc .•.• Decisions must thcrefore inc\1tably be ad 
hoc. ..• [Olne cannot say how fur an imitator must depart from an undC\;ating reproduc-
tion to escape infringement."). 
60 See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. Y. Knight-Ridder NC\\'Spapcrs, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 
1181 (5th Cir. 1980) (Bro\\n,]., concurring in part and disscnting in part) (disagreeing 
with the claim that the "idea" of a n' GZlid~ cover mergcd \\;th its Yexpression" and claim-
ing that the idea could have been rcpresentcd without rcproducing an actual n' Gllitit 
cover). 
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even without verbatim copying, in cases of "substantial similarity," it is 
difficult to distinguish idea from expression.61 Worsening the uncer .. 
tainty, the modern idea of a work'~ "total concept and feel" allows a 
finding of infringement when the overall mood of two works is essen .. 
tially the same, despite the fact that there might be no single element 
dlat is literally copied.62 Neil Netanel suggests dmt the problem of 
sorting idea from expression has become even less tractable now that 
derivative works-works based on other copyrighted works such as a 
film inspired by a novel-are explicitly protected.63 
A vague law that restricts speech is usually thought to be uncon .. 
stitutional. Confused and uncertain, speakers will '''steer far wider of 
the unlawful zone' than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked."64 A standard that freely admits that one case will 
never provide much guidance for dle next case seems about as bad a 
guide to safe conduct as one could imagine. Faced with a potentially 
devastating lawsuit, speakers will be well-advised to steer as far as pos .. 
sible away from any arguable copyright infiingement, to spare them .. 
selves the risks of going before a judge or jury, and they should care .. 
fully limit the expression of dlOse for whom they may be vicariously 
liable.65 The potential chilling effect is tlms particularly great when 
speakers, to reach an audience, need the help of publishers or Inter .. 
61 See Britten, supra note 1, at 78; Leslie A. Kurtz, Spealdllg'to the Ghost: Mea (l/ul E.\'/)/'('5' 
sion in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221, 1228, 1232-33 (1993). 
62 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's COil)" 562 F.2d 
1157,1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 
(9th Cir. 1970); Yen, supra note 2, at 410-11. 
63 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright alld a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283, 
304 (1996). 
&1 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (citation omitted): see also Gmyucd \'. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (footnotes and internal quotes omitted) ("[\\'jl1t'l'(, 
a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedol1ls, it Opt'I" 
ales to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms."). 
65 See Yen, supra note 2, at 425. Yen argues that copyright cases are more dangel'olls 
than libel and defamation cases because juries can understand concepts of falsity, malin', 
and recklessness more easily than they can tease out the difficult line between idea alld 
expression. A copyright jury will be unpredictable, and thus pose a greatel' tlll'eat of chill· 
ing speech. See id. at 426; see also Volokll & McDonneIl, supra not(' 57, at 2,J39 ("No 101lg· 
standing social consensus tells us what is 'idea' and what is 'exprcssion'; no illtuitivdy o\). 
vious line dhides the two categories."}. My argument is similar to that mlUie by some 
recent critics of sexual harassment law. See Kingsley R. Brownc, U'OIkpll/ce Ce1l50/'ship: 11 Rt~ 
sponse toProjessorSangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579, 581-82 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Frct'dow 
oj Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1811-12 (1992). I take no posi-
tion here on Browne and Volokh's crilicisms of Title VII; I merely wish to suggest that 
copyright, which sweeps far more broadly than harassment law and is unlimited ill poten-
tial subject matter, presents great incentives to limit speech. 
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net service providers, whose institutional interests make one particu-
lar speaker's material not terribly important compared to a threat of 
legal action for infringement or contributory infringement. GG 
Subjective standards for distinguishing between unlawful appro-
priation and legitimate citation in copyright cases are also suspect OIl 
free speech grounds. The influential Ninth Circuit infringement test 
requires first an objective evaluation of the similarit.y of two works, 
then a subjective evaluation.67 Yet the Supreme Court has sharply lim-
ited the availability of actions for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress based on speech, holding that the distinction bet.ween outra-
geous and non-outrageous opinion "has an inherent subjecti\'eness 
about it" that would allow defendants to be held liable just because of 
a jury's "tastes" or preferences.58 This concern is consistent \\ith 
vagueness law's fear of decisions made "on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discdminatory ap-
plication. "69 A jury's SUbjective evalution of similarity may be very 
difficult to predict.70 
One could argue that infiingement cases are unlikely to be sys-
tematically biased against the opinions of out.-groups, whereas judg-
66 Sec, e.g., The X-Philes/Mi/lClliulIl Protest a/ http://databasc.simplenet.com/x/pro-tl'St. 
html (last ,isited Oct. 30, 2000) (discussing an incident in which the Fox Network sent a 
threat letter to a university bec.l.Use of a student's web page, and the unh'ersity cut off the 
student's internet access); cf. BrO\me, supra note 65; Volokh, supra note 65 (arguing that 
an employer'S interests diverge from its employees' such that employers \\;11 suppress a 
broad range of employee speech in order to avoid the risks of a lawsuit). The Digital Mil· 
lenium Copyright Act limits online prO\;ders' liability for users' infringement if they take 
down the accused material promptly. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994). Though users can alkoge 
tllat their material is not infringing, tile new law seems unlikely to change the basic dy-
namic. 
6i SeeShawv. Lindheim, 919 E2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990). This test has C\'oh-ed from what 
was earlier labeled an "extrinsic" and an "intrinsic" test of similarity. ~ Sid & Marly Kroffl 
Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1157. But it has maintained the two-step proc(.'SS of analytic 
dissection and tllen subjective, ordinary-observer comparison of tile protected and alleg-
edly infringing works. 
68 Hustler Magazinev. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). 
69 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971). 
70 Though tlIe government does not often cnforce tllC criminal copyright law, thus 
perhaps reducing tile dangers of biased prosecution, the c.xistence of a prh":lte right of 
action creates a large potential for arbitrary litigation, compounding the risks of the sub-
jective test. The case law suggests tltat one may more readily criticize the Church of r..,Uer-
Day Saints using Mormon documents ,,;tllOllt fear of litigation tI\:ln one mar criticize Sci-
entology using the same metllods. See, e.g., Religiolls T«h Ctr., 82 F.3d at 423. Similarly, Dis-
ney engages in aggressive cop}right enforcement, while Paramolllll is r.,r more lenient for 
uses of its Stal" Trek characters and situations. Varying pli\":lte responses, whether based Oil 
economic calculations or a concern for corporate "image," furtllcr increase the arbitrari-
ness and uncertainty of cop}right law as a whole. 
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ments of outrageousness or defamation are likely to be biased. We 
could decide that arbitrariness, in the sense of random enforcement 
that falls like lightning from the sky, is not constitutionally troubling 
in a speech regulation. But then we have substantially revised the con-
cept of subjectivity, locating its harm in heuristic biases that subtly and 
routinely lead most people to judge in ways t.hat can be predicted 
based on who is speakip.g and who is being attacked.71 
Defined in this way, the problem of systematic bias is still present 
in copyright. Sympathetic plaintiffs are far more likely to have their 
rights expansively defined than unattractive plaintiffs. Thus, lovable 
Mickey Mouse gets lots of protection from a countercultural portrayal 
when Disney sues a small comic book publisher over its scandalous 
parody,72 while Howard Hughes has to lump it when a legitimate pub-
lisher publishes an unfavorable biography,73 Copyright losers are of-
ten artists making unconventional art that attempts to mock or sati-
rize society, or social- critics using the expression of powerful 01' 
popular people for their own purposes. AltllOugh this group would 
not qualify for special protection from non-speech related laws, free 
speech's concern for protecting the oddball and the unpopular 
speaker applies here. In any event, the uncertainty and arbitrariness 
of the ideal expression distinction make it a poor candidate to defend 
copyright against a First Amendment challenge. 
2. Fair Use 
The 1976 Copyright Act codified previous judicial doctrine iuto a 
statutory exception for fair use of copyrighted materials as a defense 
to a finding of infringement.74 The statute suggests four factors for 
deciding fair use claims: the nature of the copyrighted work; the pur-
pose and character of the use, including wheth(!r it is commercial 01' 
noncommercial; the amount and substantiality of the use in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use on the 
market for the copyrighted work. Though the law allows courts to 
consider other factors, in practice they usually rely on the enumerated 
four. Fair use preserves ground for some use of and comment on 
71 The Supreme Court has held that subjective employment practices ClIll be suspect 
when they appear to cover for systematic biases. See Watson v. Fort Worth BlIlIk & TI'IISI, 
487 U.S. 977,1000 (1987). 
72 See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758. 
73 See Rosemont Enters, Inc. v. Random HOllse, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cil'. 1966). 
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
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copyrighted works, and courts and scholars generally agree that it 
therefore protects First Amendment interests.75 
The "nature of the copyrighted work" factor allows courts to give 
more protection to fanciful works than to factual ones, preserving 
public access to facts and opinions about the world while fencing off 
the content of romance novels and police dramas.76 .As a free speech 
protector, this factor is particularly well-suited to a l\'leiklejohnian the-
ory of central political speech and peripheral entertaining speech. 
The "nature" factor also allows courts to further First Amendment 
interests in remaining silent by protecting unpublished works from 
copying 'without good justification.77 
The "purpose and character of the use" factor enables courts to 
give more weight to uses that serve some greater good than uses that 
are simply made for the copier's convenience. Educational or news-
reporting uses receive more favor than pure entertainment. "Trans-
formative" uses such as parody also get more leeway. In addition, 
courts also favor noncommercial uses under this factor, on the theory 
that someone who is not making money from a use is less likely to be 
a venal thief.78 The "amount and substantiality" factor protects uivial 
and incidental uses from liability. The "effect on the market" fhctor, in 
some versions at least, protects uses that do not really hurt the copy-
right owner, so that speech is not resu"icted unless the resu'iction pre-
vents an identifiable harm . .All this, copydght's defenders argue, sup-
ports First Amendment interests in the free flow of speech by limiting 
the scope of copyright. 
75 See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l Y. Henry Holt &: Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 
1989); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 
1982); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. Y. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957. 
960 (D.N.H. 1978); Denicola, supra note 16, at 293-99: Pcrlman &: Rhinclandcr, supra notc 
1, at 394. 
i6 See, e.g., Stewart Y. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); if. Blasi, slIpra notc 57, al553 
(arguing that the First Amendment should ,igorously protcct facts, though ~somehow wc 
ha"e come to think of the passionate, oftcn uninformed, soapbox orator as thc classic 
embodiment of our commiunent to di\'ersity"). 
ii See Halper & ROlll, Pllblishers, IIlC., 471 U.S. at 558. 
is On the other hand, preferring noncommcrcial works arguably docs lillie to pro-
mote First Amendment goals, because most "idcly disseminatcd works arc donc for profit 
C\'en when they also have a news reporting or public debatCoenhancing purposc: thc NnL' 
l'llrh Times does not come for free. See, e.g.. Rosemont Entcrs .• Inc. \'. Rmldom Housc, Inc •• 
366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). Ifwe acccpt the basic idea that one mn promotc speech 
by harnessing the profit motive to encourage speech production, thcn an c.-.ccssi\·c em-
phasis on the noncommcrciality of a use, dcfined as thc absencc of profit-sccking. conld 
actually conflict "ith the proper understanding of the relationship betwecn cop}1ighl and 
the FrrstAmendment. See illfra notes 226-237 and accompan}ing tcxt. 
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a. Vagueness 
One significant problem with fair use is similar to the problem 
with the idea/expression dichotomy: It is too vague to providc 
enough guidance.79 Even those who believe that fair use serves First 
Amendment purposes recognize its "infinite dasticity."Bo There arc 
four named factors, but the statute suggests that the list is not exclu~ 
sive, and there is little guidance for how to weigh one against anothCl~ 
Mter decades of litigation, it is stilI difficult to tell when and whethcr 
one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for scientific l'e~ 
search.s1 Inconsistencies are common in copyright cases, where fact-
specific analyses combined with the multifactor fair use test make 
cases almost impossible to categorize. Because the outcome of any 
particular case is uncertain, a potential infringer/fair user has to be 
willing to bear the substantial costs of litigation for a chance to escape 
liability. This seems quite likely to prompt self-censorship.B2 
79 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrille, 101 HARV. L. IU:v. 1 6(i!, 
1692-94 (1988);Jessica Litman, Reforming bljonnation Law in t'.:opyrighl's Image, 22 U. DA\'-
TON L. REv. 587, 612 (1997) [hereinafter, Litman, Refonlling illjorlllation Law]; Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Fairs Fair: A Commellt 011 the Fair Use DoclJille, 103 I-IARV. L. IU:v. 11!i7, 1137 
(1990); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 4 FORm-lAM L. REv. 12!)1 (1999): Wang, slIpm note 'Hi, 
at 1176-77. 
80 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07 
(1990). 
81 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 «(jth Ch~ 
1996); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Ch~ 19!H); Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973); Duffy v. Pcnguin Books, .. F. 
Supp.2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. United Statcs Tel. Ass'n, 8,11 F. 
Supp.5 (D.D.C. 1993); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.1522 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
82 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property ami SlIbjects (if Politics: 1ntellt'cI//(11 Property 
Laws a1ld Democratic Dialoglle, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1853, 1867-68 (1991) [hcreinafter Coolllbe, 
Objects of Property]; Litman, Reformillg bljo/'matioll Law, supra now 79, at 612-13. 
My favorite piece of evidence that fair use is not carrying its spccch.protective 
weight comes from a 1997 pamphlet distributed by Kinko's. The guide informs the readel' 
that copyrighted materials may not be reproduced by anyone ,\ithout pcrmission from the 
copyright ownel: FOrlunately, Kinko's provides a "Copyright/Trademark Pel'mission Itt ... 
quest Form." Assuming the cllstomer can find the copyright owncr, Kinko's will fax the 
form to any United States location for free. The cllstomer is to chcck all intcnded IISCS f()l' 
the copy, from a list of the following: "Personal," "News Reporting," "Scholal'ship/Rl'" 
search," "Commercial," "Comment/Criticism," "Teaching," and ·Scan into COIIIPlltcl~" 
CopyiTlg Guideli1les (1997) (pamphlet). 
This form is a perfectly rational response to unccrtainty. The pCI'mission f01'1II 
identifies some fair use favorites, such as research and criticism, but only so that the copy-
right owner can decide whether or not to withhold permission. Thcrc is no indication thaI 
"Comment/Criticism" might justify copying withollt permission. Now, maybc the govern-
ment cannot be held responsible for this distortion, though First Amendmcnt libel law 
thinks so; maybe the well-known fact that the average copy shop ignorcs what happcns lit 
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b. Fair Use and ContentDisaimination 
Control of even one copyright can allow an owner to choke off 
democratic dialogue, if that copylight is very important for full dis-
cussion of a particular issue of public interest. Courts thus sometimes 
particularize the "purpose of the use" factor of the fair use test: Not 
just any news reporting or scholarship evokes a public interest test, 
but this report is important enough to justif.}, stretching the bounda-
lies of fair use.83 The public interest test only increases the l.111Cer-
tainty generated by fair use. Apparently, it is in tlle public intcrcst to 
find out more about Howard Hughes,&! but not about Lenny BruceSS 
or Rudolph Valentino;86 "who shotJFK" but not "who shotJ.R" Thc 
public interest test also requires suspect content judgmcnts about thc 
quality or value of the allegedly infringing work. 87 
Even without the public interest subfactor, one might wonder 
whether fair use is unconstitutional because it discriminates on tlle 
basis of content. Fair use favors copying, even pure copying, for edu-
cational and news l-eporting purposes. The Supreme Court, evaluat-
ing an anticounterfeiting law tllat prohibited certain reproductions of 
images of currency but made exceptions for newsworthiness or cduca-
its self-service copiers blunts the force of the pamphlet'S blankct assertions. BUI if rhir use 
is supposed to sen'e Ftrst Amendment goals, thcre should be some indication that it actu-
ally does so in practice, not just in theory. 
83 See, e.g., RosemontElIters., 366 F.2d at 307; Berlin \'. E.C. Publ'ns, 329 F.2d 5·n, 544 
(2d Cir. (964). Paul Goldstein has gh'cn particular allention to thc risks of cop}Tight mo-
nopoly. A large corporation may own a number of intcrlocking cop)Tights, and bc able to 
leverage them to e.xert undue market powcr. In such a case, he suggests, antimonopoly 
principles are First Amendment priuciples. Sec Goldstein, slIpra notc 2, at 987.1043. 
84 See Rosemollt Enters., 366 F.2d at 303. 
85 See Man1n Worth Prods. \'. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.\~ 1970). 
S6 Sec Rohauerv. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.\~ 1974). As Celia Gold-
wag points out, "It is not the merits of the court's assessment of the relath'e values of 
Hughes and Valentino but the subjecti\'e nature of its calculation that is disturbing." Gold-
wag, supra note 17, at 19. 
s; See V{endy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failllre: .11 Strtltlllmi ami &ollomit .tbla/ysis oj 
tlle Betall/ax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L RE,'. 1600, 1637 (1982). E\'ell analysIS 
who disagree \\ith Gordon's economic focus somctimcs cndorse a public interest test that 
makes quality judgments about challenged works: 
Most would agree that the Zaprudcr film adds more to the democratiC' dia-
logue than do the Sunday comics. Likc\\ise, a more limitcd public intercst in 
cartoon characters or posters of checrlcadcrs warrants a more limited appli-
cation of the fair use doctrinc, and thus grcatcr hesitancy in limiting the 
rights of the copyright holder on first amcndmcnt grounds. 
Stephen S. Zimmerman, A Regulat0T)' ThcoT)' o/Co/J)'ligllJ: Jh'oidillg a First .111111'1/(1111(111 Colljlicl, 
35 EMORY LJ. 163, 197 (1986) (fOOUlOtes omittcd). 
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tional value, found that these exceptions were impermissibly content-
based.88 There seems to be no reason that the exceptions would lose 
their content-based nature when applied to copyright . 
. Fair use also favors criticism and parody. Reviewers get leeway, as 
do users who humorously savage an original. These preferences are 
justified on the perfectly reasonable grounds that copydght owners 
have non-profit-based reasons to prevent uses Illat are cdtical of the 
original work.89 In essence, fair use contains an analogue to the "right 
of reply" statute struck down in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo.9o Tornillo invalidated a statute tllat allowed people who had 
been criticized in a newspaper a chance to respond on the same edi-
torial pages. Anyone who had not first been criticized would have to 
pay to take out an ad or convince the editors to carry his or her view-
point. Like citizens covered by a right of reply statute, fair users have a 
special privilege to copy a work so long as they are criticizing what 
came before. They may use another's property-·a copyrighted work-
without tlle owner's consent, just as a person criticized by the Miami 
Herald could use its printing press and newsprint without the owner's 
consent. If they do not disagree with the work, hOWeVelj their use may 
trigger an obligation to pay,just like any other c()nsumer/speakel~ 
Such protection for uses the copyright owner finds particularly 
objectionable evokes the taint of compelled affirmation, having one's 
property used to endorse a message with which one resolutely dis-
agrees.91 It also seems to conflict with the Court's pronouncement ill 
Hurley v. Irish-American Ga)~ Lesbian and Bisexual Group that a speake1"s 
own speech cannot be appropriated by the state as a public aCCOlll-
modation.92 The Hurley Court held that the organizers of a 8t. Pat-
rick's Day parade could not be forced by state anti-discrimination law 
to allow marchers to display signs affirming their nonheterosexual 
Irishness because that would change the expressive message of the 
88 See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984). 
89 These reasons may also be profit-based, as criticism can destroy the market 101' II 
work even though it is not a substitute for that work. Courts refuse to conside1' negative 
press a cognizable harm, just as business lost by a restaurant when a competing rcstmmllli 
opens up down the block wiII not be legally cognizable harm. 
90 418 U.S. 241 (1974); if. Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at I'! (striking down II regulation 
that awarded access to utility-company mailing envelopes to critics of the utilitics aud crltl· 
cizing the regulation for awarding access "only to those who disolgree with appellant's vicws 
and are hostile to appellant's interests"). 
91 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Ekc., 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977); W. v.,. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnelte, 319 U.S. 624, (i42 (1943). 
92 See515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
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parade contrary to the organizers' intent. Hurle)' might be distin-
guished from fair use because there is only one parade, whereas the 
existence of a parody does not change the meaning of the original 
work. But, just as the Court recognized that signs announcing gay and 
lesbian identities would reflect on the meaning of the rest of the pa-
rade,93 the existence of a parody may well lead consumers to reevalu-
ate the meaning of the original.94 Moreover, the point of copyright is 
that it generally gives owners rights in copies, not just in physical 
originals, so that a parody could fall within the scope of the author's 
exclusive rights were it not for the content-based fair use exception. 
The transformative (including critical or parodic) uses escape 
court-backed prohibition because otherwise private owners would 
prohibit expression they disliked. Against a background of generally 
neutral copyright law, the government's hand appears to come be-
tween the speaker and the censor-but only if we accept that censor-
ship can be carried on by private parties with state backing. And this 
vision of government's role in the speech market, I will show below. is 
precisely what justifies copyright as a whole. not simply the transfo1'-
mative use preference in fair use law. 
B. Less Restlictive Alternatives 
In general, regulations that restrict speech as such are required 
to meet fairly stringent tests. Even when a compelling government 
interest supports the regulation, courts seek to assure that 110 more 
speech is suppressed than necessary.95 The appropriate inquiry, there-
fore, is not whether having copyright is important enough to out-
weigh First Amendment concerns, but whether the particular regime 
we have is a good way of protecting authors without unnecessarily in-
fringing First Amendment interests. 
There is a standard free speech argument that applies here: 
"more speech" and concerted action as a response to harmful 
93 See id. ("[T)he communication produced by the pri\'ate organizers wonld be shaped 
by all those ... who \\ished to join in \\ith some c.xprcssi\'e demonstration of their 0\\11."). 
9t As Fred Schauer mites, he cannot look at Leonardo DaVinci's Mona Usa the same 
way after haling seen the version \\ith a mustache added. SrI! Frederick Schauer, rile 011101· 
01!J' of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 
147, 157 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Olllolog),). 
95 See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101n.8 (1972); United States \'. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-564 (1965); NAACP \'. Button, 3il 
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Cantwell \'. Connecticut, 310 U,S. 296, 307 (1940); Schlleiden'. State, 
308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Dejonge\'. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937). 
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speech.96 Instead of regulating hate speech, for example, the targeted 
group should toughen up. Free speech "absolutists" argue that tm'· 
geted groups should overwhelm their opponents in the marketplace 
of ideas by offering competing ideas, by educating the public that ra-
cism is bad.97 Groups can refuse to deal with people whose speech of-
fends them, and lobby others to do the same. 
The argument for self-help exists in copydght, though it is 110t 
yet recognized as a free speech argument. There are numerous self-
help mechanisms available for content providers who want to protect 
original expression. For example, publishers could use contractnal 
mechanisms to prohibit copying and seek damages against anyone 
who violated the contract.98 They could also attempt to enforce anti-
copying norms by structuring the industry to allow authorized pub-
lishers lead time or other advantages, and punishing defectors with 
retributive "strike" editions.99 Content providers could deal only with 
those who accepted their terms of service, which would include anti-
copying agreements. Digital watermarking and other copy-protection 
technologies may allow content providers to defend their intellectual 
property against quick copying just as a fence around a plot of laud 
hinders easy trespass. lOO 
This kind of self-help is likely to be significantly more effective 
than standard "more speech" self-help. Contracts are more persuasive 
as an inducement to respect copying rights than the aspiratiollal lan-
guage of equality is as a reason to respect other people. Of course, the 
96 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (holding that public 
figures do not need the protection of expansive libel law bccmlsc they havc acccss to the 
channels of communication to respond to attacks). 
97 See V.'hiuley v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1926) (Brandcis,]., conctll'rlng), 
98 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Righls MallageJl/ellt 011 
COpylighl's Fair Use DoctJiIll!, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 577 (1998); see also Hcmy H. 1)c1'l'ilt,JI~, 
Property alld ImlOllatiolt ill the Global bljonllatioll Illfrastructure, 1996 U. CIII. LEGAl. F. 261, 
283-85. Landes and Posner point out that the benefits of contractual anticopying pro\'i. 
sions will vary greatly depending on how widely the work needs to be distributcd to guar-
antee a return to the publisher and whether the work will be resold or publicly pcrforlllcd. 
See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 330. Thus, contractual provisions will not be particu. 
larly useful to some kinds of content providers. But the variable sU'ength of contmctual 
copying restrictions would, in a copylight-free world, shift content providel's' production 
to creative works tllat could be easily protected using contractual and othcl' sclf.hdp 
mechanisms; that the mb,;: of works would change does not necessarily mcall that cl'('alive 
expression would disappear or even decrease on the \"hole. 
99 See Gordon, An Inquiry into Ihe Alelils, supra note 17, at 1401; if. Cathcrinc Grccn· 
man, Taking Sides in the Napsler mlr, N,Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000. at El (discussing scll:hdp 
measure of putting distorted "cuckoo's egg" music files on free file-sharing scrvices). 
100 See gellerally Bell, supra note 98. 
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private contract regime would still depend on the st.'lte as back-up, 
and so might seem to raise similar First Amendment problems, but at 
least no one would be able to control others' use of speech without 
. their prior consent to the seller's terms. Futhermore, general private 
property and contract law, like that which protects printing presses, 
computer servers, and other enabling mechanisms of speech, would 
not be regulation specifically targeted at speech.101 
As the cable industry does, content providers could also run pub-
lic education campaigns against the theft of intellectual property, en-
couraging people to buy only .£i·om authorized providers and educat-
ing the public about how to determine if a book is an original or a 
knockoff.I°2 Noncontractual, self-help measures based purely on per-
suasion are available.I03 One example is shareware, software that is 
provided for free by the creator. Users m'e asked to pay a fee if tile)' 
decide to continue to use the product after trying it out Shm'cwarc 
thrives today, even though only an estimated ten percent of users ac-
cede to this moral suasion.lO-! It might decrease profits, but the First 
Amendment arguably imposes certain costs on speakers, like the costs 
of developing a persuasive countel':.message to unpleasmlt speech. 
Given that there are ways for private actors to protect original 
content through voluntm·y transactions, the government arguably 
does not have a compelling interest in restricting speech tIlrough 
copyright. Yet a regime of self-help might be bad for readers mId 
speakers in a variety of ways, as technical mld contt-actual remedies 
would not have the same leeway for de minimis uses as tile copyright 
101 Maybe, though, effectiveness is not the point. Maybe incffccti\'e counterspeech is 
constitutionally relevant. but effective countermeasures are mainl}' technical or \c.-g:ll. not 
speech themselves, and so they do not count. Yet contract :lnd other fonns of economic 
self-help have strong expressive components: the ob\ious message of:l refusal to deal (or 
for that matter, of a password-protected system) is "do ",hall wanl or you may not ha\'C my 
business." See Suzanne Sangree, Title W[ Prohibitiolls '\gaillsl Hostile EIIl,irollllltlll &xl/n/lInr-
assmellt and tile First AmClldmCllt: No Collisioll in Siglit, 47 RUTGERS L. RE\'. 461. 524 n.288 
(1995). Moreover, if effectiveness does not mauer, then the possibility of counterspeech 
was a red herring from the beginning, covering up :ljudgment that certain speech cannot 
be suppressed no matter how harmful it is and how impossible it is to counter. 
102 See Macrovision Corporation ColltillUes [Is Support of The L\lIli·Tllrjl Cable Task Foree, Bus. 
WIRE, Feb. 13, 1998, allailable in LEXIS, Ne.xis Library, Curnws File. 
103 Commentators have suggested many speech-bascd ways to make speech Illore entic-
ing to convince consumers to choose a particular source, such :IS delh'ering it f."lSter or 
more attractively, in order to maintain their market shares in the absence of cop)Tight. Stt, 
e.g., Breyer, supra note 4, at 281; Gordon, Au IIIquiry' illto Ihe Mrrits, supra note 17,:lt 1401; 
Perritt, supra note 98, at 283-85. 
l().l See Trotler Hardy, Propert), (alld CojJ)"ight) ill Y'bmpacc, 1996 U. CIlI. LEGAL F. 21i, 
222. 
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law, nor would they likely distinguish between fair and unfair use 01' 
the use of a work's idea rather than its expression.lOo Contract and 
technological countermeasures, therefore, might well impede the free 
flow of information contrary to constitutional ideals. Note, hOWeVClj 
that the claim that copyright serves content users' speech interests 
better than the se1f.he1p alternative appeals to First Amendment val· 
ues as such, not to a non-speech compelling government interest. 
C. Speech as Property 
One final way to solve the First Amendment problem is to 
redefine the ground rules: to say that it is property, not speech, at is· 
sue)06 Copyright, the argument goes, recognizes the natural right of 
the creator to control and profit from his creation. The authol' brings 
the work into the world, creating it out of nothing, or out of the raw 
materials of experience, and is thus entitled to dispose of that which 
he has made, like Lear with his children. 
If copyrightable speech is property, then copyright may no longer 
need a free speech justification. Courts occasionally say that it would 
be unfair to make a defendant pay for the material it used, because 
tlIat would h1:lrt free speech interests.107 In standard First Amencltnellt 
contexts, however, it is unremarkable that a person may need to pay 
105 SeeJulie E. C?hen, A Right To Read Anonymollsly: A C/os,~r Look at "CoPYright Mallagl," 
IIIC/lt" in C)'berspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 997-98, 1021-22 (1996); Litman, Reformillg 111-
Jormalion Law, supra note 79, at 601-02; Perritt, supra note 118, at 302. Bcll argucs that 
automated use licensing will benefit users, because "fair use never comes fOJ' frce." Bcll, 
supra note 98, at 580. Consumers incur search costs looking for information aud OPPOI'tll-
nity costs when they photocopy, clip, or type quotes into their signature filcs. lIt- llJ'gllcs 
that automated rights management will reduce such transaction costs, thus giving' till' COli" 
SlimeI' a net benefit despite the addition of a previollsly unnecessary paymcnt to thc rop)'" 
right owner. See id. The conceptual flaw in Bell's reasoning is that if copyright owncl's 
could not charge for fair uses, consumers' net benefit would be much largeI'; the facl that 
they would retain some benefits if they had to pay does not prove that rights l11anagcllll'lIt 
is a good deal for them. (Arguably, many copyright owners will not allow theit- contellt to 
be made available electronically without rights management, but this is an empirical qlll'g. 
tion whose answer is unknown.) Moreovel; anyone who uses Yi1l1001, LEXIS, OJ' a ,"'l'iety of 
other electronic search engines is painfully aware that the new technology'S eITerts 011 
search costs are uncertain at best. If the technology allows more charges by copyright own-
ers but does not improve substantially for users, it will be a bad bargain. 
106 Cf NixOII, 120 S. Ct. at 905 (Stevens,j., concurring). 
107 See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. 
Fla. 1978); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Ceis, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S,D.N.V. 1968). 
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to speak. in a particular way-to take out an ad in the papel; to print 
pamphlets, and so on.1°8 
In this vision, fair use is not a necessary part of copyright; thc 
First Amendment has nothing to say about a requirement that a per-
son has to payor get an owner's consent before she can e}.'}Jl"css hcr-. 
self in a particular way.109 The government is simply barred from pre-
venting 'willing sellers and buyers from making deals.l1O The First 
Amendment and the Copyright Clause are in harmony bccause one 
protects information against government suppression and the other 
protects it against "private depredation. "lll Moreo\,el; absolute prop-
erty rules, under which any interference with rights can be elyoincd 
and punished, are more appropriate than liability rules, under which 
a rights violator only has to pay for the value of what he took.ll2 
Such a theory comes at the price of a good deal of what generally 
seems valuable about free speech. In fact, the state's refusal to inter-
vene in the distribution of material goods in aid of fi .. ee speech may 
only be palatable because speakers can choose fairly £i'cel), £i'om the 
universe of ideas and expression. Jack Balkin points out that, if the 
government chose to close all public fora, leaving speakers to ncgoti-
ate in the private market for space in which to speak, many people 
would sense a First Amendment difficulty. us 
108 CJ. Loyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,570 (1972) (holding that a lando\\1u,'r may 
exclude unwanted speakers from his land). 
109 See Richard A Posner, mu.'n Is Parody Fair (~!'r, 21J. LECAL STUD. 67, 73 (1992) (ar-
guing that the fair use defense should ne\'er be available for satiric uses because Was we do 
not suppose that writers should be allowed to stcal paper and pencils in order to reduce 
the cost of satire, neither is there a compelling rcason to subsidize social criticism byallow-
ing writers to use copyrighted materials ,,;thout compensating the cop}right holder}. 
110 SeeJohn O. McGinnis, The Ollce alld Futurt! Proprrt)'-Basrd ''isioll of tile First AWl'I/timmt, 
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 84-85 (1996). 
111 See ide at 79. . 
112 See Hardy, supra note 104, at 217.1 disagrce ,,;th Hardy on many points, notlcast of 
which is his decision to remO\'c sC\'eral factors that fa\'or latitude for copiers, snch as the 
non-profit-based incentives that people ha\'c to producc speech, from his calculus of 
rights, See ide at 221. Hardy discounts the c.xtcnt to whicll authors usc others' works to spur 
their own creativity, assuming instead that a persoll who \\;shcs to restrict access to his work 
to paying parties is making a choice that only aITccts his 0"11 incenth'cs and ability to crt. .. 
ate. Hardy also gives the game away by restricting his analysis to situations in which cop)ing 
is not amenable to a fair use analysis. See ide at 241. Dcciding whether or not r.,ir use ap-
plies often imposes a large transaction cost on its 0\\11; the difficulty of detcrmining r.,ir 
use in ad\'allce would justity a liability rulc, particularly when a copier acted in good r.,ith 
and mistook the limits of fair usc, 
113 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Lrgal Rralist Llpproachrs to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 400. 
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The property rights argument depends on certain unsound as-
sumptions about the appropriate subjects and scope of ownership,lH 
It takes as a foundation the idea that government is supposed to PI'O-
tect my property, and that such protection does not count as "inteI'-
vention" into the market or the private sphere.115 But this finesses the 
question of how information is converted into property. Why is some-
thing less "my own" if I did not think it up, so long as I said it, or 
made my own copy?116 Implicit in the argument is a modified "sweat 
of the brow" theory-information is mine if I worked to CI'eate it, and 
did not copy too much in the process. 
The sweat of the brow theory is highly troublesome as a 
justification for anything like our current copyright regime. Not only 
has the Supreme Court rather resoundingly rejected it,117 sweat of the 
brow does not explain why facts and ideas are not copyrightable. In 
ij]ust as a legal realist might argue that economic liberty is more than the 
right to sign contracts of adhesion, we understand that exprcssive libcrty is 
not simply the right to make noises in the air directed to no onc in particu-
lar .... Effective communication, or rather its substantivc possibility, is lilt un-
avoidable component of the liberty of speech,just as eJIcctivc bargaining, or 
its substantive possibility, is an essential component of e( onomic libcrty. 
Id. at40l. 
114 The economic modeling of the market for information faces a tl'Oubling concep-
tual problem: The perfectly functioning market assumes perfcct information. But whl'n 
information is itself a marketable commodity, how can tltcre bc frcely circulating full in-
formation in the perfect market? Information does not fit wdl in thc markct model bt" 
cause it is a condition of the market's existence. See James Boyle, A Theory of Law aI/(II"fol~ 
mation: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, alld Insidern'adillg, 80 CAl. L. REv. Jt113, 1420, 1,143-
48 (1992). As a result, a purely property-based vision of information wiII misdcscribc the 
way information exchange actually works. 
115 See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 85 n.149, 123. 
116 Wendy Gordon has recently offered a property theory that trics to avoid these prob-
lems by incorporating restraints on what authors may appropriatc, using the Lockean 1'1'0-
viso that an appropriator must leave "as much and as good" for later takers, Set'Wendy J, 
Gordon, A Property Right ill SelfExpressioll: Equality atlli IllllifJillualislll ill Ihe Nall/l'lIl Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A Properly Righi ill S('/} 
E:..pressionJ. She believes that this approach accommodates free spccch concel'ns without 
requiring explicit application of the First Amendment. See id. at 1539. The restmints she 
would impose look a lot like the ideal expression distinction and the fair use defl'llsl', 
though, and thus her property theory, while it avoids my criticisms of stmldard PI'OPl'I'ty 
theories, does not in my opinion adequately answer First Amendmcnt questiolls IIbout 
cop}Tight. 
117 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The COIu't hilS 
generally maintained that copyright is a creature of statute, not natlll'al !'ight. St'e SOllY 
Corp. v, Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) ("The protectioll given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory. "); id. at 429-30 11.10 ("Copyright is not based UpOll any lIatu-
ral right the author has. "). 
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theory, my idea is no less my O'wn than my expression. Both are em-
bodied in a creative work, and my idea may be far more valuable. One 
answer is that tracing the source of ideas (and facts) can be too 
difficult, and it is cost-unjustified for the law to allow suits for anything 
but copying expression.ll8 Even if this did not sound like a just-so 
story, we do have a relevant example of an intellectual property re-
gime that does not capitulate to tracing difficulties: patent law. The 
first inventor of an idea or discoverer of a fact could be protected in 
similar fashion. 
The property vision also cannot explain the peculim- lights that 
copyright allows authors, such as the right to contI'ol derivative works, 
even if those works would otherwise be independently copylight.1.ble; 
tlle right to control public performmlces; and tI'Ulslation and 
abridgement rights.1l9 In all tllese cases, otller people may do as much 
or more work to bring new expression into tlle world, but tlleir work 
does not count. Their children are illegitimate. Moreover, tlle prop-
erty rights theory makes the limited duration of copyright pm·ticulm·ly 
hard to explain. Houses (and paper and ink) do not revert to a com-
mon pool after an owner has had contI'ol of tllem for a cert.1.in period 
of time. "If I may own Blackacre in perpetuity, why not also Black 
Beaut)'?"120 The standard defense of limited duration from tllis per-
spective is tllat, eventually, tracing tlle cop}'light proprietor "ill be-
come impossible. But surely tllis is only because tlle duration of copy-
right is limited: If it were unlimited, tlle market would generate 
institutions that could find owners,just as it is possible to find out who 
owns any particular piece of Imld. Plenty of permissions orgmlizations 
already exist, such as ASCAP, BMI, and tlle Cop}'light Clem-ance Cen-
ter, There is no reason from a property perspective tlmt anything once 
in their catalogs has to be set free.121 
But a property rights entllUsiast could agree with all tllese criti-
cisms, and argue tllat these limits should be abolished. Greater consis-
tency would cause greater First Amendment concerns, tllOugh, mId 
would still not answer tough questions about tlle scope of owner-
118 See McGinnis, supra note 110, at 83. 
119 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) ("[TJhcrc is no fixctl, immuta-
ble line to tell us which 'human productions' are privatc properly and which arc so gem-
eral as to become 'free as the air."'); Stephen M. McJohn, Fair ({fe alld Privali:.Lllioll ill CoPJ-
right, 35 SAN DIEGO L. RE\'. 61, 80-84 (1998) (arguing that an)' coppightctl work contains 
noncopyrightable elements that a property rights approach is iIl-cquippctl to idcntify). 
120See Nimmer, Cop)'right, supra note 16, at 1193. 
121 See McJohn, supra note 119, at 77-78. 
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ship.122 Even if transaction costs are generally low in cyberspace, it will 
remain just as difficult to distinguish idea from expression or dete .. ~ 
mine substantial similarity in bytes as it is on the printed page,123 
In addition, as Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell point out, 
any interest can be reconceptualized as a property interest to defeat a 
speech claim.l24 Your right to swing your fist ends at my face, but the 
law can define how far my "face" extends. There is no particulal' rea~ 
son the law could not give me a property interest in physical and men-
tal integrity that could be violated by exposure to pornography; no 
reason, that is, but the First Amendment as it is now understood. 
D. Conclusion 
This pai·t examined standard justifications for copyright against 
free speech challenges. The usual suspects-the ideal expression dis~ 
tinction and fair use-attempt to provide a justification that does not 
depend on copyright's speech-enhancing role. Unfortunately, neither 
ideal expression nor fair use bear the necessary weight, primarily be~ 
cause they are too vague to provide a speech user with any real cer~ 
tainty about what she may say.l25 There are also less restrictive alterlla~ 
tives to copyright as we know it that would not require nearly as much 
overt state intervention further weakening the conventional case for 
copyright. And, the proposal to assimilate speech law in its entirety to 
property law is ultimately incapable of avoiding the difficult questions 
122 See David Fewer, CoT/stitutioT/alizing Copyright: Freedolll of Expression ami Ihe Li1llils oj 
Copyrif!Jlt in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 175, 187-88 (1997) (noting' that natuml 
property rights concepts of copyright gloss over the dependence of authors on othc!'!!' 
expression). 
123 Cf. Hardy, supra note 104, at 219 (arguing that low tmn$actioll costsjustify choosing' 
property rules over liability rules for copyright). 
124 See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 24,15-46; see also Eugene Volokh & Mark 
Lemley, Freedolll oj Speech a1ld Inju1IctioT/s in Intellectllal Property Cases, 48 DUK~ LJ. 147 
(1998) (noting that a bill introduced in Congress would have declared the Unitcd Statcs 
flag to be copyrighted and defined flag·burning and desecration as infringement). 
125 As several commentators have noted, the existence of two apparently quite difter· 
entjustifications for finding copyright protection consistent with the First Amendment has 
also caused practical difficulties. The contraction of each doctrine is justified by !'cassul'ing' 
free speech partisans that the other doctrine is still available, so First AlJlendmcnt con-
cerns do not receive serions consideration. See Jessica Litman, Copy tight (lml Illj01'1I1ll1i1J1l 
PoliC)~ LAw & CONTEIIIP. PROBS. 185, 204-06 (1992) [hereinafter, Litm;\II, Copyright (///(1 
l1iformation Policy); Netanel, supra note 63, at 303. One answer 10 this problem might be to 
make a First Amendment analysis an explicit part of copyright decisions, rathel' thnn claim< 
ing that fair use and idea/expression are themselves sufficient. See NIMM~It. FR~~DOM m' 
SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C), at 2-73; Denicola, sllpra note 16, nt 304-06; Litman, 
CopYlight aT/d Injol1llation Policy, supra, at 208; Wang, supra note '16, at 1159, 1177. 
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of how far to extend ownership of intellectual creation.I2G And yet it 
seems inconceivable that copyright could be unconstitutional, since it 
serves such an important public interest. Nor has my aim been to 
suggest that copyright is unconstitutional. R.1.ther, its constitutionality 
depends on the fact that the government interest underlying copy-
right is the promotion of speech. 
ll. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR COPYRIGHT 
.A. HOllJ Copylight Serves First Amendment 11ilues 
When the conflict between free speech and copyright 'was first 
theorized, the natural response 'was that the e>..rpressive and communi-
cative interests involved in copyright protection were constitutionally 
cognizable. Therefore, every recent discussion of copylight and free 
126 One might also argue that appl}ing First Amendment principles is unnccessary in 
coppight because the Framers took free speech into account when they \\Tote the Consti-
tution. As a matter of constitutional history, this claim is debatable at best. Copyright was 
first developed as a tool of official ccnsorship. ~ MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNF.RS 12, 
15 (1993); Pattcrson, supra note 14, at 3. Thc presence of the Copyright Clause was one 
factor in the inclusion of the First Amendmcnt in the Bill of Rights. because anti-
Federalists feared that cop}Tight could be used to reward fa\'ored authors and punish dis-
favored ones. See Fraser, supra note 17, at 19-20 & n.126. Furthermore. the claim thatlhe 
Constitution already balanced free speech interests against coppight does not appear to 
distinguish the Cop}Tight Clausc from any other part of the Constitution. such as the 
Commerce Clause. See NIMMER, FREEDOr.1 OF SPEECH, supra note 15. § 2.05[C] at 2-57. 
The existence of thc Cop)Tight Clausc certainly does not imply that the Copy-
right Act as it exists now comports '\ith thc First Amendment as it c.xists now. Modem 
spcech thcory itself is rather young, constitutionally speaking. Str, {'.g.. Schenk \~ United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs Y. Unitcd States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Before the First 
Amendment was applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, stl'GitIow 
Y. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), "ery few pcople thought to challenge long .. ,cceptetl 
practices such as bans on blasphemy, obscenity, libel, and politically sub\'crsh'c speech. On 
its side, cop}Tight has expandcd substantiaIly in reccnt years. The demise of thc registra-
tion requirement has made cop}Tight easier to obt.,in and harder for a potential user to 
determine. The cop)Tight term has doubled and redoubled. The media coveretl by copy-
right law have expanded to include new forms and some older ones, such as newspapers, 
that were previously considered too cphcmeral to warrant cop}Tight protection. Perfonn-
anee, translation, and dcrivati\·c rights havc becn added to the original replication rights, 
ghing to the copyright mmer the sole right to authorize adaptations and reworkings that 
were once up for grabs. See, e.g., Stowe Y. Thomas, 23 F. c."lS. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); Fol-
som Y. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). As both kinds of information polityex-
pand their scope, it is 110t surprising that thcy would collide. 
Another important point about tIle claim that the CoP}Tighl Clause itselr does 
the free speech balancing job is that it finesses a crucial question of institutional compe-
tence. The claim is not really that thc CIa liSt! balances free speech concerns \\ith other 
goals, but that Congress does ill the cop}Tight law it enacts. I take up thc issue of congres-
sional balancing in Part III. See i7lfra notes 217-251 and accompan}ing tc.xt. 
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speech calls attention to the Supreme Court.'s pronouncement in 
Harper & Rmv, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterplises: "The Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be an engine of free expression. By estab-
lishing a marketable right to use one's expression, copyright supplies 
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. "127 While the 
Court was at the time mainly concerned with copyright's furtherance 
of the First Amendment privilege not to speak,128 its language has 
generally been taken to have wider import, covering copyright's 
speech-productive incentives as well)29 In a leading treatise on free-
dom of speech, Professor Nimmer takes the same position. He con-
cludes that, though expression ordinmily deserves protection from 
government suppression, the ideal expression dichotomy is justified 
by the counter-speech value of encouraging authorship.Iso That is, a 
speech-promoting regulation can justifiably snppress more speech 
than a regulation with a permissible but non-speech-promotillg 
aim)31 
When government enforces copyright, it encourages a broad, 
diverse array of publicly available ideas and expressions, a core inter-
est underlying the First Amendment.182 Free speech values, then, sup-
port affirmative government action to encourage speech by harness-
ing the power of the market. The marketplac(~ is 110t just a forum 
where ideas compete for dominance, but a literal (if not always liter-
127 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). The contention that the Framers held this belief Is 
probably wrong, given copyright's historical connection to censorship. Sec Frusel; slIpm 
note 17, at 19-20. 
128 See Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559. 
129 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 63, at 289. 
130 See NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 15, § 2.05[C], at 2-66 11.18'1: set' (lisa 
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 990. 
131 Cf. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 13'16, 1357-58 (2000) 
(Souter, j., concurring) (students' First Amendment objection to activity fcc was leS$ per-
suasive because the purpose of the fee was to increase speech): Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding publicly financed campaign subsidies becaus/! 
they facilitated First Amendmen t self.governmen t goals). 
132 The Association of American Publishers expressed the point with understandable 
firmness: 
Freedom of expression is meaningless unless works arc created and distrib-
uted ... , [T]he copyright law assures that there is opportunity for 1'{'COUp" 
ment of the intellectual and financial investment of authors and publishers, 
that their creative efforts arc maintained, and that their works arc made aV<liI· 
able to the public. It is essential to the purpose of the First Amendment, 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Publishers, Inc., supra note 1 (footnote 
omitted); see also Goldwag, supra note 17, at 23: Shipley, supra note 17, :It 986-87; WlIng. 
supra note 46, at 1177. 
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ary) marketplace where ideas get traded for money. "\"l'J.tat the "engine 
of free expression" argument means, simply enough, is that there are 
First Amendment interests on both sides of a copyright case. The 
plaintiff complaining about copying upholds the public interest inso-
far as a prohibition on copying preserves creators' incenth'es to put 
creative material in the marketplace, just as the defendant upholds 
the public interest insofar as copying is necessary to enable broad ac-
cess to information. 
The full argument that there are First Amendment interests on 
both sides presupposes that the extent to which a speaker is heard is a 
constitutionally relevant fact.133 Being heard is crucial to a speaker. 
The government cannot require speakers to speak in the middle of 
the night on an island off the mainland even if it prO\ides speakers 
free transportation there. Speech values are harmed when govern-
ment acts in ways that substantially impair speakers' ability to com-
municate. Thus, copyright aids free speech because "[e]ffecti\'e dis-
semination of creative work costs money. "1M 
Free speech theory sometimes seems to imagine a nation of 
speakers each yammering into a void. Copyright, by contrast, empha-
sizes the communal nature of creati,ity and speech. People only share 
their ideas because there is an audience, and copyright is limited be-
cause speakers depend on what was said before. Correspondingly, lis-
teners are entitled to speech rights because tlley may choose to adopt 
tlle messages tllat others are sending and also because tlleir varying 
interpretations may enrich our shared dialogue as much or more than 
the original message. The speech-interests-on-botll-5ides argument 
asserts that preserving a market share for speakers is constitutionally 
relevant because speakers often need an incentive to speak. If tlle 
government refuses to enforce copyright, tlle mm'ket for ideas \\ill 
end up impoverished. 
B. Implications Jor GeneralFree Speech Docllillt! 
Copyright is not a constitutional mlomaly. There are a series of 
areas in which First Amendment interests may be served by resu'icting 
and channeling speech. The reasons for government regulation are 
different, but they are analogous. To have a healtllY, dynmnic system 
of speech, tllere must be certain architectural limits on tlle system 
133 CJ. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisc.xual Group, 515 U.s. 557, 568 
(1995) (noting that a parade's expressive content is meaningless if no one sees it). 
1M 'Wang, supra note 46, at 1178. 
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that shape what occurs therein.135 Many people agree with this claim. 
as applied to property rights, but not to speech; intellectual property, 
which bridges the gap between the two, shows that speech cannot es· 
cape government structuring, because speech is often capable of sup· 
pressing other speech. 
One major purpose of my comparison of copyright and other 
market failure or speech-versus-speech theories is to suggest that First 
Amendment absolutists, who have busied themselves fending off 1'aeli· 
cal attacks in areas such as campaign finance, s(~xual harassment, por-
nography, and hate speech, should be attending to the apparently 
enormous exception to standard First Amendment doctrine embod· 
ied in copyright. Copyright, after all, covers every single fixed piece of 
expression,136 not just isolated areas of the universe of free speech. 
But it is not unconstitutional, because its absence would be worse for 
speech. Broad indictments of regulations designed to promote some 
speech by controlling other kinds threaten to make copyright look 
unconstitutional; this is a reason to reject those broad theories, 01' at 
least to cabin them. 
This section elaborates on the incentive arg·ument for copyl'ight, 
explaining how it is properly described as a market failure theory that 
enlists government to achieve a better balance of speech, and how 
copyright's incentive structure has predictable effects on content. In 
many cases of speech-versus-speech conflict, the market failure 
identified can only be addressed by some form of regulation that can 
be described as content-based. The question is not whether one has to 
accept all such regulations if one accepts any, because there are rea· 
sonable distinctions between the various kinds of market failures. In-
stead, my aim is to show that a basic problem of speech-versus-speech 
underlies several important kinds of regulations and proposed regula· 
tions, and that the case against them must not rely on the simple claim 
that the government has to be kept out of the world of speech. 
I want to be clear that I remain uncertain about the wisdom of 
these various regulations. My understanding, howevel; is that many 
people support copyright and oppose one or more of the other 
speech regulations discussed in this section, usually without consider-
ing the relationship between those two positions, and I am interested 
in whether that is a consistent stance. My sense is that one's conclu-
1$5 See, e.g., eass Sunstein, A New Dealfor Speech, 17 HASTINGS LJ. 137 (HJ!l4). 
136 And a few unfixed; for example, one can infringe by publicly performing n cop),-
righted work even if the performance is not fixed. 
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sion about whether copyright is fundamentally distinguishable from 
other regulations depends mainly on one's beliefs about the e."dent to 
which the First Amendment should invalidate laws that dispropor-
tionately burden the speech of disadvant<lged groups that are not 
primarily defined by the content of their speech. The First Amend-
ment, conventionally understood, regulates the conditions under 
which the law may disfavor people based on their beliefs and their 
speech (Communists, pornographers, copiers). But, at times, the dis-
favored categories precede the speech, and speech regulations only 
have a disparate impact on people in those categories rather than 
creating the categories. It is possible that the First Amendment is pri-
marily concerned with laws that create a category of disfavored speak-
ers, not laws that may enhance prior disadvanL.'lges by regulating 
speech. Yet that First Amendment seems impoverished mId unrealistic 
to me.137 
1. The Basic Analogy Between Cop}'light and Other Mm·ket-Failure-
Based Speech Regulations 
The argument for government intervention is not unique to 
copyright. It is made by a number of prominent scholm-s discussing 
pornography, sexual harassment, hate speech, cmnpaign finmlce, mId 
new media.l38 For example, racist speech is said systematically to un-
13; For example, African Americans and Jews who were drmm to Communism were, in 
part, responding to discrimination, while the racial and ethnic composition o[ the Ameri-
can Communist Party added extra impetus to the movement [or its suppression; disfm-ored 
• groups can define themselves, and be defined, through regulated speech. Sre JAMES 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCO'ITSBORO 27-29, 74-84, 204 (1994) (African Americans); Da\id 
Suchoff, Tlze Rosenberg Cose alld the New Hllx Illtellectuals, ill SECRET AGENTS: TilE ROSEN-
BERG CAsE, McCARTHYISM, AND FIFTIES AMERICA (M;ujorie Garber &: Rebecca 1.. Walko-
,~itz eds., 1995) 153, 158-59, 161 Uews). Moreo\'er, I see no strong reason why the First 
Amendment should limit its protection to cases in which the suppression of a definable 
group's speech is intentional. 
138 See generally OWEN FISS, LIBERAUSM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TilE MAN\" 
USES OF STATE POWER (1996); FREEING THE FIRST &IENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 195-223 (Da\id S. Allcn &: RobcrtJcnsen cds., 1995); C.-\TIIARINE 
A. ?>.L\CKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET At-, WORDS TIIAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND TIlE FIRST AMENDMENT 77-78 (1993); 
THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEEcn (1..·mraJ. Lederer &: Richard Del-
gado eds., 1995); CAss SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TIlE PROBLEM OF FREE SI'E£ClI (1993); 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedolll oj Expression in tlte Wornplau alld th~ Probltlll oj Discrimillatory 
Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 687, 694-95, 735 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Frtt Spr«ll allli Social 
Strudure, 71 IOWA 1.. REv. 1405 (1986); Owen M. FISS, n7l)' tlt~State1, 100 lIAR\'. 1.. RE\'. 781 
(1987); Sangree, supra note 101, at 559-60 (arguing tllal sc.xual harassment law furthers 
HeinOnline -- 42 B.C. L. Rev. 40 2000-2001
40 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 42:1 
dermine and devalue the speech of minority groups, because racist 
speech silences minorities and makes their speech seem less credible 
when it does appear.139 Unlimited campaign spending arguably dis~ 
torts democratic dialogue by allowing wealthy donors and interest 
groups to set the public agenda, while politica] deliberation gets lost 
in the scramble for cash. Cable providers may exclude broadcasters 
from their former audiences by refusing to carry them as pmt of a 
cable package. 
The analogy can be seen by describing copyright's incentive 
mechanisms in greater detail. Copying makes original authors less 
attractive to publishers because there is not much point in paying for 
what others will then take for free. Audiences will pay less attention to 
the original speaker if her work can be freely reproduced by others, 
perhaps even without attribution.140 Ultimately, copying makes 
authors less willing to enter into the market in lhe first place. The ar~ 
gument for cop}'light explains how piratical speech can have negative 
effects on authors and audiences' access to spe<::ch, just as the radical 
case for speech regulation explains how hate speech can distort the 
speech incentives of minority-group members and the receptivity of 
potential audiences or how political donations can crowd certain 
views out of the public domain. Therefore, copyright and the radical 
theories have a family resemblance in that they identify certain 
mechanisms that operate through speech and that negatively affect 
the functioning of the marketplace for speech. 
The similarity in the arguments for regulation is apparent, for 
example, in Catharine MacKinnon's argument for a civil rights rem~ 
edy for pornography. Not only does MacKinnon argue that porno~ 
graphic speech silences women's speech, her analysis converges with • 
that of infringement doctrine. Both in evaluation of substantial si11li~ 
larity and in application of the fair use defense. copyright refuses to 
look at an accused work as a whole. This is because the cxitical issue is 
the harm the defendant may have done to th(! plaintiff by using a 
copyIighted work, no matter what else the defendant may have cre~ 
free speech values); Frederick Schauer, The Political IlIddellce of Jlle hee SPeech Plindple; (14 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 935 (1993). 
139 See, e.g., 'Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Lei Him Go: Regulating Racist Spe/'ch oil 
Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431, 458-61; Mari]. Matsuda, Public Respollse to Racist Slm'ch: Con-
sideling the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2323-26 (1989). 
140 Cf David L. Marcus, Faux Vimllegut Talk Sheds Light 011 P(lltJel' of 'Net, BOS'rON GLOu~, 
Aug. 13, 1997, at D1 (discussing problems that occur whcn a creativc work is widdy 
misatlributed). 
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ated in the course of so doing. MacKinnon likewise rejects the "w'ork 
as a whole" standard of obscenity law: "[T]aking the work 'as a whole' 
ignores [the fact that] legitimate settings diminish the inj11l1' per-
ceived to be done to those whose trivialization and objectification it 
contextualizes .... If a woman is subjected, why should it matter that 
the work has other value?"141 This agreement on what is essentially a 
detail of the respective regulatory schemes shows how both kinds of 
market-failure theories attend to what a regulable work does in the 
world and not to what it says in itself.142 
The incentive-based or speech-on-both-sides argument also ap-
pears where relatively new media are at issue and, lacking a tradition, 
their structure and function are contestable.14S Government has to do 
something about new media, and the Supreme Court has recognized 
that government action will inevitably balance speech against speech 
in such cases. The Court has accepted the theory that the Federal 
Communications Commission was established because an unregu-
lated radio spectrum led to chaos. So many people were trying to talk 
that they cancelled each other out.l44 'While other forms of regulation, 
including a property regime based on first-in-time capture of spec-
trum, would also have worked, possibly better, some form of govern-
ment-backed rights holding 'was necessary to enable broadcast 
speech.l45 Although broadcasters were private entities, their actions 
threatened to "snuff out the free speech of others." The Court ulti-
mately found that there was no right to do so, and that there was a 
HI Catharine A MacKinnon, POTllography, Civil Rights, alld SjJt'«II, 20 HAm'. c.R.-c.L. L. 
REv. 1, 21 (1985); see also CATHARINE A MACKINNON, TOWARD A FDIINISTTUEORY OF TIlE 
STATE 202 (1989). 
142 Self-help arguments also align against cop}right and hate speech/pornography 
regulation. See supra notes 27-40 and accompaIl}ing tc.xl. 
143 See Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 1, at 408 (1"0 the c.xtent that the cop}right 
is perceiyed as an economic de\ice to advance the public interest in dissemination of intel-
lectual products it is comparable to a broadcast license. Both arc monopolies granted by 
the government to facilitate the distribution of information. Both bear the same public 
interest burden."); see also Columbia Broad. S}'s. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.s. 9-1 
(1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
144 See Red Lion, 395 U.S at 376 ("Without go\,crnmcnt control, the medium would be 
oflittIe use because of tIle cacaphon)' of competing \·oices. none of which could be clearly 
and predictably heard."). 
145 SeeThomas ,,,,T. Hazlett, Physiml Smrci~l~ Relit &tkillg, alld th~ Fint J\III~I/lllllnlt, 9; Co-
LUM. L. REv. 905 (1997) [hereinafter Hazlett, Physical Scam{l']; Thomas W. Hazlett, Th~ 
Rationalil)' of U.S. Regulation of the Bl'Oadmsl SPrctTlllII, 33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990) l hereinaf-
ter Hazlett, Rationality]. 
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strong government interest in preventing such silencing.H6 In addi~ 
tion, the Court has found that there is a First Amendment interest ill 
encouraging the dissemination of a diversity of views via broadcast 
media.147 
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld must-cany rules l'e~ 
quiring cable providers to carry local broadcast stations in ordel' to 
preserve the profitability of broadcast so tlIat free local television will 
remain widely available.148 Cable providers are required to subsidize 
broadcast television for the greater public good, just as fair use argua~ 
bly requires some authors to subsidize others for the greater good.1,J!) 
The Court found the costs of must-carry rules to cable providers 
could be justified in large part because of con<:erns that cable could 
146 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387. In Associated Press v. United States, the Suprcmc Court tip-
held antitrust controls on newspapers on similar grounds: MFrecdom of the prcss from 
governmental interference under the First Amendmcnt docs not sanction rC)I'ession of 
that freedom by private interests." 326 U.S. 1,20 (1945) (footnotc omitted), Bccause the 
First Amendment is based on the belief that a diversity of available vicws is essential to II 
free socicty, its "command that the govcrnmcnt itself shall 110t impcde the fl'ec flow of 
ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose I'cslmints 
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom." Id. 
147 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Conlin., 436 U.S. 775(1978); see all'o Time Wal'llc1'l~l1tlll't 
Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 976 (D.C. Cil: 1996) (holding that public acccss to a divcrslt)' of 
views and sources of opinion is an interest Mat the core ofthc First Amcndmcnt"). 
148 See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
149 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Ellioll, /111:., 
521 U.S. 457 (1997), sheds some light on the question of when a group can bc ta)(cd to 
support others' speech. Glickman upheld indusu'y-specific tlL'WS to support generic IIdvel'-
tising for that industry'S products. Although people often have a right not to be compclled 
to pay for others' speech, the Court held that the government c:ould assess fees for product 
advertising. SeeAbood v. Deu'oit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court rcachcd this 
conclusion becausc, first, no producer had to change or restrain its own advcrtising. cven 
though the regulation decreased the money available to pay for such ads. Copyrighililllits, 
too, never resu-ain authors, even if some authors make less moncy because of them. Sec-
ond, the regulations did not compel speech from anyone; no producer Was requircd to 
associate itself with the generic ads. A copyright mmer is not compcllcd to rcpcat 01' ell-
dorse a fair use out of his 01' her mm mouth. Cj. Pruneyard Shopping CI1~ v. Robins, tJ41i 
U.S. 74, 88 (1980). Third, there was no compulsion to cndorse or financc any political 01' 
ideological views. In copyright, fair lIsers might well advocatc for some ideological vil.'w-
point, but the governmcnt would not have chosen any such mcssage, and in that sense the 
burden is less than that imposed by a government decision to make a plum producer pay 
for ads that say that all plums are tasty. Inasmuch as f.'lir use is decentr:llized, it is 1I0t a~ 
worrisome as taxes on magazines or papel: And, like a progrcssive income tax, it llIay 
weigh most heavily on the Mrichcst" works. Glickman's underlying point was that compul-
sory ta.'{es for advertising were justified, evcn though some peoplc objccted, because the 
contributions increased the welfare of the producers as a whole,just as limits 011 copyright 
increase the welfare of authors as a whole by allowing them to dmw on sources of inspit'a-
tion and information. 
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take anticompetitive action against broadcast competitors, squeezing 
broadcasters out of the market. 
That anticompetitive possibilit}~ howevel~ relies on the behavior 
of the television audience. Even if cable did not can)' broadcast 
channels, television households could get the benefit of both if they 
used manual switches. But the average viewer is unwilling to use a 
switch. Because the television audience is composed of teclmologi-
cally inept couch potatoes, cable providers could exclude broadcast-
ers from cable households. The Court characterized this interaction 
between cable providers and the market they face as a matter of pro-
viders' power: "A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can 
thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the 
switch. The potential for abuse of this private power over a ccnu-al 
avenue of communication cannot be overlooked. "150 Crucially, the 
power to silence depends not on any technological facts but on belzav-
ioral facts; not on characteristics of the speaker but of the audience. lSI 
Insofar as they look to the appropriate conditions for the mmdmiza-
tion of speech given the ",ray that people actually behave, the must-
carry rules have the same justifications as copyright, campaign 
finance reform, and regulation of hate speech and pornography. 
Others have noted that copyright is relevant to more politicized 
free speech issues. Eugene Volokh and like-minded scholars, who 
think that the radical theories are a very bad idea, have also become 
nervous about copyright.I52 Meanwhile, some of the radical thcorists 
are arguing that courts' unhesitating acceptance of copyright, a 
speech restriction that serves the interests of the wealthy and power-
150 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656. 
151 See Yochai Benkler, Free as tlle Air to Common Usr: First Jilllflldlllflli Cot/strait/ts ot/ En· 
clomre of tlle Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 374 (1999) (noting that barriers to llIul· 
tiple cable operators competing for cadt \icwer are not really physical or technologirnl but 
economic). 
152 See gt!llerall)' Volokll & Lemley, supra notc 124; Yoloklt & McDonnell. supra note 57. 
See also E.'i:pert Report of Professor I..a\\TCnCC Lessig, A & M Records. Inc. \', Napster. Inc •• 
114 F. SUppa 2d. 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (Nos. 99-5183. 00-0074), availablr al http://dl,nap-
ster.com/lessig.pdf (Iast\isited Oct. 31, 2000) (discussing intersection betwccn free speech 
and coppight in the Napstcr Music file-shating litigation); Brief of Amici Curiae J\ssocia· 
tion of Am. Physicians & Surgcons, Inc. et al., A & M Records. Inc. \'. Napster, ]nc., 2000 
U.S. App. LEXiS 18688 Qui}' 28, 2000) (Nos, 00-164.01, 00-16-t03), avai/ablt at http:// 
dl.napster.com/amicus_physicians.pdf (last \isited Oct. 31, 2000) (anti·;,bortion grOllp 
opposing injunction against cop}nght infringement on the grounds that such injunctions 
could be used against other kinds of speech); Brief of American Chil Liberties Union et 
aI., A & M Records, Inc. Y. Napster, Inc., 2000 U,S. App. LEXIS 18688 Uul}. 28. 2000) (Nos. 
00-16401, 00-16403), available at http://www.adunc.org/cyber/ napstcJ·-brief.hunl (last 
\isited Oct. 31, 2000) (opposing copyright injunction 011 frec speech grounds). 
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ful, is unprincipled and hypocritical when the radical theories of 
regulation are brushed aside as incompatible with free speech.tlill 
What the people on both sides of the issue-particularly the radical 
theorists-have not yet discussed, however, is that copyright is llotjust 
a run-of:.the-mill speech restriction. It is a member of a family of 
speech restrictions unified by the claim that some government regula-
tions improve the functioning of the market for speech by acting as 
the equivalent of a police force keeping order.I5<l Copyright is the pel'-
feet demonstration of Stanley Ingber's point that marketplace theo-
ries readily lend themselves to arguments for government interven-
tion. Once we decide that a market is valuable because it furthers 
individual choice, it becomes possible to argue that individuals should 
be regulated in aspects of their market behavior to increase the ag-
gregate amount of choice.I55 
The fact that incentives to speak have constitutional weight and 
deserve First Amendment consideration is important. Ifwe accept the 
speech-enhancing justification for copyright, we cannot easily dismiss 
other market-failure claims. If copyright serves dIe First Amendment, 
we cannot say, as the Supreme Court has, that "the concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment. "156 
a. The Importance of Incentives for Future Speech 
One response to my claim of sU'uctural similarity between copy-
right and other market-failure theories is that copyright is 110t about 
153 See, e.g., Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Tell ArglllllmlS Agai1lst lIalc-Spredi Rt'gll/a-
lioll: How lfllid'!, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 475, 484 (1996); Richard Delgado &: David H. \\111, Pm-
slIre Valves alld Bloodied Chicke1ls: An Allalysis of Palemalistic Objectiolls 10 lIaie Sptwh Rt'gll/a-
lioll, 82 CAL. L. REv. 871, 892 (1994); Martin E. Lee, The Pliee Hi' Pay: The Case Agaillst 
Racist Speech, Hale Propagallda and Pomography, NAT'L CAnl. REI'., Oct. 4, 1996, at 17 (book 
review). 
15-1 The incentive-based argument is not limited to left-leaning acadcmics cvcn outsldc 
the copyright field. For example, Justice 'White, dissenting in Gerlz. v. Robert lIHch, IIIC., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974), argued that private indhiduals should not faC(' high b<lrricrs to libel suits: 
"It is not at all inconceivable that virtlmlly unrestrnined dcfamnlory rcmarks abollt primtc 
citizens will discournge them from speaking out and concerning thcmselvcs with social 
problems." Id. at 400 (White,]., dissenting). See also Richard A. Epstein. Pllblicatioll, (/1/(111/11 
First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendmellt Exeepliona/isll/, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1033 
(2000) (arguing that enjoining defamatory broadcasts would ultim<ltely strengthen till' 
press's information-gathering ability by increasing its credibility). 
155 See Ingbe1~ supra note 23, at 4-5. 
156 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). 
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restricting A's speech to enhance the relative voice of B. e\'en if it is 
about restricting A's speech to B's advantage. Because this characted-
zation does not note that the advantage that copyright confers on B is 
based on the attractiveness of B's speech-people who want it will 
have to pay-this reformulation makes copydght sound even worse 
from a free speech perspective, like an aggressive libel law or resUic-
tions on seditious speech or bans on comparative price ad\'ertising for 
alcohol, all of which benefit one group at another's eh'Pense. :More 
importantly, the "advantage and not speech" characterization does 
not descdbe the reasoning tllat cow·ts and tlleorists actually use to 
defend copyright, and it is tllis reasoning tllat is structurally similar to 
other, less favored arguments. Copyright is justified .because of its sys-
tematic effects on future speakers--tlle profits tlmt copydght makes 
possible will spur many people to invest in creating speech. 
Once we concede that harm to market-based incentives to speak 
in tlle future is harm to First Amendment-protected interests, how-
ever, it makes little sense to limit tlle cogniz.'lble class of speech-
suppressing private acts to that which merely copies and sllcks off 
profits. It is not the profit-making or even tlle profit-stealing nature of 
the infringement fuat is constitutionally relevant. It is tlle decrease in 
tlle speaker's incentive to speak, which could also be caused by speech 
fuat derided her or by speech so pervasive tlmt her message was lost, 
tllat triggers First Amendment interests on her side.157 Put another 
way, it is descriptively false to say tllat First Amendment law is not con-
cerned 'wifu silencing (defined as pdvate parties' acts tlmt decrease 
other private parties' incentives to speak) or crowding out (defined as 
private parties' speech tllat makes otller private parties' speech less 
likely to be attended to). 
lATe regulate when we tllink tllat incentives to speak deserve pro-
tection. Thus, we regulate copiers, but not people who tell other peo-
15i Frank Michelman points out tlmt "silencing" is usually as figurath'c as it is literal: 
American constitutional law has long indulgcd in C\'cn morc extended 
figurations of silencing, reaching back at least to the moment when it was re-
solved that punishment of speech already uttered, as well as prior restraint of 
yet·unuttered speech, can count as an abridgment of the freedom of speech 
and a cognate deprivation of liberty forbidden by the first and fourteenth 
amendments, The silencing "Tought by criminaliz.'llion of speech acts is less 
direct, more metaphorical, and no more reliabl}' efficacious than that 
'\Tought (on Professor MacKinnon's account) by pornography. 
Frank I. Michelman, Collceptions o/Democrac), ill Jillle/icall ColIslitllliolloi.tbglllllml: 77/t Case oj 
Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291, 296 n.13 (1989) (citations omitted). 
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pIe that they should not scream at their children. Though both de-
crease others' incentives to speak, only one group does so in a way we 
recognize as unjustified. Alternatively, if really good government de-
creased the public's incentive to speak out on public affairs, because 
there was no reason to complain, we would not worry about First 
Amendment problems. The distinction between acceptable silencing 
and unacceptable, thus regulable, silencing is necessary and valid. 
Since we can never escape choices about whose speech to favor, we 
should focus on why we choose one group over another. 
The free speech justification for copyright may also seeIil distinct 
from other market failure arguments because it sounds in economics; 
it is about cold-blooded economic calculation, not artistry and the joy 
of creation.I5S By contrast, the explanations for why pornography, 
hate speech, or well-funded political campaigns can suppress others' 
speech seem psychological and mushy. Economic rationality works 
through psychological structures, of course, as any human motivation 
does, but we are not accustomed to thinking of it that way. It seems 
easier to say that people who feel threatened and oppressed by others' 
speech should just grit their teeth and fight back with better ideas 
than to say that people who are upset by others' copying should take 
pride in the joy of creation itself and should be glad that their expres-
sion reaches so many people. Nevertheless, the other market-failure 
theories can equally be described as problems of economic incentives, 
just as authorship and creativity can readily be described in romantic 
ways that ignore the influence of economic incentives. 
The same is true on the audience's end. Jack Balkin has recently 
argued that all speech competes with other speech in an important 
way-audience time is limited, and someone who is watching The X-
Files is not debating foreign policy at the local Republican Party head-
quarters.159 The real scarcity that is relevant to First Amendment 
analysis is of people's time and attention, not of opportunities to 
speak in any particular medium. Competition exists in 11 on-
economic-or at least nonmonetized-registers as well.I6o 
158 Standard copyright rhetoric merges the author and the cntrcprcncul', I'ccognizlng 
that the author who has an interest in making moncy will ('ontmct with pcoplc who can 
distribute her works. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 53-54. Evcn whcn wc conceivc of crca-
tivity as psychologically motivated, we expect that the impulse to gct widc rccognition 1'01' 
that creativity will be economic; why else would a creator sclI hcr rights to a publishCI'? 
159 See Balkin, supra note 113, at 409. 
160 A related point is that speech is therefore, like othcr apparcntly unlimitcd "public" 
goods, vulnerable to slow erosion. Some theorists argue that using an idca ncvcI' "dcplctcs" 
it in the manner of a physical resource. See Mark A. Lemley, Th,~ Economics of /mprovl'meJIl ill 
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Once we accept that speech trades off with speech, it is simply a 
matter of calculation to determine how much exposure to pornogt"a-
phy decreases a woman's incentive to participate in public life, or how 
much spending by the major political parties decreases a new party's 
ability to reach potential converts.I61 Then, if those disincentives are 
unjustified, we n~ed to figure out how to counteract them. Maybe 
sometimes regulation would be more justified than in particular cases 
of copying for fun and profit. 
b. COp)'light's Effects on Content 
Because the other market-failure theories are often rejected on 
the grounds that they impermissibly regulate the content of speech, it 
is useful to look in greater detail at copyright's effects on content. In a 
world without copyright, information would be distributed differently. 
There would probably be patrons of the arts, bOtll governmental and 
private, and the content of that art would be shaped by patrons' pref-
erences. Without copyright, coordination difficulties and free riding 
problems would make it difficult for the less wealtlly to aggt'egatc 
their resources and fund creativity; tlms, as Neil Netanel argues, 
wealth and power would likely have more influence on tlle kinds of 
expression that would be readily distributed.162 COllversely, copyright 
encourages creators (and investors) toward works tlmt may prove 
popular with some market segment. The desire to give a mass audi-
ence what it will pay for, while not dispositive of content, makes a 
significant difference in many creative decisions.163 Cop}'light encour-
IntellectualPropert), Law, 75 TEX. L REv. 989,1045 (1997); Mc;John, slIpra note 119. nt 106-
07. But overexposure can drain an idea, or 01 kind of expression derh'ec:l from that ide:t, of 
vitality; consider Seillfeld and the Spice Girls. Whether coppight protects ngninst such 
overexposure or encourages it is nnother question entirely. 
161 CJ. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 284-90 (1992) (pro\iding equation to de-
termine whether abortion should be banned). I do not me:tn that these rnlculations \,ill 
be easy or exact, just that factfinders (such as Congress) could gnther relC\-allt C\idellce 
and judge its credibility: 
162 See Netanel, supra note 63, at 288. 
163 See Benkler, supra note 151, nt 400-08. Benkler nrgues that e:tch increment of copy-
right protection encourages further centralization. which harms t!emocrncy nnt! dh·ersity. 1 
understand him to be arguing about the ncgath'e effects of marginnl increases in copy-
right, not copyright in general. See id. nt 394 n.180, 401. I agree that 01 thin copyright fo-
cused on preserving incentives to create by protecting agninst wholesale, 1I0ntrnnsfonnn-
!h'e copying would be best for speech. Especially as Bcnkler's c.xplanation of why incrensed 
rights increase centralization relies hea\ily on large orgnniz.,tiolls' nbilit)' to crente derh-a-
!h'e (transformati\'e) works from their stockpiles. I doubt his mtalysis would produce \\idel)' 
di\'ergent results from mine. 
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ages the creation and dissemination of the speech of those who seek 
economic rewards, decreasing the relative voices of those who create 
for personal satisfaction, for the glory of God, or for the respect and 
praise of the audience. 
Perhaps the model of television and radio programming would 
exist in some modified form in the absence of copyxight, so that in-
teresting stories would be available for free, their content pervaded 
with ads so that the average consumer would sit through the ads to get 
the story. In that case, we might expect that creators whose work does 
not fit well next to an ad for Burger King fries would have a harder 
time reaching an audience; as evidence for this proposition, consider 
that the markets for books and even film are much more varied than 
the television and radio markets. 
Authorial self-help as descxibed in Section I.C above would likely 
be popular, and media that would be easiest to copy-protect would 
receive the most investment-computer disks that could be read Ollce 
and would then erase themselves, for example, instead of traditional 
books. Self-help would have effects on content as well as form. Copy-
I suspect, however, that Benkler romanticizes the possibility ofa Icss-copyrightcd 
world. He argues that concentrated media systems are likely 10 exclude challcngcs to the 
prevailing wisdom and translate unequal economic power into uncqual pOWCI' to set the 
terms of public debate. See id. at 377-78. But how would small, divcrse sources obtnin a 
wide audience without the possibility of large-corporation allianccs for distribution, as his 
exemplar Matt Drudge (briefly) did? Cf David Segal, Big Record Labels Slart 10 Like Ihe SOil/III 
of Ollline klusic, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at HI (discussing large labels' distl'ibutional 
and content-sorting advantages). Also, because Benkler focuses on the individual as the 
source of meaning, he appears to discount the value of common culture-in Imlay's cco-
nomic language, the "network effects" of having The Wizard ofOz as a commOnl'efCl'cllt. 
Finally, Benkler does not fully defend the argument that conccntl11ted mcdia gi-
ants decrease diversity. Even Disney produces arguably blasphemous movics tl11'ollgh nn 
affiliate. Some economic theory suggests that large corpOl11tiOIlS will supply some contcnt 
that appeals to specialized tastes as well as to the median taste in order 10 caplUl'e ns much 
of the market as possible; if a provider can offer only one TV channel, it lllay well pl'ogmlll 
for the median taste, but if it has three it may try to appcal to thc top thrce grollps. &'~, 
e.g., Daniel L. Brenner, OWllership ami COlltellt Regulatioll ill Alergillg ami Emergillg fIJI'dill. ,J& 
DEPAUL L. REv. 1009 (1996); Benjamin M. COlllpaine. The Imjlact of Owtlership QII COlltellt: 
Does it Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 755 (1995). Indced, in my view, the risk that 
combining conglomerate power with the modern ability to target subscts of lilt audience 
will lead to too much fragmentation is at least as great as the risk ofviewpoillt hOlllogcnitn. 
tion. Every reader can now receive a personalized newspaper wiling her only nbout things 
she already knows she cares about. The risk in this scenario is thnt we will lose :Illy com-
mon culture. See Todd Gitlin, PI/blic Spheres or Public Sphericl/les?, ill M~DIA. RITUAL AND 
IDENTITY 168 (Tamar Liebes & James Curran eds., 1998); Elihu I(:ttz, AlId Delil/('1' Us /tom 
Segmelltation, ill BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND TilE NEW MEDIA WORLD (ROg('I' 
G. Noll & Monroe Joseph Turow eds" 1997). I believe that copyright and its limits can help 
us navigate a path between Scylla and Charybdis. 
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right encourages investment in entertainment oyer facts, as facts are 
not copyrightable. If authors had to use other means to protect their 
work, they would presumably be equally able to protect facts and 
fictions, and therefore there would not be a copyright-ulduced skew 
toward the fanciful. 
The bias of copyright, pushing new work away from what has 
gone before it, also has systematic effects on content and viewpoint.1G4. 
Copyright favors expression that looks like a creative genius'; the fur-
ther an author gets from what has gone before, the more protection 
he will get.I6S It does not recognize value in folklore or othel' u-adi-
tional art forms whose richness consists in repetition of u-aditional 
themes.l66 Copyright favors high and mass culture over countercul-
ture and subculture, since marginal groups are more likely to express 
themselves by unauthorized reliance on popular and well-known ma-
terials, while large corporations that have a "library" of proven chm-ac-
ters will retise winning formulas. I67 Copiers who borrow without per-
1&1 Cj FCC Y. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776-77 (1978) (Brennan,J., dissenting) 
(discussing how certain groups are proportionally more likely to express themsch'cs using 
the seven dirty words, so suppression of broadcasts using thosc words "ill bc systematically 
biased against those groups and thc \iewpoints those groups arc proportionally more likely 
to hold). ' 
165 Thus, facts get very little copyright protection no matter how hard it was to unearth 
tllem or express them, while fiction is hea\ily f",'ored by comparison. Even \\ithin fiction, a 
hierarchy of creamity prevails. A hackneyed plot \\ith stock characters gets a thin copy-
right, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Ch~ 1936) (Hand,].). while 
innO\<ltive, whimsical puppets Ihing on tllcir own strangc island getllluch stronger protec-
tion, see Sid & Marty Krofft TelC\ision Prods., Inc. Y. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 1977). This allocation of rights fa\'ors tlle iconoclast, thc author of lrifillileJrst over the 
author of a Harlequin Romance. Harlequin and otller romance publishers ha\'c style 
guidelines tllat indicate exactly what sort of plots are acceptable, whatt}l)e of jobs thc hero 
and heroine should have, what kind of prcmarital sc.xual acti\it)' is permissible, when first 
sexual contact should occur, and how many words thc nO\'el should contain. Sre CAROL 
THURSTON, THE ROMANCE REVOLUTION: EROTIC NO\'ELS FOR WOMEN AND TilE QUEST FOR 
A NEW SEXUAL IDENTITY 223-26 (1987). E"cn one that met conventional standards of 
"good writing" would have trouble pro\ing that anytlling other than vcrbatim cop}ing 
constituted an infringement. Copyright also f.'wors tlle kinds of creati\it)' men havc histori· 
cally dominated over the kinds of creati\ily womcn ha\'c historically dominated, sincc 
women's art has often been variations on a thcmc, like quilting. instead of distinct crea-
tions. See Shelley 'Wright, A Feminist Explomtioll of the Ltgal Protertioll of ~\rt, 7 CAN.J. WOMEN 
& L. 59, 90-94 (1994). 
166 See, e.g" Christine Haight Farley, Protedillg Folklore of IlldigtllOIlS Ptoplrs: Is II/ttllerillot 
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. RE\'. 1 (1997).1 do not cndorse Farley's notion that copy-
right's boundaries should be expanded and its term extended in perpetuity to protect 
folklore, but she cogently sets fortIl tlle \\<l}'S in whicll cop}right's definitions c.xclude what 
many people consider tlle IllOst valuable aspects of traditional culturc. 
167 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1975);JENKINS. Sll-
pm note 48; Coombe, Objects of PropertJ~ slIpra notc 82; Nels Jacobson, Notc, Faith, Hope & 
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mission and then add their own content tend to be making fun, mak-
ing light, attacking the conventional; they do not have a "stable" of 
well-recognized character and situations.16S Such copiers do not set 
the agenda of public discussion. They generally lack name recogni-
tion on their own-to get people to pay attention, they may need to 
trade on names and situations we already knoW.169 The owners of 
popular products, by contrast, have an incentive to keep their most 
popular products from close association with anything unpopular 01' 
unsettling. 
Despite these predictable effects, copyright can be defended as 
content-neutral in aim. It could be that punishing copying that de-
stroys the economic incentive to speak by substituting for a creator's 
speech and satisfying demand is like prohibiting the interruption of a 
public speaker. John Hart Ely persuasively argues that prohibiting in-
terruption, even by "the most coherent and trenchant p~litical com~ 
mentary," would be perfectly constitutional because the underlying 
value protected by the regulation would be the right of the original 
speaker to speak and tlle audience to listen, and those rights are not 
dependent on the message of the interrupter or even on the fact that 
the interrupter has a message. Interruption that agrees ordisagl'ees 
with the speaker threatens the values sought to be protected.l7o Like-
wise, pure copying, whatever the underlying intent, harms speech and 
thus can be prohibited. Yet, as Part I explained, many copyright cases 
do not involve pure copying. Also, questions remain regarding 
whether certain speakers are more likely to benefit from an anti· 
interruption/ copying regulation and whether the regulation will pI'e-
vent the interrupter/copier from speaking at all. 
Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, "011, Pretty Woman, " and Paroe/isls' Rights, 31 I-lous. L. Ih:v. 
955,1015-18 (1994). Rosemary Coombe notes that copyright piracy is oftcn carricd Ollt by 
immigrants struggling to survive and others at the margin of Amcrican socicty. Sce Rose--
mary J. Coombe, The ClIllllral Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches 10 Law ami Socie(y ill 
Conditions oJGlobalization, 10 AM. U. INT'L L. & POL'y 791, 817-18 (1995). 
168 See Mark Gunderson, Copyright .•• For Poorer or Richer, al http://www.icollllu.ca/ 
macos/copyrite.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 1999); VirComlll, Copyrighl Law Is Wrollg, (II 
hup:/ /www.cyborganic.com/people/vircomm/projccts/antkopy (last visitcd Jan. 15, 
1999). This could be desclibed as a problem of risk aversion-copyright oW/lcrs do /lot 
want to risk the value of their property, and thus they are less likely to nmkc rcally cl't':lIlvc 
or controversial use of their works than copiers arc. See Me John, supra notc 116, at 106. 
169 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Rogers v. Koons, 
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (onc of several cases involving "appropriation :lI'Iist" Jcff Koolls 
who copies elements of popular works as sardonic comJllelltarr 011 thcm); Air l'irall's, 581 
F.2d 75l. 
170 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecratioll: A Case Study ill the Roles of CategO/izalioll allli BiI/wlril/g 
in First AllIendll/e1lt Analysis, 88 HAR\,. L. REv. 1482, 1499 (1975). 
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Frederick Schauer argues that mechanisms that repress speech 
are all-pervasive, in norms about polite or appropriate speech, ill con-
ventions that limit what will be understood as intelligible communica-
tion, and in other varied pressures that lead people to watch their 
words. In this view, censorship, in the sense of external forces beming 
on individual communication, is everywhere; the question is what 
kinds the government should regulate when it pm·ticipates, as it must, 
in shaping those forces.l7l Meanwhile, "\Tendy Gordon m·gues for 
broad rights to use pre-existing creative works on the ground that 
some works essentially reach out and grab audiences. A person who 
has been powerfully affected by a work may feel a sense of constraint, 
a need to respond to the thoughts and feelings generated by e.xposure 
to the initial work.172 
Schauer and Gordon are describing two aspects of the smne phe-
nomenon, as prior works are part of the environment that shapes 
what stories we want to tell and even what we cml imagine telling. 
Copyright generates works that affect what will be created thereafter, 
not just by prohibiting pure copying and by directly encouraging 
variation, but also by altering the background universe of information 
that provides the raw material for tlle next generation, in tlle literal 
sense of the word. Government tllUS participates in encouraging some 
kinds of content and discouraging others. 
2. Differences Between Market-Failure-Based Regulations: 
Infringement Contrasted to Hate Speech mld Pornography 
Copyright is a regime tllat affects a lm·ge amount of speech, but 
seems relatively content-neutral, and in evaluating it we have to ask 
exactly how stringently tlle First Amendment requires us to evaluate 
content-neutral speech regulations. Perhaps smprisingly, tlle breadtll 
of copyright's effects becomes a factor in its favOl; while tlle more tar-
geted radical theories seem more suspect. The following subsections 
explore the family of speech-versus-speech claims by contrasting copy-
right to tlle regulation of hate speech and pornography. 
a. Borrowing Ve1:5US Attaddng 
What is really at stake in tlle evaluation of speech-versus-speech 
claims is a judgment about what options people should bave to re-
IiI SeeSchauer, OlltOWg)~ slIpm note 94. 
m See Gordon, A Property Right ill &lJ·E:o:prossioll. slIpm note 116. 
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. pined to speech that in some way harms them. As Kent Greenawalt 
has noted, the democratic aim of promoting courageous citizens, "in-
dependent of mind and hardy emotionally," does not mean that all 
kinds of hardiness are equally desirable goals for First Amendment 
jurisprudenceP3 Greenawalt argues that fortitude ill the face of seri-
ous and imminent threats of violence is not the kind of hardiness that 
is valuable for democratic citizenship; thus, penalizing such thl'eats 
does not conflict with the goal of creating robust and vigorous citizen-
communicators.174 Similarly, willingness to create in the absence of 
the economic incentives generated by copyright is not the kind of 
hardiness that we should require of speakers. The question is what 
other kinds of hardiness government should or should not demand of 
its citizens. 
One obvious distinction between copyright and the regulation of 
racist and pornographic speech is that the mechanisms by which "si-
lencing" works in the two cases are different. Richard Delgado re-
cently described the speech-versus-speech justification for regulating 
hate speech: "[h]ate messages also make the task of the minority 
speaker harder, because of the toll that they take on the credibility of 
speakers of color .... The very same message from a woman will regis tel' 
differently from one delivered by a man."175 He concludes that 
[b]ecause the message is the same, irrespective of the 
speaker, the reason for the different reception cannot lie in 
the words themselves ... [T]he only possible origin of this 
different credibility lies in the system of stories and messages 
that we choose to tell about, and to, minorities and 
women-in short, hate speech.176 
The speech of A, then, deprives B of effective speech, the one value 
that a First Amendment absolutist cannot denyP7 
The economic motivations to buy or use au infdnger's product 
can be unrelated to the literal message of the infringed material, 
173 KENT GREENAWAL'f, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF L\NGUAGE 292 (1989). 
1U Seeid. 
175 Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of Ihe First AII/elllimelll, llll HAIlV. L. 
REv. 778, 792-93 (2000) (reviewing Steven H. Shiffrill, DISSENT, INJUSTICg, AND 'fm: 
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999» (emphasis added). 
176 [d. 
177 See id. Copying and hate speech are not differentjttst because a minority speaker's 
incentives and attractiveness are affected by speech distant in time and place. Copyright. 
too, assumes that the regime governing speech in general will affect future installces of 
speech. 
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while the connection between the cognitive biases invoked by rac-
ist/ sexist speech and the oppressive messages of that speech is strong. 
In other words, racist speech may destroy a minodt.}' speaker's credi-
bility or otherwise short-circuit cognitive mechanisms for evaluating 
speech, but the persuasive mechanism by which such suppression 
works is itself arguably deserving of protection. Infdngement., on the 
other hand, makes a copyright owner's speech economically unatu-ac-
tive: Why buy a newspaper when you can get the stories for free? The 
copier is not the enemy of the creator's viewpoint, only of his or her 
livelihood.l78 The infringer is piggybacking on the first speaker, while 
other speakers are using their targets in an entirely different way-
gdnding them down. Where piggybacking is not primmil}' 
antagonistic to the first speakel; despite its negative effects on 
incentives, racist and pornographic speech is. Certainly, regulations of 
hate speech and pornography can be defended on the ground that 
such speech inflicts harm on the people it targets, but that rationale 
stands in contrast to copyright's encouragement of disagreement. 
In fact, the fair use doctrine's preference for pm'ody mId o'iticism 
parallels the argument against regulating hate speech, The m'gulllent 
is as follows: There are some hanns to incenti\'es to speak that. the 
government cannot take into account when considedng whether or 
not to regulate. In copyright, those hm'ms m'e (at least) hm'lUs to in-
centives that may occur when vicious reviews or parodies suppress 
demand for a work, This is either because the interpreL'\tion of the 
parodist/reviewer is more importrult to ft'ee e.xpression thmi the di-
minished incentive to create new works that might be savaged, or be-
cause the effect on incentives comes not through pure economic sub-
stitution but through some other mechanism, I would m'gue that the 
former proposition is bound up with the latter. 
Valuing cdticism over "odginal" creation raises the specter of 
content bias, Yet it can be defended as a way to keep people beJie\ing 
in the marketplace of ideas, since a good review is probably more 
credible in a world that allows bad reviews. This is a concern for 
proper marketplace functioning, a regulatory concern. It also pm-al-
178 As discussed in Section LB, this distinction between coppighl and the radicaltheo-
ries does not track. the actualla\\' of copyright, which often imposes liability on a copier 
whose \iC\\point is clearly distinct from that of the copyright O\\1lcr or who participates in 
a different market, for example by parod}ing the cop}nghted matcrial. NC\'crthcless, the 
distinction between types of speech incentives and disincenth'es can be defended if we 
distinguish economic harms from dignitary harms and defend cop}Tighl only as a rt'-
sponse to the former, 
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leIs the traditional truth-finding rationale for free speech; criticism, 
even false or erroneous criticism, is valuable because it tests the value 
of prior works and received wisdom. Furthermore, if criticism is al-
lowed but pure substitution is not, there are still large incentives to 
create. Therefore, it is reasonable to value criticism or parody ovel' an 
attacked work when the two come into conflict. 
Perhaps racist speech and pornography are so much like criti-
cism and parody that, even if they affect incentives to speak, they still 
should not be regulated. Nonetheless, the analogy between the two 
speech-conflict situations is still useful. In both cases we may recog-
nize that an "unregulated" speech market is subject to skewing in fa-
vor of some speakers; there is no natural pregovernmental level of 
unconstrained speech. Furthermore, infringement and racist speech 
may operate by different noncognitive mechanisms, but the objection 
in both cases is that the mechanisms are fundamentally ullfait~ Pm-
ponents of hate speech regulation and the like believe that silencing 
through the coercive power of racial epithets is wrong, just as copy-
right defenders believe that silencing through the limitation of eco-
nomic incentives is wrong. 
b. The Relationship Between Content Nelltrality and .J.\1ec/zanisllIs of Silencing 
Copyright, unlike the radical theories, seems content- and view-
point-neutral on its face. The decision to classifY a regulation as con-
tent-based or content-neutral, however, depends upon the categoriza-
tion of the mechanism by which dangerous speech does harm. That 
is, the neutrality argument is ultimately a characterization of the ef-
fects of the kinds of speech likely to be suppressed by regulation. To 
see this point, take a standard example: the regulation of inciting 
speech that creates a clear and present danger of violence. Unlike 
regulation of racially derogatory fighting words, regulation of the en-
tire category seems viewpoint-neutral. Anyone who advocates inllui-
nent violence in a way that is likely to succeed in triggering such vio-
lence will be punished; whether the violence is in support of 
segregation or socialism, the advocacy is illegal. The proponent ofvio-
lence could, however, characterize the regulation as viewpoint-based. 
People who express the belief that violence is a good idea-at least 
those who are likely to persuade others to agree-can be punished, 
but those who express the opposite viewpoint, that nonviolence is the 
appropriate way to effect change, will never be punished. As with a law 
dividing pregnant persons from nonpregnant persons, it tUl'llS out 
that only one side loses. 
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One response to this criticism is that the advocacy of imminent 
violence does what it does in a different way than the ad\'ocacy of 
peaceful change, by destroying the audience's ability to reflect on 
what it hears, which brings us back to the different-mechanisms ar-
gument.179 The argument that speech that destroys a listener's ability 
to abstain from violence is not persuasion but coercion is one plausi-
ble characterization, but there are others. In a real sense, if I say "Let's 
take the damn street now" and my followers do so, I have been per-
suasive even if I have also been inarticulate. The persuasive power of 
any argument often depends on an audience's preexisting biases and 
favored concepts or code words, and deciding that some m'gument 
operates outside the register of persuasion is tric1.1' business. I will not 
attempt to resolve the issue; I use the example simply to demonstrate 
that the determination that a regulation is content- or viewpoint-
neutral will ultimately depend on judgments about how different 
kinds of speech work. .. 
Therefore, an infringer, particulm'ly one who takes only parts of a 
copyrighted work, could well argue that infringement expresses the 
viewpoint that copying is good and that there is nothing new under 
the sun.180 Popular anti-copyright rhetoric contains many such s~"\te­
ments.181 No matter what the content of the infringed material, only 
infringement can express this viewpoint in the most persuasive way, 
because only infringement shows the audience what inftingemellt is 
good for. 
Copyright protects noninft'inging materials, never inft'inging ma-
terials; it embodies the viewpoint that inftingement is bad. This is only 
neutral if infringement operates on the universe of available speech 
in a way that differs from noninftingement, a way whose hm'Ills moe 
more extensive than the harms of other kinds of speech. The harmful 
incentive effects of infringement make it plausible to treat cop}Tight 
179 Kent Greenawalt makes a similar move. Hc recognizes that prohibitions on encour-
aging political assassination and violent rcvolution f."wor peaceful ideologies ovcr ,;olclll 
ones, but argues that "the preference for urging obediencc to law over urging ,;olencc is 
not itself the kind of preference that is strongly at odds \\;th a principlc of frcc speech," 
C\"en if it may have unC\"en effects on differing ';C\\1>0ints. GREENAWALT, slIpra notc 173, at 
122. To him, the ban on criminal advocacy (if cabincd to requirc an imminent likclihood 
of harm) is an acceptable contentjudgmcnt, perhaps like other acceptable contcntjudg-
ments that favor local telC\;sion stations over cablc pro\;dcrs or O"cators of cop}Tighlablc 
works over infringers (also narrowly tailorcd). 
180 CJ. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts \'. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 611 n.6 (1998) (Souler,j., 
dissenting) (discussing the "communicativc clement inherent in UlC VCr)' act of funding 
[art] itself"), 
181 See SIIpm note 55. 
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as a neutral regulation, since copyright targets a mechanism of 
speech-suppression and not a viewpoint as such. Note, howevel~ that 
arguments for regulating hate speech, pornography, and campaign 
finance similarly characterize their targets as behavior with effects 011 
the market for speech. Under the radical theories, it is acceptable to 
say that women are inferior or that the rich should pay no taxes, so 
long as that speech does not use the (particularly powerful) mecha-
nisms of sexually explicit subordination or saturation political adve!'-
tising.182 
The distinction between copyright and pornography or hate 
speech regulation is therefore bottomed on an evidentiary disagl'ee-
ment. Both theories look at audience response to regulation or a lack 
thereoE We are confident enough about how economic rationality 
works that we can predict how unredressed infringement will affect 
the production of speech. Without copyright, some people will create 
because creation is independently satisfying, and some people will still 
pay creators, whether as patrons of the arts or out of a sense of moml 
obligation, but the addition of economic incentives has a significant 
effect on the level of speech. By contrast, mechanisms of silencing 
through racist speech and pornography are far less clear. Theories of 
human psychology can explain the mechanisms, but they seem less 
intuitively obvious to many people today than tlle idea that money 
motivates action.183 Pornography and hate speech promote inequality, 
and one effect of that is to harm the victims as speakers, but the proc-
ess seems more diffusely connect to silencing dmn infringement is, 
even if the amount of silencing is as great or greater. 
In addition, much discomfort with proposed regulations of por-
nography (and hate speech) comes from the perceived impossibility 
of tailoring regulation to that which silences women. A variety of non-
sexually-explicit demeaning images and stories affect women's ability 
to speak and be heard. Against tllat background, it is hard to imagine 
tllat eliminating pornography would materially affect women's speech 
incentives or credibility. Ironically, copyright's breadth seems more 
acceptable as an incentive scheme because its wide coverage makes it 
more likely to achieve its goal. Inquiry into me<:hanisms of silencing 
sugges~ a version of a tailoring requirement. A speech-promoting 
speech restriction should be targeted to cover bad, speech-
182 See, e.g. MAcKINNON, supra note 138, at 108. 
183 But if. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expressi(l/I, III HARV. L. lU:v. 1149 
(1998); Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1305-06 (noting the absence of significallt 
empirical evidence about copyright's incentive effects). 
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suppressing speech. If it covers substantially more or less than that, 
then the law is not really promoting speech. Copyright law does not 
currently work this way, but it should. ,. 
c. Diversity 
Copyright seems to be content-neutral because it regulates all 
speech.184 By contrast, racist and pornographic speech often have a 
predictable and politically charged content. Yet, copyright's interest in 
promoting diversity and new expression is, ultimately, content-based 
in the sense that the term is usually used. ,file usually demand that 
mechanisms of speech regulation be content-neutral because we fear 
government oppression, but we have a legitimate content-based pref-
erence for a rich and diverse array of speech.l85 Thus, copylight sug-
gests tlIat certain broad content-based preferences are acceptable 
justifications for government regulation. 
"'When courts and commentators declare tlmt protecting authors' 
expression ensures a wi.de variety of expression ratller than a flood of 
copies, they invoke diversity principles.ISG Diversity is a preference for 
certain kinds of content: new expression tlmt would be less prevalent 
in the absence of regulation.IS7 Ex ante, diversity might seem neutral, 
because Congress cannot be sure when it establishes a copyright law 
whose ox will be gored, just as legislatures cannot be sure who will use 
a libel law. The content discrimination comes in ex post, when a pref-
erence for variety over repetition punishes copiers and favors trans-
formative uses.188 In tlle case of libel law, at least, tlle ex post effects 
1st SeeFraser, supra note 17, at 10. 
185 See Associated Press Y. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945) ("[The First Amcnd-
ment) rests on the assumption that the \\idest possiblc disscmination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wclfare of thc public, that a free press is 
a condition of a free society."). 
186 See Tunzer J, 512 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part) 
("Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for location, for educational programming, and 
for news and public affairs all make reference to contenL "). 
187 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. y. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.s. 1,20 (1986) ("[T]he 
State's asserted interest in c."posing appellant's cllstomcrs to a \':nict}' of \icwpoints is 
not-and does not purport to be--content neutral."); Lemlcy & Volokh, supm note 124, at 
2447. Then:Justice Rehnquist's dissent, by contrast, argues that gO\'crnment decisions that 
affect the mix of content available to the public :n'e not problcmatic unless thc actioll ""P' 
proximates that of direct content-bascd suppression of speech." Padfic Gas, 475 U.s. at 29 
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
188 See Voloklt & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2447 ("[C]opyrightliabilit)' turns 011 the 
content of what is published. True, thc law draws no ideological distinctions .••• But while 
this might make the law "\iewpoint-ncutral, it doesn't makc it content-ncutral."). 
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that disadvantage defendants are enough to subject libel law to faidy 
intense judicial scrutiny.189 
The upshot of the diversity preference is that copyright has a dis-
parate impact on various kinds of works and speakers. Yet it is 110t 
clear that the First Amendment erects any barrier to neuU'allaws that, 
although reasonable and limited, nonetheless have a disparate impact 
on some group, especially if that group is not. historically disadvan-
taged. 
Radical theorists argue for a change in government regulation 
precisely on the grounds that the speech suppressed under the cur-
rent regime should be more widely available. We need government to 
balance the scales so that certain disfavored people have a chance to 
be heard. Some of the radical theorists think they know what these 
unheard voices would say; others remain more agnostic. As a matter 
of democratic self-governance, it may be u'oubling that any group is 
silenced no matter what it might say, and particular attention to the 
silence of historically disadvantaged groups makes constitutional 
sense (for Fourteenth Amendment, Carolene Products-type reasons). 
Perhaps copyright is less troubling than other market-failure 
theories because copyright promotes diversity of expression, not diver-
sity of ideas, and only the latter is a troubling kind of diversity prefer-
ence. But recall dle argument of Part LA that expression and ideas 
are intertwined in ways that are difficult to sort out. Ideas have no 
form without expression. Furthermore, without copyright, no one 
would have property rights in ideas in any event; the incentive to have 
a "new" idea and clothe it in expression could well be diminished 
without copyright. Therefore, copyright's protection for ideas works 
in tandem with its protection of expression.190 
The bias of copyright may differ in another way from the biases 
in other speech-promoting regulations. Copyright's goal is not just 
189 The fear is either that libel law wiII have a disparate impacl on ccrtain gl'OUpS that 
wiII be impossible to tease out case-by-case or that too much speech will be stlppl'csscd 
regardless of whether any identifiable group is affected. As I argucd in Section 1.A, one 
could make the same case against copyright, 
190 While copyright's main incentive function is to encourage vrlricd cxprcssion, that in 
itself tends to encourage different viewpoints and different subjccts. Evcn thc l'chllivc1y 
idea-free example of Hollywood moviemaking shows how the principlc works. 1'i/(II/;cwag II 
success, but only one studio reaped the direct monetary benefits of the movic; othcl's had 
to figure out how to take advrlntage of the audience's passion for the story. Thus Lconardo 
DiCaprio gets to star in many other movies, with different storics; thus we get anothcl' 
summer of disaster films; thus we get a slew of period pieces. All thcse are stmtcgics fOi' 
taking part of Titanic, some part that copyright does not protect, and tul'lling it into copy-
righted gold. In the process, we get different ideas, not just differcnt cxprcssion. 
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diversity but al1wunt Qf speech-let a thQusand nQvels bloom. I dO' not 
believe that the distinctiQn between diversity and amount O'f speech is 
meaningful, hQwever. One CQuld make the same claim about cam-
paign finance refQrm, hate speech regulatiO'n, antipornography O'rdi-
nances, and sO' O'n. Such restrictiO'ns 'wO'uld enable many vO'ices hereto-
fQre silent to' begin speaking, regardless O'f what thO'se vO'ices might 
say. MQre fundamentally, the spatial metaphO'r fQr measuring speech 
becQmes fairly useless at this pO'int. Assume that, withO'ut cO'pyright, 
peQple wO'uld spend less time cO'mmunicating their thO'ughts to one 
anQther, since there wO'uld be less prQfit in it. V{e wO'uld have to' make 
up O'ur O'wn stQries to' entertain O'urselves individually. "'{O'uld there 
really be "fewer" stO'ries? Or WQuld we have the "same" number O'f 
thQughts, O'nly less advanced because they would not be enriched by 
O'thers'? While I believe that twO' peO'ple may well imprO've the 100gic 
and persuasiveness Qf their beliefs by exchanging ideas, I am not sure 
it is apprQpriate to' say that the "number" O'f ideas chmlges thrO'ugh 
cQmmunicatiQn. CO'pyright lends itself to' cO'unting mO're easily thml 
O'ther fQrms O'f speech regulatiO'n, perhaps, because it is easier to' 
measure the number Qf magazines Qn a shelf thml it is to' measure di-
versity Qf viewpO'ints. But that still dQes nO't tell us whether a billiO'n 
cQpies Qf a biO'graphy O'f LeO'nardO' DiCapriO' is a better free speech 
gQal than ten thQusand cQpies each O'f ten thO'usmld different biO'gra-
phies. 
"MQre" speech is nQt just abO'ut having more alternative \iew-
pO'ints Qr nQvels frO'm which to' chO'O'se, but about having more tO'O'ls 
"with which to' make new speech. Diversity in the marketplace is usually 
cQnceived Qf at static slices O'f time: mO're chO'ices fO'r consumers 
means mO're diversity. Diversity Qf speech is a different mlimal, as the 
theQry behind CQPyright demO'nstrates; the vmiety available at O'ne 
time affects what 'will be available later Qn. The preference fO'r a dy-
namic diversity, O'ne that allQWS speakers to' generate new speech, is a 
CQntent preference, but it is a justified O'ne. 
Whatever O'ne thinks O'f the regulatiO'n O'f hate speech mld pO'r-
nQgraphy, cQmparison with cQPyright theO'ry is useful to' identify 
grO'unds Qn which O'ne cO'uld prQmO'te O'r cO'ndemn pm·ticular gO'v-
ernment actiQns that penalize SQme speakers to encourage O'thers. In 
the end, whether a regulatiQn is "cO'ntent-based" may nO't be as impor-
tant as whether we can define mld defend its predictable effects O'n 
variQUS grQUPS Qf speakers. 
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3. Campaign Finance Reform 
Campaign finance reform raises similar questions of whether a 
speech regulation designed to improve one group's access to speech, 
which therefore has a predictable disparate impact on a different 
group, is legitimate. 
The strongest justifications for campaign finance reform rest on 
some theory that lack of regulation has poisoned the system by which 
information about candidates gets to voters.I9l The general idea is 
that no one really wants the situation we have, but that most particiM 
pants are forced to play the big-spending game because of a collective 
action problem, a Prisoner's Dilemma. Some proponents of reform 
argue that unlimited spending by candidates leads to a system in 
which challengers (who may have difficulty getting contributions 
when challenging a proven candidate) or less wealthy candidates are 
drowned out.I92 Large modern campaigns require huge "war chests," 
which in turn drives politicians to solicit wealthy donors 01' interest 
groups, creating a system in which money buys influence. I!)!! Justice 
Breyer has thus endorsed the proposition that campaign finance 
regulation is justified as a speech-promoting speech restriction, preM 
venting the few from drowning out the many.I94 
Still another argument for reform is that modern campaigning is 
an "arms race" in which, for defensive reasons, politicians have to 
spend so much time on fund-raising that they have no time for gov-
ernance. Some speech and deliberation-fund-raising speech-
crowds out speech and deliberation about what to do in office. CmuM 
paign finance reform, then, will not necessarily change the l'ange of 
views available to the public, but it will improve the quality of public 
service. R~gulation of campaign finance will, it is argued, produce 
1915ee David A. Strauss, 1l1mt Is the Goal oJCampaigll Finance ReJorlll? 1995 U. CHI. Lt!-
GAL F. 141 (discussing various justifications proffered by reformcrs). 
192 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2470, 2479-80 (1997) 
[hereinafter Fiss, Money and Politics] (arguing that a democratic undcrstanding of the First 
Amendment requires the equalization of political opportunity through rcgulations 011 
campaign spending). 
193 SeeFEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480. 496-97 (1985) 
(stating that "preventing corruption or the appcarance of corruption» is "thc only Icgitl-
mate compelling governmcnt interest thus far idcntificd for rcstricting campaign 
finances"); Fiss, Money and Politics, supra note 192, at 2478-79 (arguing that unrcstricted 
campaign finance spending gives untoward power to the wealthy, distorting political equal-
ity contrary to First Amendment principles). 
194 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897. 905 (2000)'(B.'cycr.J •• 
concurring) . 
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more democratic deliberation.195 Just as copyright can be att.'1cked fOl' 
promoting the interests of wealthy corporations, campaign finance 
reform is often criticized as an incumbent-protection measure. In-
cumbents have greater access to non-monetary assets such as an abil-
ity to get free media exposure and name recognition. Therefore, the 
argument goes, campaign finance reform, by restricting campaign 
expenditures, will increase the relative import.'l.llCe of these incmn-
bent-favoring assets, 
In the campaign finance context, the Supreme Court held that it 
is a content preference to fear that some speech, because it is backed 
by deep pockets, will drown out other speech. To the Court, campaign 
finance regulations evinced a content-based concern with comnllllli-
cative impact.196 Campaign finance reformers, by contrast, consider 
regulation content-neutral, a concern with the volume of speech 
rather than its ideas. But, because the "volume" of political ads bears a 
fairly clear relationship to their ability to persuade, and the volume of 
a loudspeaker does not, the Court saw content discrimination. Like 
the different-mechanisms argument discussed in the preceding sub-
section, this judgment depends on the characterization of money as 
something that enables speech rather than as a mechanism by which 
certain speech makes its mark on the world. 
In tandem 'with its characterization of limits on campaign spend-
ing as content-based, the Supreme Court rejected the democratic, 
speech·equalization rationales for campaign finance reform, on the 
theory that the speech of some should not be suppressed to enhance 
the relative voice of others.197 Like copyright, there is no ex ante re-
striction, but once the political season begins, the restrictions affect 
who can speak or what can be said.19B Also like copyright, campaign 
finance reform challenges us to recognize the relation betl\"een 
money and speech-money generates speech, in copyright by 
financing the production and distribution of speech, and similarly in 
195 See, e.g., Vmcent Blasi, Free SpeedL and the n7delling ~",r oJ Fund·Raisillg; mry Cam, 
paign Spendi1lg limits May Not Violate the First Amendmellt After /W. 94 CoLUM. 1.. RE\,. 1281 
(1994). 
196 SeeBuckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976). 
197 See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. Cily of Berkeley. 4:;'1 U.s. 290, 298-300 
(1981); Buckle)" 424 U.S. at 48-49. Academic critics of campaign financc reform also argue 
that government nonintervention is the natural baseline for a regimc of free speech. &to, 
e.g., Lillian R BeVier, Compaign Finance ReJOn/I: SPedolls Llrgulllellts, [lItmdabit'DilellllllaS, 9·1 
CoLm-I. L. REv. 1258, 1260-61 (1994). 
198 See Blasi, supra note 195, at 1292 (discussing ways in which r.,cially ncutral campaign 
finance reform might favor certain ideological interests over othcrs). 
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campaign finance. The desire for money affects the content of incli-
vidual speakers' speech, as publishers seek to produce popular mate-
rial or candidates solicit the support of wealthy donors. 
Copyright and campaign finance reform are linked not only by 
their market-failure theories but also by a concern for democracy, in 
the sense that both theories postulate that citiz(!ns should have aCCeSS 
to many speakers saying many different things. Some people criticize 
the radical theories because they seem to make the state responsible 
for deciding what is good for people, deciding which stories have not 
been sufficiently successful in reaching a sympathetic audience. Rob-
ert Post, for example, finds Owen Fiss's emphasis on getting informa-
tion out into the public sphere so that people can decide how to vote 
unappealing because it "offers a strikingly passive image of the demo-
cratic citizen, who can be brought to identify with collective self-
determination merely by being provided with ... full and accurate 
information. "199 
The radical theorists, however, disagree with this characterization 
because to tllem there should be no easy line between speakers and 
audiences. Currently, some people talk too much when they should 
be listening, and vice versa, but that is not inevitable. Integrating 
copyright into other theories about how the state constructs the con-
ditions for speech helps illuminate how no citizc:m, on either the crea-
tive/speaking or the copying/listening side, is passive. Copyright's 
understanding of how audiences can rework expression to suit their 
own purposes suggests that even what we think of as passive listening 
may be more active than sharp distinctions between listening and 
speaking admit. Access to multiple viewpoints is important not just so 
citizens can choose, but so they can create their own viewpoints. 
Campaign .finance reform has similarly democratic aspirations, as it 
attempts to enhance the political voice of groups that may currently 
lack the means to be heard, both by directly decreasing the impor-
tance of money and by eliminating the fund-raising pressures that 
may lead politicians to devote insufficient time to the issues. 
A distinction between campaign finance reform and copyright 
may therefore rest on predictions about the groups affected by the 
two regulations. Campaign finance reform affects rich people, a 
group that seems smaller and more stable-thm; more politically vul-
199 Robert Post, Equality alldAlItollomy in First Amencimelltjllrisprllciellce, 95 MICII. L. R!;\,. 
1517, 1526 (1997) (reviewing OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVlDlm: FREEDOM 01-' SI'EECII &: 
THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996». 
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nerable-than the authors protected by copyright (never mind that 
the real beneficiaries of copyright are often from the same group). 
Various aspects of First Amendment law are structured to mini-
mize disparate effects on identifiable groups, as with libel law, where 
we predict that unconstrained juries will be too sympathetic to the 
powerful and unsympathetic to their challengers to preserve vigorous 
reporting and editorializing. Campaign finance reform raises the 
same concerns. Similarly, we ought to see copyright, and its e.xcep-
tions, as a law with predictable content-based effects, which should 
therefore be subject to some heightened review. Because of copy-
right's breadth, however, the standard tests for constitutionality of 
speech regulations may be too stringent; copyright, and perhaps other 
regulations, may deserve scrutiny limited to the reasonableness of 
Congress's line-drawing. But when speech is directIy regulated, is tIle 
inquiry ever limited to mere rationality as WitIl a standard economic 
regulation, or must courts demand some tIling more from Congress? 
The next section addresses tI1at question. 
4. TurnerBroadcastingand Semi-Content-Neutral. Regulation 
Must-carry regulations are tIle only speech-promoting regulations 
upheld in their entirety in recent years. The Court's articulation of a 
theory that allowed tI1ese regulations to persist, despite tIleir substan-
tial and direct effects on cable providers' speech, provides valuable 
guidance for what serious First Amendment analysis of copyright 
would look like. 
Must-carry regulations ensure tI1at cable systems carry local 
broadcasters at no charge, if the broadcasters so desire. The fear tIlat 
prompted enactment of the must-carry law was that cable providers 
would shut local broadcasters out of tIleir systems, tIl1.lS destroying tIle 
local stations that h;ad served regional populations for decades before 
the development of cable. Local stations, in tIleory, carry local news, 
as well as educational and informational programming tImt might not 
otherwise be found on cable.2OO The crowding-out oflocal stations was 
linked to cable technology, which made it inconvenient for a viewer to 
switch back and fortI1 between cable and local broadcast. 
!!OO This is in part because the governmcnt rcquires broadcast Iiccnsees to serve the 
public interest by offering such programming, whilc it does not similarl}" dcmand public 
interest programming from cable prO\idcrs, though it does require that cable pro\iders 
allow certain favored groups (local governmcnt and educational organizmions) to nCCl'SS 
some cable channels. . 
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The Turner I Court held that "the mere assertion of dysfunctioll 
or failure in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield 
a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable 
to nonbroadcast media. "201 The Court emphasized that laws that Sill~ 
gle out the press are always subject to some heightened First Amelld~ 
ment scrutiny.202 The Court then invoked Unitt'd States v. O'Brien203 as 
the basis for its analysis, despite very different situations. O'Brien COll~ 
cerned a regulation banning the destruction of draft cards that was 
used to prosecute an antiwar protestel: It set forth a test for conduct 
regulations that have an incidental impact on expression, whereas the 
Cable Act directly regulated expression. 
The Turner I Court used O'Brien because it found that none of 
Congress's interests in must-carry were related to tlle suppression of 
free expression.204 In fact, the multiplication of information SOUl'ces is 
"a governmental purpose of the highest order. "205 The Court, how~ 
ever, demanded a showing that the threatened harms to free televi~ 
sion, diversity of information sources, and fair competition in the 
programming market were real and that regulation would alleviate 
those harms in a direct and material way.206 In addition, the govel'11~ 
ment had the burden of showing that its regulation did not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary.207 Thus, the Court defel'l'ed 
to Congress as a fact-finder; once it determin(!d that Congress had 
carried out its fact-finding responsibilities, it accorded great weight to 
the problems Congress identified and the rem(!dies Congress chose. 
At the same time, the Court scrutinized the Cable Act carefully in ol'~ 
del' to determine whether, if the facts were as Congress found them to 
be, the Act regulated only as much speech as necessary to achieve 
Congress's aims. 
The Turner I Court justified its somewhat relaxed test for direct 
regulation of speech on the ground that the must-carry law was con~ 
201 Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 640. 
202 See id. at 640-41. 
203 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
204 See Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 662. 
205 Id. at 663. justice Breyer's Turner II concurrence explicitly recognized that the 
Court was balancing speech interests on both sides-cablc carriers on one, the public In-
terest in having a wide variety of sources available on the oth(~r. See TImler II, 520 U.S. at 
226 (Breyer,j., concurring). Because important First Amendment interests existed on both 
sides,justice Breyer found that the key question was one of "fit." The Court had to deter-
mine whether significantly less restrictive alternatives existed and whether the balance 
between speech-enhancing and speech-restricting functions was reasonable. See ill. 
206 See Tumer 1, 512 U.S. at 664. 
207 See id. at 664-65. 
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tent-neutral. The test for content neutrality, it stated, was whether the 
government adopted a regulation because of agreement or disagree-
ment with a message.208 Also, laws that "by their terms distinguish £.-
vored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views 
expressed are content based. "209 This definition seems like a better 
description of viewpoint regulation, since we usually think of content-
based regulations as covering obscenity, libel, or other classes of 
speech that may have a broad range of "messages. n Indeed, Justice 
O'Connor declared in dissent that Congress's preference for the topics 
covered by broadcast stations-local news, public affairs, educational 
programs, etc.-constituted a content preference.!!10 
208 See id. at 642. 
209 la. at 643. 
210 Turner I also seems to conflict ,\ith Hurll!}' tl lrisll-Jillll'liCatl Gay, Lrsbiall & Bisrxllal 
Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the parade <A'lSe. Hu'rlt:)' noted that the o~nizers of Boston's 
St. Patrick's Day parade let in multiple messages. often disconncctcd from one ,mother, so 
that it was hard to say that tllere was any particular themc to the paradc. ~ it!. at 569. \'Ct 
"a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protcction simply by combining Illulti-
farious voices, or by failing to edit tlleir tllemes to isolate an exact message as the exdush'e 
subject matter of me speech." ld. at 569-70. Even tllOugh tll('re was no particular message, 
me parade could not be forced to add another messagNhrcad to the o\'crall tapestry. 
Hurley distinguished TImler I because tlle Hur/t:)' Court tllought that people 
would beliC\'e that tlle organizers endorsed any signs in the parade, C\'cn though the C\i· 
dence showed tllat tlle organizers almost nC\'er c.xercised control o\'er signs. ~ icl. at 575. 
The Court found that parades are not disconnected units like tclC\;sion programming but 
unified wholes, C\'en when tlley lack a unified mess.,ge. Stt! id. at 576. This distinction seems 
mistaken. Like a parade, telC\ision is often perceived as a unified experience, with dispa-
rate interlaced segments reflecting on one another. ~, t'.g.,JtUIES B. TWITCIIELL, C.\RNl-
YAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA 195-96 (1992) (discussing smdies on 
teIC\ision watching habits that rC\'eal tlmt average ,iewers treat watching as a process rath('r 
tllan as a series of discrete C\·ents). Moreover, cable operators cannot disclaim an)' en-
dorsement of NBC or PBS, because tllC}' are prohibited by law from altering the broadcast 
signal on retransmission, so tlle Court's conclusion that cable operators can dissociate 
themselves from must-carry channels is not persuash'e. The Court beliC\'ed that ~gi\'en 
cable's long history of sening as a conduit for broadcast signals. there appears little risk 
that cable viewers would assume tlmt tlle broadcast stations carried on a cable S\'Stem con-
YC}' ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator." TImltr I, 512 U.S. at 655: That long 
history, howC\'er, was not produced by must-carl'}; caniagc was ,\,o!tmtal'}', and the natural 
assumption of tlle average viewer would more likel}' be that broadcast carriage. like car-
riage of RBO and Showtime, was and continued to be the result of the cable operator's 
choice. The Court noted tllat ,iewers are frequently apprised of the broadcaster's identit),. 
See id.. Yet parade-goers in Boston were apprised of GUB's identity, and the bill recipients 
were apprised of the public interest group's identity in Padfic Gas & Eltcllic Co. u Hutlsol/. 
It was the forced inclusion of another's ,iews, despite the c.xplicit identification of that 
otller, mat tlle Court found objectionable in those cases. Finally. tlle III1r/ry Coun also 
invoked monopoly considerations to distinguish TImltr I: "fhe Go\'ernment's interest in 
Tunzer Broadcasting was not tlle alteration of speech, but the suni\'al of speakers." Jlllr/ry, 
515 U.S. at 577. The Court also emphasized that it was clear which message the parade 
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Despite the conceptual difficulties, however, the Court found that 
the must-carry provisions were content-neutral because they required 
carriage of broadcast stations regardless of the views those stations 
expressed.2l1 The Court also found that the congressional purpose of 
maintaining access to free television for all Americans was content~ 
neutral. According to the Court, Congress was not saying that bl'oad-
cast was more valuable than cable, just that it had value.212 This seems 
disingenuous, since Congress fairly clearly was expressing a prefer-
ence for local programming over the alternatives that would other-
wise appear on the cable channels reserved for must-carry. It might be 
more accurate to say that must-carry is reasonably content-neutml, 
and that the categories of speech it prefers are broad enough to be 
acceptable, especially given the inevitable clash between cable and 
broadcast speech created by the characteristics of the televisioll~ 
viewing audience. 
Turner I and Turner II, which upheld Congress's balancing of in-
terests after a full examination of the record, leave a very ullcertaiu 
impression of what kind of congressional findings will suffice to justify 
a speech regulation.213 O'Brien itself did not distinguish between situa~ 
tions in which Congress was attentive to fact-finding and those in 
which it was not. It applied a very deferential test in a case whel'e 
Congress did not have much evidence before it. But the Turner cases 
appear to modify that test, applying it to direct regulation of expres-
sion and holding that deference is appropriate, while requiring that 
organizers disfavored, by letting in so many and excluding so few. See icl. at 574. It is less 
clear which message cable prO\jders were trying to exclude when they opposed IIIl1st-cm'I'Y. 
211 See Turner I, 512 U.S, at 643-44. 'When the D.C. Circuit analyzed other provisions of 
the Cable Act, it used Turner analysis to uphold provisions mandating leased access to a 
percentage of channels on cable systems reserved for programmers unalTIliated with cable 
operators. The Court held that there was no content discrimination involved because the 
law's preference operated in favor of certain speakers-those unalTIliated with c;,ble COlli-
panies-and not in favor of any message. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 
969 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing "sources" of information from "substance"). The 
analogy to copyright is simple: Congress can prefer author-souf('es to copier-sources. 
212 See Turner I, 512 U.S, at 648. The burden on cable operatol's was also cOlltcnt lieU-
tral, because the reduction in channel capacity available for their own choiccs opcl1lted 
across the board and not upon channels with a particular viewpoint. See icl. lit 645. 
213 See, e.g., William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The SlIpn'JIlI! COIII'I {l/ullhl! First 
AlIlelldmCllt, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1261 (1998); Comment, COllstilutiollal Substalltial·Evicicl/(/! & ... 
view? Lessons from the Supreme Collrt S Turner Broadcasting Decisiolls, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 
(1997); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact DetemliTlations ill First AlIleJl(illll'llt Cases Aj1el'1'ul'llct' 
Broadcasting, III HARV. L. REv. 2312 (1998). 
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Congress be attentive to fact-finding.2H The Court stated that its "sole 
obligation" was to assure that Congress drew reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence, because Congress is better equipped 
than the courts to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data in-
volved in complex regulation.215 
One implication of this reasoning is that, without dat.'l, Congress 
is not in a better position to draw reasonable inferences than the 
Court.216 Unaided speculation is not enough; Congress at least needs 
some help speculating. The Court may also have been influenced by 
the fact that economics and technology played large roles in TII17le1; 
whereas the justification for regulation in O'Blien was essentially based 
on the psychology of draft dodging. In cable regulation, and in copy-
right, there are clear economic pdnciples that e.xplain the 
justification for the regulation, although the application of those 
principles may be hotly contested. 
Possibly, as in Tumer II, a speech-protective justification for regu-
lation will make the Court's scrutiny less exacting than it would have 
been had tlle law been enacted to protect children from corruption. 
When speech interests exist on both sides of an issue, the courts must 
tread carefully. They cannot just analyze tlle reasonableness of the 
restdction, and they cannot assume tllat they know better than Con-
gress even if tllere are content-based elements to a regulation. If 
speech is opposed to speech, a decision not to regulate, or to regulate 
in some other way, will also have content-based results. If the st.'\lldard 
for legislation is set too high, speech will actually suffel~ as it probably 
would if the Court struck down the Copyright Act in its entirety; if the 
standard is too low, interest groups may capture the legislature and 
overprotect some speech at tlle expense of other speech. (This is what 
has occurred for years witll copydght term extension, e::-..-panded 
rights of various sorts, and legal protection for anti-copying measures 
that prevent even fair uses.) 
214 See TUrIler II, 520 U.S. at 191-95. Essentially. the 7imltrca5eS applied the standard 
rule that a content-neutral regulation ,,;11 be sustained if it ad\':tnces important gO\'Cm-
mental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substan-
tially more speech than necessary, but took the requirement that the regulation actually 
advance the identified government interest more seriously than O'B,im had. &to, t.g .• id. at 
191 (referring to Congress's "explicit factual findings" and predictions codified in the 
statutory statement of purpose). 
215 Id. at 195. 
216 See Comment, supra note 213, at 1175-76. 
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III. CODA: A FEW IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT 
Just as copyright's free speech justifications have implications fot' 
the evaluation of other speech restrictions, free speech has implica-
tions for copyright. In the next few pages, I hope to offer a few exam-
ples of those implications, though many other things could be said. 
Reconceiving copyright as speech-promotion law helps us understand 
not just how to make copyright efficient at what it does, but what it 
should do. 
For example, I began this Article with a discussion of copyrighes 
vagueness. I conclude, perhaps surprisingly, that vagueness is the nec-
essary price of the benefits of copyright. (And the same might be true 
of other speech-promoting speech regulations, though the evidence is 
much less clear.) 
Similarly, rethinking copyright as a speech-promotion device has 
several implications for fair use; I will only discuss one. The £,ir use 
preference for "noncommercial" uses should take account of what 
general First Amendment law recognizes, which is that speech fot' 
profit is not necessarily robustly "commercial." Much profit-seeking 
speech is nonetheless easily suppressed or deformed, and COlIntlet-
dality as it has been understood in fair use doctrine should be nar-
rowed in a manner more consistent with general free speech law. 
Finally, I suggest a framework for evaluating copyrighes effects on 
speech that takes account of Congress's ability to find relevant facts, 
an endeavor that Turner puts at the center of free speech analysis and 
that will be vital for any other speech-promoting speech regulation. 
A. The Importance of Vagueness 
The problems of vagueness discussed in Part I seem particularly 
problematic given that there are speech interests on both sides of any 
copyright dispute. Assuming tllat people are generally risk averse,217 
vagueness chills speech on both sides, although vagueness is almost 
217 Even if insurance can make some entities risk-neutral, all that is really required to 
make this argument work is that some entities are risk-averse and that they arc l'audolllly 
distributed between the universes of potential copyright plaintiffs and potcutial delcll-
dants, universes which overlap. Volokh and McDollnell discuss dlC possibility that copr-
right liability is just a cost of doing business, not a drag on speech. As with libel law, cxpan-
sh'e copyright will deter even risk-neutral entities from producing' matcrial with a lowc!' 
profit potential because of the risk of liability, thus changing (p{'rhaps evcn dccrc"sing. 
when investors shift from newspaper to toilet paper) the kinds of 1-pecch "vai/ablc. See Vo-
lokh & McDonnell, supra note 57, at 2448. 
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universally discussed as detrimental to the interests of a copier.218 We 
get less original production because authors (and their publishers) 
cannot be certain of capturing enough of the gains of creativity. and 
we get less copying because legitimate users cannot be sure they will 
be able to fend off infiingement claims. This seems like a lose-lose 
situation. 
Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell have offered one way for 
courts to decrease First Amendment-copyright tensions. Appellate 
courts could review de novo findings of infi"ingement where the case 
rests on substantial similarity. They argue that this practice would <!1-
low the circuits to build a body of case law that would enhance pre-
dictability.219 They take as models to be emulated the appellate-court-
supervised development of the law of fair use, libel and defamation, 
obscenity, and the Fow-th Amendment. 
This list, however, does not really recommend itself as a set of 
models of adjudicative deliberation and clarity. In fact, evel), one of 
these areas is pretty much a mess, the Fourth Amendment most of all, 
despite the fact that appellate courts spend appalling amounts of time 
and paper sorting out Fourth Amendment cases.220 Even if libel and 
the like formed coherent bodies of law, I am not sure how well the 
lesson would apply. Libel, defamation, and obscenity lack the infinite 
variety of copyright. In libel and defamation. the actual malice re-
quirement does most of the speech-protective work, and the doctrine 
is further limited to the subset of speech that is widely understood to 
be damaging to the target. Obscenity is confined to the graphically 
sexual; the potential variations between challenged publications are 
on the order of "Insert Tab A into Slot B." In copyright, by conU-ast. it 
is difficult to understand how a finding in one case will aid others in 
any but the vaguest of ways. Subst:c°mtial similarity rests on compruing 
the plaintiff's work to the defendrult's, not to rulY social consensus or 
paradigm work. Volokh and McDonnell do not actually offer rulY vi-
sion of what concrete, explicit principles of SUbSt:c'llltial similru·ity 
might look like, and their silence highlights the difficulty in\'olved 
when trying to analogize from an infiingemellt case o\'er 12 MOll-
218 See supra note 58 and supra note 79. ''<>lokh and l\IcDonncll arc the first to recog-
nize the vagueness problem on both sides. See ''<>lokh & McDonne1\, sllpra note 57, at 2 .... 9. 
I suspect this belated recognition stems precisely from the increasing C01l\"ergence of copr-
right's "speech on both sides" paradigm ,\1th the radic .. ll theories of speech. 
219 See Volokh & McDonnell, supra 110te 57. 
220 See William Stuntz, TIre Uneasy RelatiollshiP lkh,r«11 C,imillal Promlllrr allli Crimillal 
Justice, 107YALELJ_1 (1997). 
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keyS221 to one over The Devil's Advocate: Are four points of similarity 
enough? How does similar color stack up against similar shape?!!!!!! 
Whatever predictability results from the Volokh and McDonnell pro-
posal would largely stem from the numbers--there are fewer potential 
threejudge panels thanjuries.223 
The attempt to decrease uncertainty substantially is futile, be-
cause vagueness in defining the scope of copyright is the price we pay 
for speech.224 Arguably, most vagueness law serves to contract the 
number of situations in which the government can punish speech, as 
it is harder to define punishable speech than to identi.ty it ill practice. 
In copyright, though, it would be very difficult to live without an 
ideal expression distinction or a fair use exception. More certain re-
gimes (no copyright at all, for example) would be even worse for 
speech.225 
B. Commercial Speech: Turning Two Meanings into One 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union gives some guidance about what other aspects of a First 
221See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
222 The copyright lawyers consulted by Volokh and McDonncll scem fairly split 011 thc 
question of whether more appellate rcview of idea/exprcssion cascs would help. Somc 
thought that nothing would clarity the distinction. See Volokh & McDollncll, SlIprtlllote 57, 
at 2456. One thought that "the more cases decided, the morc likely it is that you can Hnd II 
rationale for your argument because not all courts are going 10 agrec." lei. at 2457 (quOl-
ing Blaine Greenberg). Da\id Nimmer thought that life would be easier "if there WCI'C 
fewer benchmark cases." ld. 
2"..3 Cj Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 57 (discussing copyright lawyers' rcasolls fOl' 
paying more attention to circuit court cases than to district court cascs), That's Ilot pea-
nuts, but it's not terribly principled either. 
224 Cj 'Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1309 (arguing that unprcdictability cannot 
be eliminated from fair use because the doctrine is inherently multifilceted and sitltalioll-
dependent) . 
225 My defense of vagueness resembles the argument in Dan M. Kahan, 19/1ortltut' of 
Law Is all Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 127 (1997). Knhall aI'glle$ that 
vagueness in the criminal law is often .1 good thing, because it encourages mom I belmviol' 
rather than immoral adherence to the letter of the law, Copyright's vaguencss lIIay be de-
sirable inasmuch as bright-line rules would be more destructive of authors' incentives 
(whether as primary creators or as users of elements of cop}Tighted material). One 
significant distinction between Kahan's argument and mine is that Knhan sees the Mchill-
ing" effect of vague criminal laws as a good thing, whereas I suspect thnt the (I;lIIgers cn." 
ated by copyright are a necessary price for flexibility. However, 1<4lhan's argumcnt dlllt 
good citizens should ask themselves whether their conduct is right, as well as whcthcl' it is 
la\\{ul, resonates in copyright. Copyright may be easiest to obey when it tracks o\\r 1110111\ 
norms about ownership, plagiarism, and rights in one's own books and tapes. &oc Weinreb, 
Fail" Use, supra note 79, at 1307-{)8. 
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Amendment-influenced copyright would look like.2!!G The Court 
struck down portions of the Communications Decency Act which ex-
posed people and entities using the Internet to liability if minors 
could access indecent speech. In the process, the Court's opinion re-
peatedly emphasized the dangers posed by the Act to noncommercial 
speakers, for whom the profit motive did not operate as a counterbal-
ance to the threat of liability and who would therefore be more easily 
deterred from speaking than commercial speakers.227 This reasoning 
suggests a free speech justification for nm-rowing the commerciality 
prong of fair use. 
The current explanation of the commercial/noncommercial pm·t 
of the fair use test states that commercial uses m'e more likely than 
noncommercial uses to capture the copyright owner's mm·ket. Not 
only is this highly debatable-certainly repeated mld widespread non-
commercial use can eliminate a potential mm'ket, say for videotapes of 
popular shows or sound files of populm' recordings22lL-it also faces 
substantial baseline problems defining what e.xactly tlle copyright 
owner's "market" should be. This explanation invites claims tlmt, if 
liability is imposed, a market autllorized by tlle cop}'light owner will 
develop; these claims then produce tlle conclusion tllat economic 
harm is caused by the challenged use because tlle autllOI1zed mm'ket 
never materializes.229 
The circulaIity of the market-based m'gument creates a need for a 
better justification, and free speech has it in standm'd explmmtions for 
regulating commercial speech. Commercial speech is robust enough, 
because of the profit motive, to generate a broad range ofworks.230 A 
defendant who believes tllat she has made a commercially successful 
product may be more willing to litigate a potential infringement, 
whereas a defendant making a noncommercial use will likely have 
226 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
227 See id. at 850. 
228 The current distinction also imites courts to stretch the meaning of "commercial" 
when they really mean that a noncommercial use may cause market harm. SIr. e.g.. \\'orld· 
wide Church of God Y. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that copying religious te.xt that was gi\'en away was "commercial" becausc it at· 
tracted new members to a church); A & 1\1 Records \'. Napstcr, Inc., 114 F. Sup}>. 2d 89G 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding indhiduals' free music filc-sharing "commercial" becausc carried 
out on a large scale among strangers). 
229 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union y. Te.xaco, GO F.3d 913. 937 (2tl Cir. 1995) 
Uacobs,j., dissenting); Weinreb, Fair Use, supra note 79, at 1296. 
230 CJ. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. \'. Public Sen'. Comm'n. 447 U.S. 557. 564 n.G 
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy". Va. Citizens Consumer Council. 425 U.S. 748. ii2 n.24 
(1976). 
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neither the resources nor the inclination to risk a large judgment 
against her. But this would also invite courts to look more carefully at 
what a "commercial" use is. Not every part of a publication is cccom~ 
mercial" in the same way, even when the publisher wants to make 
money; advertisements are commercial speech. in First Amendment 
law but the news stories right above them in the newspaper are not.!!!!l 
A publisher is probably more willing to suppn:5s the content of any 
particular story for fear of liability, whether for copyright infringe~ 
ment or another reason, than to suppress an ad. Therefore, unless 
near-verbatim copying is at issue-suggesting that the publisher is get~ 
ting commercial advantage from copying and has not done anything 
else to attract consumers-courts should not let profit-seeking weigh 
very heavily in a non-advertising commercial use. And courts should 
be leery of imposing any liability for nonprofit uses, because they are 
more fragile and easily suppressed. 
This interpretation would bring the meaning of "commercial" in 
copyright closer to its meaning in free speech law. In copyright, 
"commercial" use is defined broadly, as any speech disseminated for 
profit. Although the Supreme Court in Campbell rejected the proposi~ 
tion that a profit-seeking use is presumptively unfair when the use is 
also transformative, it did not reject the idea that anything that peo~ 
pIe pay for is commercial use as far as copyright is concerned. By con~ 
trast, in the First Amendment context commercial speech is deter~ 
mined by three factors: whether the speech is an advertisement; 
whether it refers to a specific product or service; and whether the 
speaker has an economic motive for the speech.232 
There is an underlying relationship between commerciality in 
free speech and in copyright. The first two factors of the free speech 
test have less to do 'with the justification for lessened protection for 
commercial speech-its robustness-than the third. The first two facM 
tors instead cabin the principle of commercial robustness against the 
expansion of speech regulation. If the speech is an advertisement that 
refers to a specific product or service, it may be easy for the speaker to 
communicate its core message even in the presence of government 
regulation. In other cases, the core of the message may not have 
much intrinsic relationship to the commercial motive, as when a pu~ 
lisher chooses to publish books it believes will be best-sellers, regard-
less of whether the topic is Chicken Soup for the Teenage Soul or 101 Uses 
231 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 V.S. 484 (1996). 
232See Bolgerv. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 V.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
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for a Dead Cat. 'Where the message and the motive have a looser rela-
tionship, the content of speech is vulnerable to government-induced 
deformity even though the speaker intends to keep saying something 
despite regulation. Thus, such speech is not "commercial" in general 
free speech law; it is noncommercial speech for profit. 
Noncommercial speech for profit is the speech on which copy-
right's incentive function operates. Advertisements do not need the 
inducement of copyright; the profit to be gained fi:om selling the un-
derlying goods would support Madison Avenue in any event. Copy-
right is designed to encourage precisely those creators (or, more ac-
curately, those investors in creative work) who want to make mone), 
and whose profit motive is not as strongly tied to the message of the 
copyrighted work. 
We can therefore identifY three kinds of message-motive connec-
tions. For ads, the message is "buy X," and the moti\'e is profit from 
selling X. For general speech sold in the market, the message varies 
and the motive is profit from selling the speech, and maybe proselytiz-
ing, too. Finally, for nonprofit speech, the message varies and the mo-
tive is something other than profit. 233 The first class of speech is par-
ticularly robust,234 although the Supreme Court has recentIy 
cautioned that tile government still needs substantial justification to 
regulate it. 
The second class is susceptible to deformation and needs greater 
protection from regulation.235 Government regulation of such speech 
may be particularly disturbing for tile vel'y reason tImt a profit-
motivated speaker may keep speaking, only 'wi til different content, if 
the government regulates speech. The market will appear robust and 
free, but it will be pervaded by government-induced distortion. Profit-
!!33 cf Ma.xtone-Graham Y. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986); William F. 
Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Miscollstrued: Profit, PmlllllptiollS, alld Porrxl.r. 11 CARDOZO 
.ARTS & ENT. LJ. 667,679-81 (1993) (suggesting a continuum of comlllcrcialily). 
!!34 Cf Leval, supra note 80, at 1116 n.53 (WPcrhaps at thc c.xtreme of commcrcialism, 
such as advertising, the statute provides little tolerance for claims of fhir usc. "). 
!!35 See Campbell Y. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (holding that 
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use, but it is only one r.,ctor and "C\"Cn the 
force of tllat tendenC)' \\ill \'at'}' \\itll tlle contc.xt "); Ma....:tollt-Graholll, 803 F.2d at 1262 (hold-
ing tltat "tlle commcrcialnature of a use is a matter of degree" and that an anti-abortion 
book sold for profit was first and foremost a work of political opinion sllch thal its COIII-
mercial character did not weigh against a finding of fair usc); Wojmlro\\icz \'. Amcrican 
Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding thOll, whilc a fundraising 1110-
ti\'ation for a political pamphlet had some commercial }llll]>OSC, its precmincnt purpose 
was to express a political \iC\\]>oint, and tlle laller purpose outweighed lhe cOlllmcrcialily). 
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seeking should therefore not inherently weigh against the defendant 
in a fair use analysis. 
The third class lacks even a generalized profit motive and is likely 
to be particularly fragile and deserving of heightened scrutiny when 
regulated. The absence of profit suggests that the motive has some-
thing to do witll the specific message being communicated, which de-
serves special consideration in a free speech analysis.236 Noncommer-
cial copyright uses may have market effects, but they still deserve 
special favor because they represent communication that could easily 
be suppressed.237 
C. Institutional Competence 
Who will decide where to draw the line, Congress or tlle courts? 
Though courts will defer to congressional judgments about many fac-
tual situations, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
the judiciary must ultimately determine whether laws are consistent 
with the First Amendment. Where First Amendment interests com-
pete, however, the difficulties are compounded. Assuming tllat copy-
right contains some speech-enhancing element'3, a range of possible 
regimes could work, depending on an assessment of the empirical 
236 Distinguishing message from motive can also distinHuish variolls types of ml~. 
Therefore, I disagree with the statement in Campbell that parodying a work to advertlsc all 
unrelated product is entitled to less protection than the sale of a parody for its olVn sake. 
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. An ad that evokes copyIighted material to make :In lIlII'elated 
product attractive, such as a beer ad that satirizes ads for batteries, see Eveready BaHct'y Co. 
v. Adolph Coors Co" 765 F. Supp.440 (N.D. III. 1991),01' imitates a rap gl'oup's l'cdol'lll' 
ance, see Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. l\Iiller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp.826 (S.D.N.V. 1990), Is 
arguably more deserving of fair use protection than an ad for a product that itself (ontains 
copyIighted work and trades on the appeal of that work to sell the pl'Oduct, sei! Dallas Cow-
boy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cil'. 1979). An ad 
can potentially try to sell beer and lampoon social phenomena at the same timc. If the 
Coors family can donate beer money to political causes, it sllCluld also be allowcd to gct 
extra bang for its advertising bucks by social commentary in ads-the advcrtising vct'sioll 
of doing good by doing well. Cf. Nina Munk, Levi's Ongoi1lg Quest for Sireet Cn:d, Fotl't'UN'-'!, 
Feb. 1, 1999, at 40 (discussing Levi's campaign in which young people talk "fmnkly"lIuout 
cutting school and the benefits of inequality under capitalism). 
237 The true believe!; of course, may well continue to proselytize (or infringe) no mat· 
tel' what the sanctions; punishment may even seem like vindkation to him. See Negati\'. 
land, supra note 55. But many people may not have the ability to continue to comlllunicate 
their messages if their websites are shut down or their presses forfeited. They may continue 
to believe, but their beliefs will not be readily available to the rest of us. 
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validity of claims about encouraging rewards for creativity versus al-
lowing creators to draw on what has come before.2S8 
The Court has rejected suggestions that it should evaluate the 
extent of a patent monopoly to determine whether it was the best way 
to promote the useful arts.239 The Court emphasized the explicit con-
stitutional grant of power to Congress: ",t\1}len as here the Constitu-
tion is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can 
come only from Congress. "240 Yet in Graham v. John Deere Co., the 
Court held that the Copyright and Trademm'k Clause is 
both a grant of power and a limitation. . .. [Congress may 
not] enlarge the patent monopoly 'without regard to the in-
novation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. 
Moreover, Congress may not authodze the issuance of pat-
ents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from 
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials al-
ready available.241 
Most recently, in FeistPublicatiolls, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the 
Court held that tlle constitutional scope of copyright cont.-uned a re-
quirement of odginality; Congress was not free to allow copyright in 
facts or in non-odginal works.242 It is difficult to imagine that a copy-
dght of infinite term would be constitutional, mld Congress could 
probably not enact a copydght law in tlle old English censorial form, 
giving exclusive dghts (and ensuring profitable production) only to 
238 In TtIT1lCl" 1, Justice Kennedy found that congressional judgmcnts nrc cntitlcd to 
substantial deference, but tIlat courts must still e.xercise independcnt judgmcnt when First 
Amendment rights are at issue. He defined tIle judicial obligation as assuring that "Con-
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based 011 substantial C\idcnce." 512 U.s. 622. GOO 
(1994); see also Perlman & Rhinelander, sllpra note 1, at 405 (arguing that courts should 
not disrupt congressional judgment about tIle particular balance in coppight cases). 
239 See DeepsoutIl Packing Co. y. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (19i2). 
240 !d. at 530. 
241 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
242 See499 U.S. 340 (1991).Jane Ginsburg has argued that Congress can do under the 
Commerce Clause what it may not do under the Coppight Clause, at least for r.,clltal 
compilations SUdl as yellow pages. SceJalle C. Ginsburg, No "Sll'ml-r Copyright 01/(1 01"" 
Protection ojW0I7CS oj lIz/OnTlotion After Feist Y. Rural Telephone, 92 CoLUM. L R£\'. 338. 367-
84 (1992). I assume for my purposes that if tIle First Alllcndmcnt inmlidates a particular 
vision of copyright, a similar law passed under tIle Commerce Clause would also fhil. Gh"C1l 
tIle speech-promoting functions of cop}ught, we should be suspiciolls of attcmpts to make 
information policy tItrough tIle Commerce Clause whell tIle cop}ught power appears in-
adequate. 
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state-approved works.243 If a court were to determine that Congress 
had failed to identify a speech-based justification for some aspect of 
copyright and the law suppressed more speech-maybe a lot morc-
than it promoted, it would be obligated to tell Congress to try again. 
With limited empirical evidence at hand, Congress would need at 
least a persuasive economic theory to explain why its preferred copy-
right regime did not limit substantially more speech than necessary.2-H 
The justification would not, however, require that each work pro-
tected increased the incentive to speak, since the marginal contribu-
tion of anyone work is minimal. Instead, the effect of a decision to 
grant rights in the copyright owner or in the user should be general-
ized, to see what the effects on speech would be if a right or a use be-
came widespread.245 As Justice Souter recently suggested in the cam-
paign finance context, "the quantum of empirical evidence needed to 
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary 
up or down Witll the novelty and plausibility of the justification 
raised. "246 
Jessica Litman has examined the legislative history of the 1976 
Copyright Act, and concludes that Congress adopted compromises 
between industry groups. Producers and large consumers of informa-
tion such as libraries were represented, and ordinary viewers and 
readers were not. The result was expansive definitions of copyright 
holders' rights coupled with narrow exceptions to protect the few in-
243 See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Ch~ 
1987) (rejecting a congressional attempt to extend the copyright in Mary Baker Eddy's 
works for an extra period as unconstitutional favoritism toward religion). Bul st'e San Fmn-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (discuss-
ing various super-intellectual property rights that have been granted to favored org.llIlza-
tions such as the U.S. Olympic Committee). 
244 In Jane Ginsburg's opinion, for example, Congress can supply content to the Copy· 
right Clause by defining the limits of copyright. See Ginsburg, supra note 2,J2, at 375-82. 
Yet note how uncertainty worked for the Religious Freedom Restomtioll Act. Without (:vl· 
dence of widespread suppression of religious practices, Congress was not allowed to ex· 
pand protection for religion beyond that which courts were prepared to give. St't! City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In the case of copyright, a claim that allthors wlll 
have to stop writing if they cannot get more years of exclusive rights, strengthened pel" 
formance rights or the like cannot really suffice to justifY expanded protection. Instead, 
courts should demand rigorous findings from Congress that adequately set forth the tea-
sons for altering the balance. Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Poslsccondm'y Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (finding evidence of trademark illfringelllcnt by states 
insufficient to justifY abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
245 See Mitchell Bros. Film Corp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852. 860 (5th Ch~ 
1979) (holding that Congress can find that a class of works promotes the useful ,lI'ts with· 
out requiring proof that each work in the class does so). 
246 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897, 900 (2000). 
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formation users at the bargaining table.247 Congress, and individual 
members, did not understand or even agree with the particulars of 
the law adopted. Rather, the legislature brokered a series of deals be-
tween industries and then wrote them into law.248 This is not our ideal 
of policymaking, and it does not fit the Tumer vision of serious con-
gressional consideration of the values at stake. The process was 
probably a good way of allocating copyright ownership as between the 
various contenders (authors, publishers, etc.) who were all repre-
sented, but it was a bad way of defining the scope of copyright against 
other parties.249 This history, and the similar genesis of industry-
sponsored legislation to increase lights in information in years since, 
provides another reason for courts to scrutinize specific assertions of 
rights against information-users with greater care.so 
The Tumer cases suggest that Congress needs credible evidence 
that its copyright law enhances speech. A speech-sensitive analysis 
would make expansions of copyright owners' rights such as the addi-
tion of moral rights to copyright, protection for derivative works, and 
the recent retroactive extension of the copyright term2.51 look highly 
suspect. 
24i See Jessica D. Liunan, Copyrigllt, Compromise. alld Ugislalitl{' Hislory. 72 CoRNELL 
L REv. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Liunan, Compromisr]; sre also Jessica Litman, &,isillg Copy-
right Lmv for the bifonnationAge, 75 OR. L RE\'. 19,22-23 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, &';s-
ing]. 
2~ Sometimes e\'en the industry members who agreed on compromise positions did 
not agree on what those provisions meant. See Liunan, CompromiSl', slIpra note 2·17, at 877, 
887-88. 
249 See ld. at 894-95. 
250 See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Cojl)~ 108 YALE LJ. 1661, 1685-86 (1999). History 
should make \IS particularly leery when a Congress pressured by established media indus-
tries tries to protect them from new media, which have in thc past thrh"ed in the absence 
of specific regulation. See Liunan, Rel.lisillg, slIpra notc 247, at 27-29; sre also [Jollie R«ort/illg 
of Cojl)"igilled Works: Hearillgs before Ihe SlIbC(}IIImittre OIL Collrls, Cit,i/ llbrrlirs, alld IIII' ~\dmilli­
stratioll of Justice of the House Judiciar), Committee. 97th Congo (1982) (testimony of Howard 
'Wayne Olh"er, AFrRA) (testiljing that audio and \ideo tape recording had to be curlailt"tl 
to save mO\ies and TV). New media usually mean new market participants, new voices ami 
new listeners, see Liunan, Rroisi71g. supra note 247, at 29; this connection to the First 
Amendment's diversity-promotion goal should not bc ignored becausc of fears that estab-
lished firms "ill not be able to compete. 
251 Pub. L No. 105-298, 112 St.'lt. 287 (1998) (codificd at scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). See Netanel, supra note 63, at 369; Nimmer, Cojl)'riglll, supra note 16. at 1193 
("[\\'Jhen we consider cop}Tight protection beyond thc lifc e. .. pcctancy of the author's 
children and grandchildren thc balancc between speech and cop}Tight must shift. 111e 
real, if relatively slight, speech interest in e. ... pression remains constant, while the COP}Tighl 
interest in encouraging creathity largely vanishes."). Nimmer's assessment of the balance 
ofincenth"es is probably biased in fiwor of cop}Tight; givcn the prcscnt discounted value of 
the re\'enues that "ill accrue to an author's grandchildren, C\"cn if the coppighl remains 
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CONCLUSION 
Copyright poses a serious First Amendment problem. It restl'icts 
speech pervasively and powerfully, and its contours are ill-defined. Its 
saving grace is that it is better for free speech than its absence woulcl 
be. This article made the First Amendment case against and for copy~ 
right, concluding that copyright is justified as a way for govel'11ment to 
promote a wide range of speech. Nevertheless, copyright's wide~ 
ranging effects on speech require careful balancing so that the needs 
of future creators are not lost in the name of protecting the property 
rights of those who have already spoken. 
The implications of taking market-based and incentive theories 
seriously can justify the Supreme Court's new approach to evaluating 
speech-generating regulations in the Turner cases. Although the Court 
treated must-carry as a free speech issue, not a property ownership 
issue, the Court clearly saw a market opposed to a government regula-
tor rather than a soapbox-pounding speaker fighting Big Brothel~ Ca-
ble operators are not very much like orators or authors in the Roman-
tic sense. They are shopkeepers who price and deliver a product. As 
such, treating must-carry as a problem of potential market failure and 
monopoly made sense. But, because the problem was also a First 
Amendment problem-having appeared after the First Amendment 
became a significant constraint on government action rather than be-
fore, like copyright-the Court applied a higher standard to this mar-
ket regulation than it does when non-speech markets are at issue. 
Like must-carry, copyright is about economics and speech. The 
challenge of reconciling modern constitutional docU"ine on economic 
and social regulation with modern free speech doctrine may be the 
most serious constitutional difficulty of our time. Copyright forces us 
to recognize that government has an essential role to play ill creating 
the conditions for speech. Furthermore, that government role is 
predicated on specific judgments about the value of broad classes of 
speech, and has systematic effects on content and expression. If gov-
ernment intervention and value judgments are inevitable, free speech 
inquiry should not focus on the necessity of government intervention, 
a useless debate, but rather on the kinds of value judgments that are 
acceptable in distinguishing speech that may be prohibited-in copy-
right, infringing speech-from speech that will be protected against 
and by government intervention. 
quite valuable throughout a lengthened term, the incremental inccnth'c to Cl'clItivity of a 
copyright that extends much after an author's death is vanishingly small. 
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The conceptual separation between copyright and free speech 
doctrine stems from a general assumption that speech as free speech 
is not about profit but about politics or self-expression, while people 
using speech as a profitable commodity have no real invesuuent in its 
actual content. Although the reality is that the same words often play 
both roles, a speech claim is created by characterizing words as mat-
ters of private choice, while a copyright claim is created by character-
izing them as salable property. The challenge of modern copyright 
law is to explain how words can be both meaningf"lll and profitable, 
protected speech and protected property. 
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